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Abstract 
Aim: To determine the prevalence and nature of prescribing errors in general practice; to 
explore the causes, and to identify defences against error. 
 
Methods: 1) Systematic reviews; 2) Retrospective review of unique medication items 
prescribed over a 12 month period to a 2% sample of patients from 15 general practices 
in England; 3) Interviews with 34 prescribers regarding 70 potential errors; 15 root cause 
analyses, and six focus groups involving 46 primary health care team members 
 
Results: 
The study involved examination of 6,048 unique prescription items for 1,777 patients. 
Prescribing or monitoring errors were detected for one in eight patients, involving around 
one in 20 of all prescription items.  The vast majority of the errors were of mild to 
moderate severity, with one in 550 items being associated with a severe error.  The 
following factors were associated with increased risk of prescribing or monitoring errors: 
male gender, age less than 15 years or greater than 64 years, number of unique 
medication items prescribed, and being prescribed preparations in the following 
therapeutic areas: cardiovascular, infections, malignant disease and 
immunosuppression, musculoskeletal, eye, ENT and skin.  Prescribing or monitoring 
errors were not associated with the grade of GP or whether prescriptions were issued as 
acute or repeat items. 
A wide range of underlying causes of error were identified relating to the prescriber, 
patient, the team, the working environment, the task, the computer system and the 
primary/secondary care interface. Many defences against error were also identified, 
including strategies employed by individual prescribers and primary care teams, and 
making best use of health information technology. 
Conclusion: Prescribing errors in general practices are common, although severe errors 
are unusual. Many factors increase the risk of error. Strategies for reducing the 
prevalence of error should focus on GP training, continuing professional development for 
GPs, clinical governance, effective use of clinical computer systems, and improving 
safety systems within general practices and at the interface with secondary care.  
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 Glossary 
 
Dispens-IT® Software designed for use in dispensing general practices. 
EMIS  Type of GP computer system supplier. 
Monitoring error A monitoring error occurs when a prescribed medicine is 
not monitored in the way which would be considered 
acceptable in routine general practice.  In our study it is the 
absence of tests, for specific drugs, being carried out at the 
frequency listed in the criteria, with tolerance of +50%. If a 
patient refused to give consent for a test, then this would 
not constitute an error. 
NOMAD® pack A monitored dosage system aimed at helping patients to 
manage their medicine taking. 
Prescribing error A prescribing error occurs when, as a result of a prescribing 
decision or prescription-writing process, there is an 
unintentional, significant: reduction in the probability of 
treatment being timely and effective, or increase in the risk 
of harm when compared to generally accepted practice. 
QSR-N-Vivo® A qualitative data analysis package. 
ScriptSwitch® Prescribing decision support software (with a particular 
emphasis on helping general practices to control their 
prescribing costs). 
SystmOne® A type of GP computer system supplied by the company, 
TPP. 
TPP Type of GP computer system supplier. 
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Executive Summary 
Aim:  
To determine the prevalence and nature of prescribing errors in general practice; to 
explore the causes, and to identify defences against error. 
Objectives: 
 To update a recently completed systematic review of medication errors in primary 
care. 
 To report on a current Cochrane systematic review of interventions in primary 
care aimed at reducing medication-related adverse events. 
 To investigate the prevalence, nature and causes of the prescribing errors made 
by general practitioners. 
 To determine the prevalence, nature and causes of monitoring errors, for 
prescribed medications that require monitoring. 
 To explore whether the prevalence and nature of errors vary according to the 
grade of GP.  
 To explore whether the prevalence and nature of errors vary according to other 
factors including the characteristics of general practices, patients and 
prescriptions. 
 To explore how general practices incorporate information from hospital discharge 
prescriptions and any associated errors. 
 To find out what informal or formal safeguards exist in general practice to protect 
patients against potential harm from prescribing errors. 
 To explore systems that are used, or could be used, to report prescribing errors 
in general practice. 
 To explore what might be unique to general practice culture that might have an 
impact on prescribing error rates and incident reporting. 
 To make recommendations for best practice, and educational interventions to 
reduce prescribing errors in general practice. 
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Systematic review of the prescribing errors in UK general 
practice 
We updated a systematic review that members of our team had published in 2009.  This 
identified one further study, which investigated the prevalence of medication errors in 
care homes in the UK.  
The authors found that 39% of 256 residents had one or more prescribing errors, with 
8.3% of prescriptions (or intended prescriptions) affected.  The most common types of 
prescribing error were “incomplete information” (37.9%), e.g. no strength or route was 
specified; ‘‘unnecessary drug’’ (23.5%), ‘‘dose/strength error’’ (14.4%) and ‘‘omission’’ 
(11.8%).   
Monitoring errors, which were studied in a list of drugs that an expert group had deemed 
to require monitoring, occurred in 27 (18.4%) residents (or in 14.7% of prescriptions for 
these drugs).  Of these 32 monitoring errors, 90.6% were due to a failure in requesting 
monitoring. 
Systematic review of interventions in primary care aimed at 
reducing medication-related adverse events 
We identified 43 studies which satisfied our inclusion criteria, including 20 pharmacist-
led interventions that reported hospital admissions as an outcome; 10 educational 
interventions targeting primary health care professionals that reported preventable drug-
related morbidity as an outcome; and 13 complex interventions that included a 
component of medication review aimed at reducing falls in the elderly (the outcome 
being falls).  Meta-analysis found that pharmacist-led interventions were not effective at 
reducing hospital admissions OR 0.92 (95% CI 0.76, 1.10 n=15) and suspected adverse 
drug events OR 0.65 (95% CI 0.26, 1.59 n=3).  Interventions that included a medicines 
management component to reduce falls in at risk patients did not have significant impact 
(OR 0.93, 95% CI 0.71 to 1.22, n=10).  Pooling the results of studies in the other 
categories failed to demonstrate any significant effect on the main outcomes. 
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Investigating the prevalence and nature of prescribing and 
monitoring errors 
Methods 
Setting:  English general practices. 
Participants:  Fifteen general practices with diverse characteristics from three primary 
care trusts (PCTs). 
Sampling of patient records:  A 2% random sample of patient records in each general 
practice was selected for assessment of prescribing and monitoring errors. 
Data collection:  Data were collected by four pharmacists who were specially trained to 
identify potential errors from GP records.  The pharmacists undertook a retrospective 
review of unique prescriptions issued to patients in the 12 months prior to data 
collection.  They identified any potential prescribing or monitoring errors, having taken 
account of detailed information in patients’ medical records relating to patient 
characteristics, co-morbidities, other medications, allergies and the need for blood test 
monitoring.  The pharmacists also collected data on potential omission errors, and 
medicines reconciliation for patients who had been discharged from hospital during the 
12 month data collection period. 
Error definition:  A prescribing error in this study was defined as follows: “A prescribing 
error occurs when, as a result of a prescribing decision or prescription-writing process, 
there is an unintentional, significant: reduction in the probability of treatment being timely 
and effective, or increase in the risk of harm when compared to generally accepted 
practice.”  
In addition, the following definition was used for a monitoring error: “A monitoring error 
occurs when a prescribed medicine is not monitored in the way which would be 
considered acceptable in routine general practice.  It includes the absence of tests being 
carried out at the frequency listed in the criteria, with tolerance of +50%.  If a patient 
refused to give consent for a test, then this would not constitute an error”. 
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Judgement of potential errors:  The details of all potential errors were discussed by a 
panel (one GP, one clinical pharmacologist and three pharmacists) to decide whether 
they fitted our error definition, and if so, how the error should be classified.  The severity 
of errors identified was judged on a validated 0-10 scale (0=no risk of harm; 10=death) 
by a separate panel (two GPs, two pharmacists and one clinical pharmacologist). 
Data entry:  Data were entered onto a Microsoft Access database and all data entries 
were double checked and corrected where necessary.  
Data analysis:  Descriptive analyses of the prevalence and nature of prescribing and 
monitoring errors were conducted in Stata, Version 11.2, as were modelling analyses of 
the factors associated with error at patient and prescription levels.  Descriptive analysis 
of the severity of errors was conducted in Microsoft Excel and SPSS, Version 16. 
Results 
The mean list size of the 15 general practices was 5,916 (standard deviation: 3,014); ten 
(66.7%) were involved in GP training, and two (13.3%) were dispensing.  
Compared with figures for England the general practices involved in the PRACtICe study 
were similar to other English practices in terms of mean list size, number of GPs, and 
Quality and Outcomes Framework scores.  The general practices involved in the 
PRACtICe study appeared to have higher deprivation levels. 
The study involved examination of the records of 1,777 patients.  These patients had a 
mean age of 39.3 years (standard deviation: 22.7 years) with similar age distribution to 
that of the English population in 2010; 884 (49.8%) were female.  Of the 1,777 patients, 
1,200 (67.5%) had at least one prescription during the 12 month retrospective review of 
their records. 
Collectively, the pharmacists reviewed 6,048 unique prescription items.  Of these, 2,929 
(48.4%) were acute prescriptions; 3,119 (51.6%) were repeat prescriptions, and 770 
(12.7%) were items that were considered to require blood test monitoring.  Most of the 
6,048 prescriptions (4,859; 80.3%) were issued by GP partners, 779 (12.9%) by salaried 
GPs, 185 (3.1%) by locum GPs, and 133 (2.2%) by GPs in training.  
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From the 6,048 prescription items on the database there were the following numbers of 
medication problems: 247 prescribing errors; 55 monitoring errors; 427 examples of sub 
optimal prescribing, and eight legal problems. 
The prevalence of prescribing or monitoring errors for different groups of patients over 
the 12 month data collection period was as follows: 
 
 All patients (n=1,777): 12% (95% CI 10.5%-13.6%) 
 Patients who had received at least one medication (n=1,200): 17.8% (95% CI 15.7%-
20%) 
 Patients aged 75 years and older who had received at least one medication (n=129): 
38% (95% CI 29.5%-46.5%) 
 Patients who had received five or more drugs over the data collection period 
(n=471): 30.1% (95% CI 26.6%-35%) 
 Patients who had received 10 or more drugs over the data collection period (n=172): 
47% (95% CI 39%-54%) 
The percentage prevalence of prescriptions with prescribing or monitoring errors was 
4.9% (95% confidence intervals (CI) 4.4%-5.4%).  The most common types of 
prescribing error were ‘incomplete information on the prescription’ (74; 30.0%); 
‘dose/strength errors’ (44; 17.8%) and incorrect timing of doses (26; 10.5%).  The most 
common type of monitoring error was ‘failure to request monitoring’ (38; 69.1%). 
For the 302 prescribing and monitoring errors, the median severity score was 3.3 
(interquartile range (IQR) 2.2, 4.4; minimum: 0.7; maximum: 8.6).  The 55 monitoring 
errors had a median score of 3.8; the 247 prescribing errors had a lower median score of 
3.0. Overall, 128 (42.4%) errors had scores of less than 3, and were thus deemed to be 
minor; 163 (54.0%) had scores of 3 to 7 and were thus moderate; 11 (3.6%) had scores 
greater than 7 and were thus severe. Thus, one in 550 of all prescriptions (11/6048, 
0.18%) were associated with severe error. 
Modelling of associations between prescribing and monitoring errors (compared with no 
prescribing or monitoring problems) was undertaken at the patient-level and the 
prescription-level using mixed effects logistic regression techniques.  The following 
significant associations were found in the patient-level model: 
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 For each additional unique medication item that the patient had received over the 
course of the 12 month retrospective data collection there was 16% increased risk of 
error (odds ratio 1.16, 95%CI 1.12-1.19, P<0.001) 
 Women were less likely than men to have a prescribing or monitoring error (odds 
ratio 0.66, 95%CI 0.48-0.92, P=0 .013) 
 The following age groups were more likely (than age group 15-64 years) to have a 
prescribing or monitoring error: 
o 0-14, odds ratio 1.87 (95%CI 1.19-2.94, P=0.006) 
o 65-74, odds ratio 1.68 (95%CI 1.04-2.73, P=0.035) 
o ≥ 75, odds ratio 1.95 (95%CI 1.19-3.19, P=0.008) 
 Compared with a list size of 5000-10,000, patients in practices with a list size of 
greater than 10,000 had reduced risk of error: odds ratio 0.56 (95%CI 0.31-0.99, 
P=0.047) 
The following significant associations were found in the prescription-level model: 
 For drugs on the monitoring list there was an increased risk of error (odds ratio 
3.18, P<0.001) 
 For the following drug groups (compared with gastrointestinal drugs) there was 
an increased risk of error: 
o Cardiovascular (odds ratio 2.37, 95%CI 1.03-5.45, P=0.042) 
o Infections (odds ratio 2.67, 95%CI 1.17-6.11, P=0.02) 
o Malignant disease and immunosuppression (odds ratios 6.77, 95%CI 
1.71-26.84, P=0 .006) 
o Musculoskeletal (odds ratio 6.97 95%CI 3.06-15.88, P <0.001) 
o Eye (odds ratio 4.92, 95%CI 1.12-21.62, P=0 .035) 
o ENT odds ratio 4.6, 95%CI 1.29-16.42, P = 0.019) 
o Skin (odds ratio 5.78, 95%CI 2.04-16.36, P = 0.001) 
Thirty-seven cases involving medicines reconciliation at hospital discharge were 
examined in detail.  Prior to admission the 37 patients were taking a total of 194 
medications, and 29 (15%) of these were discontinued by the hospitals.  In 36 patients 
(97%) there was a difference between the medications that the patient was taking before 
admission and those listed in the discharge summary.  According to the hospital 
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discharge communications, the 37 patients were supposed to be taking a total of 252 
medications.  Twenty-six (10.3%) of these involved a change in dose of a drug that the 
patient was taking prior to admission; in none of these cases was the dose change 
highlighted in the discharge communication.  Eighty-seven (34.5%) of the discharge 
medications were newly prescribed and for only seven (8%) of these was the new 
prescription highlighted in the discharge communication.  Following discharge, 24 (28%) 
of the 87 drugs newly prescribed by the hospital were either not continued, or there was 
some discrepancy between the prescribing advice of the hospital and the subsequent 
prescription.  For the medications that had been stopped by the hospitals, none was 
restarted by the practice within a month of hospital discharge. 
 
At the patient level, discrepancies were found between the medicines on the hospital 
discharge communication and those subsequently prescribed by the practices in 16 
patients (43.2%). 
Investigating the causes of prescribing and monitoring errors, 
and identifying solutions for preventing error 
Methods 
We undertook the following: 
 Interviews with prescribers 
 Focus groups with primary health care team members 
 Root cause analyses 
Interviews with prescribers 
Face-to-face interviews were undertaken with 34 prescribers with the aim of exploring 
the causes of prescribing and monitoring errors.  A total of 70 errors were discussed with 
interview participants.  All but two of the interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.  
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Focus groups 
Six focus groups, involving 46 primary health care team members, were held in 
participating general practices across the three PCTs.  The main issues explored in the 
focus groups were: safeguards in general practice to protect patient against potential 
harm; reporting prescribing errors in general practice, and general practice safety 
culture.  All of the focus groups were audio-recorded and transcribed. 
Root cause analyses 
The pharmacists undertook 15 root cause analyses relating to a wide range of different 
types of prescribing and monitoring errors; two examples of suboptimal prescribing, and 
one case that was judged not to be an error. 
Qualitative data analysis 
Data analysis aimed to identify major themes from the interviews and focus groups.  A 
robust and complete analysis was carried out using the framework provided by Reason’s 
Accident Causation Model.  A ‘conceptual framework’ was developed, by which the raw 
data could be labelled and sorted.  A workable list of main- and sub-themes was 
developed and applied systematically to the whole data set with the aid of the 
computerised qualitative data analysis software QSR N-Vivo version 8.0.  The index was 
then mapped to the categories outlined in Reason’s Accident Causation Model, and the 
coded data were then sorted and synthesised by grouping data with similar content 
together under the different themes and sub-themes.  
Researchers made sense of the data by looking at particular themes across all practices 
in order to understand the range of views and experiences of interviewees.  The 
researchers began to build explanations for the recurring patterns and associations in 
the data.  This process involved interrogating the dataset as a whole to identify linkages 
between sets of phenomena and exploring why such linkages occurred. 
Causes of prescribing and monitoring errors: error producing conditions 
Seven categories of error-producing condition (perceived to contribute to an increased 
risk of prescribing and monitoring errors) were described and explored in-depth.  The 
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main findings presented for each high-level condition were as follows: 
The Prescriber - five conditions were found to affect ‘The Prescriber’, namely their 
therapeutic training, drug knowledge and experience, knowledge of the patient, 
perception of risk, and physical and emotional health.  Undergraduate therapeutic 
training was felt by many to have been insufficiently taught at University. The “jump” 
from being a GP trainee to a salaried GP was also perceived to have been quite high.  
One example, in particular, emphasised not only the importance of hands-on experience 
with chronic disease patients during GP (vocational training scheme) training, but also 
the need for trainees to have experience treating a range of patients at varying stages of 
their illnesses.  Some established GPs admitted becoming ‘slightly blasé’ about 
prescribing for their long-term patients, thus running the risk of overlooking certain 
things.  Prescribers’ perception of risk appeared to be influenced by previous experience 
of a similar situation and the severity of potential harm associated with the drug.  
The Patient - patient characteristics (including personality, literacy issues, and language 
barrier) and the complexity of the individual case were found to have contributed to 
prescribing errors.  Some particular examples highlighted a tension between the GP’s 
responsibility to improve or maintain their patient’s health, and their view on the patient's 
responsibilities for their own health. 
The Team - poor communication and nurses’ quasi-autonomous role within the team 
were considered to be two key conditions influencing the occurrence of prescribing 
errors in general practice.  The communication between practice colleagues appeared to 
vary widely, with some feeling isolated whilst others felt very close and supported by 
their colleagues.  Two important factors may explain these different GPs’ perspectives, 
including the length of time the GP had been working in the practice and the frequency 
of formal / informal meetings within the practice.   
Nurses’ ‘quasi-autonomous role’ in chronic disease management was felt to be 
associated with an increased risk of prescribing errors in general practice, particularly 
because of the need to interrupt GPs to have prescriptions signed when the patient had 
not been assessed by the GP.   
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The Working Environment – High workload, time pressures and associated stress 
were felt to be important factors making error almost inevitable. The failure of 
appointment systems to cope with patient demand was perceived as a particular source 
of stress. Distractions and interruptions were common for some GPs and thought to be 
an important cause of error because of their effects on disrupting prescribers’ thought 
processes. 
The Task – We focused on repeat prescribing systems and patient monitoring. Some 
safety issues were identified in the ordering and processing stage of repeat prescribing, 
but failure to properly review some patients was probably the most important cause of 
error. General practices had various systems aimed at ensuring timely blood-test 
monitoring for patients, but sometimes these broke down. The most important problem 
identified was in a practice where GPs prescribed warfarin without access to INR results. 
The Computer System – There were many positive comments about the role of clinical 
computer systems in preventing error, but some problems were highlighted including 
selecting the wrong drug or wrong dosage instructions from pick lists; overriding 
important drug-drug interaction alerts; unnecessary/inappropriate alerts; the need to 
maintain an accurate electronic health record, and staff sometimes expecting too much 
from the computer system. 
The Primary Secondary Care Interface - The quality of secondary care 
correspondence appeared to vary a lot, depending on the hospital and department. The 
ambiguous wording of hospital letters was also felt to be partly responsible for the failure 
of some GPs to make changes recommended by specialists.  GPs recognised the need 
to update their patients’ computer records promptly with hospital information (once 
received), and individual practices’ processes to be in place verifying that these changes 
have been made.  Three important factors appeared to influence GPs’ decisions to 
prescribe medications recommended by specialists, including local guidance, whether 
the drugs were commonly used in general practice, and whether the GP perceived the 
harms to outweigh the benefits for the patient. 
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Root cause analyses 
Fifteen root cause analyses were undertaken, covering a wide range of different types of 
prescribing and monitoring errors, along with two cases that were judged to represent 
sub-optimal prescribing and one that was subsequently judged to be not an error.  
A number of error producing conditions were identified from the root cause analyses, 
which broadly mapped upon those identified from the interviews and focus groups. 
Defences 
On the basis of the interviews and focus groups, defences against medication errors in 
general practice have been identified at multiple stages in the medicines management 
process: 
 Issuing new prescriptions 
 Supporting patient decision making 
 Dispensing prescriptions 
 Repeat prescribing 
 Monitoring patients 
 Amending prescriptions based on outside correspondence 
 Processes supporting medicines management. 
These defences have been grouped as: 
 Personal prescriber strategies 
 Practice-wide strategies 
 Health Information Technology (HIT) strategies. 
Key personal prescriber strategies include: 
 Read aloud printed prescriptions to help ensure patient understanding and to 
allow the prescriber to check the accuracy of the prescription 
 Clarify prescribing recommendations made by specialists where these go beyond 
the GP’s comfort zone 
 Review newly prescribed medicines within six weeks 
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 Add medicines to the repeat list only when patients are stable on them 
 Confirm important information with patients even when they are well known to the 
prescriber 
 Ensure that prescribers are competent to use all of the important features of e-
prescribing and other IT-support systems. 
Key practice-wide strategies include: 
 Adopt a formulary to increase familiarity with medicines prescribed 
 Strongly discourage verbal requests for repeat prescriptions 
 Train non-medical staff to manage requests for non-repeat prescriptions and 
consider using dedicated staff to manage repeat prescriptions, with additional 
staff trained as back-up 
 Highlight repeat prescriptions with queries so they receive more attention when 
considered for signing off by GPs and other prescribers 
 Perform face-to-face medication reviews 
 Check INR results before generating repeat prescriptions for warfarin 
 Do not delegate responsibility for difficult patients to junior or locum GPs 
 Schedule necessary blood tests for one week before medication reviews 
 Update prescribing records as soon as possible (within 48 hours) of receiving 
correspondence from specialists 
 Clarify prescribing changes with specialists if correspondence not available 
 Build and maintain a strong safety culture based on open, blame-free, 
communication 
 Appoint a prescribing lead for each practice to lead on protocol reviews and best 
prescribing-practice. 
Secondary care strategies 
 Ensure specialists’ correspondence highlights new medicines, changes to 
medicines and reasons for changes 
 Ensure specialists’ requests for unusual medicines state duration, key adverse 
effects, and monitoring requirements 
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Key Health Information Technology strategies include: 
 Code allergies in electronic clinical records 
 For high risk medicines: programme robust alerts to highlight risky prescribing; 
block inappropriate medication request intervals; automatically insert weekly 
dosage instructions for methotrexate 
 Provide on-line access to clinical/medicines information resources, linking directly 
from clinical computer systems 
 Embed an electronic-formulary within the e-prescribing system 
 Use the electronic-formulary to guide prescribing to safer alternatives  
 Avoid similar drug names being adjacent in pick-lists  
 Allow drug interaction alerts with severity gradings and brief descriptions of the 
problems associated with specific interactions 
 For general practices using the EMIS computer system, use ‘practice notes’ to 
improve communication and provide an audit trail for unauthorised repeat 
prescribing requests, errors, and new prescribing information 
 Run searches on clinical records system to identify potential prescribing errors, 
and patients requiring blood-test monitoring 
 Programme computer to alert when patients taking warfarin go 12 weeks or 
longer since their last INR test  
 Use screen alerts and repeat prescribing dates to highlight need for monitoring 
 Amend e-prescribing records if accepting community pharmacists’ interventions 
 Familiarise locums with health information technologies available in practices 
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Recommendations 
A number of recommendations have emerged from this study for reducing the 
prevalence of prescribing errors in general practice and these are outlined below. 
 
 
1) GP training 
 
Many of the types of error identified in the PRACtICe Study could have been prevented 
with better training in safe prescribing in general practice. We recommend that the GMC 
discuss the outcomes of this research with those organisations with a remit for quality 
assurance (including other professional and systems regulators), patient safety and the 
provision of medical education and training. Where appropriate, this would include the 
RCGP and General Pharmaceutical Council. We recommend that discussions focus on 
ways of strengthening training in, and assessment of, safe prescribing and medicines 
management.  Options include: 
 
 Reviewing the RCGP curriculum to give greater prominence to therapeutic 
knowledge, and the skills and attitudes needed for safe prescribing 
 Development of an educational package to enable GPs in training to assess the 
safety of their prescribing (e.g. by structured examination of, and reflection on, a 
sample of their prescription items) 
 Development of an educational package to help GPs in training (and established 
GPs) to improve their knowledge and skills in undertaking structured medication 
reviews with the aim of identifying and correcting important prescribing and 
monitoring errors 
 Making available within the RCGP Trainee ePortfolio a facility to enable GP 
associates in training to record educational activities, audits, and reflections 
specifically relating to prescribing 
 Including in the RCGP membership examination, assessments of prescribing 
competence, such as the ability to write error-free prescriptions and to detect, and 
correct, errors when undertaking simulated medication reviews 
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 Additional educational support for newly qualified GPs to help them make the 
transition to providing on-going medicines management for patients with complex 
long-term conditions. 
 
2) Continuing professional development for GPs 
 
Many of the types of error identified in the PRACtICe Study could have been prevented 
with greater attention to safe prescribing in the continuing professional development of 
GPs. Some of the recommendations made above for GP training may be relevant to 
established GPs. In addition, we recommend that the GMC discuss the outcomes of this 
research with those organisations with a remit for quality assurance (including other 
professional and systems regulators), patient safety and the provision of medical 
education and training. Where appropriate, this would include the RCGP and General 
Pharmaceutical Council. We recommend that discussions centre on the following 
options for continuing professional development: 
 
 Development of an educational package highlighting key learning points from the 
PRACtICe Study to support reflection and, where appropriate, for use in identifying 
GPs’ personal development needs 
 Development of strategies to support GPs in dealing appropriately with high-risk 
prescribing scenarios (balancing risks, benefits, patient requests and the need to 
avoid error) 
 Development of strategies to help GPs make best use of information technology to 
support safe prescribing 
 Development of strategies for improving prescribing safety systems in general 
practices. 
 
3) Clinical governance 
 
Many of the types of problem identified in the PRACtICe Study could have been 
identified and corrected using appropriate clinical governance procedures, particularly in 
relation to hazardous prescribing and failure to undertake timely blood test monitoring for 
certain drugs. We recommend that the GMC discuss the outcomes of this research with 
those organisations with a remit for quality assurance (including other professional and 
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systems regulators), patient safety and the provision of medical education and training. 
Where appropriate, this would include the RCGP and General Pharmaceutical Council. 
We recommend that discussions centre on promoting the following clinical governance 
methods to identify, correct and report prescribing errors: 
 
 Conducting audits using prescribing safety indicators50 and correcting problems 
identified using evidence-based approaches (such as support from pharmacists, as 
demonstrated in the PINCER trial34 
 Conducting significant event audits 
 Reporting adverse prescribing events (and near misses) through the National 
Reporting and Learning System 
 
4) Effective use of clinical computer systems 
 
General practice clinical computer systems contain a number of features aimed at 
improving the safety of prescribing. As noted above, we recommend that general 
practices develop strategies to ensure that they make best use of the safety features 
that are already present on their systems. 
 
In addition, we recommend that the GMC discuss the outcomes of this research with 
those organisations with a remit for quality assurance (including other professional and 
systems regulators), patient safety and the provision of medical education and training. 
Where appropriate, this would include the RCGP and General Pharmaceutical Council. 
We recommend that discussions centre on whether improvements can be made in the 
following areas: 
 
 The training of GPs and practice staff so that they are able to make best use of 
prescribing safety features 
 The use of pre-specified “order sentences” to encourage prescribers to provide 
appropriate dosage instructions 
 Context-specific dosage guidance taking account of patient factors such as age and 
renal function 
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 Alerts to the most common and important examples of hazardous prescribing (in 
addition to drug-drug interaction alerts which are present on all GP clinical computer 
systems in the UK) 
 Alerts to the need for blood test monitoring for certain drugs 
 
5) Improving safety systems 
 
General practices vary in the systems they use to support safe medicines management 
within the practice and at interfaces in health care (such as community pharmacy, 
community nursing, care homes and secondary care). We recommend that the GMC 
discuss the outcomes of this research with those organisations with a remit for quality 
assurance (including other professional and systems regulators), patient safety and the 
provision of medical education and training. Where appropriate, this would include the 
RCGP and General Pharmaceutical Council. Specifically, we recommend that 
discussions focus on the following proposals:  
 
 General practices review the procedures they have in place for repeat prescribing, 
medication monitoring, medication reviews and communication at interfaces in health 
care to help ensure that these are as safe as possible in the context of high workload 
and multiple competing demands on staff 
 Primary care organisations, general practices, community pharmacies and acute 
trusts take account of recommendations for managing patients’ medicines after 
discharge from hospital, such as those issued in England by the Care Quality 
Commission39 
 General practices review the procedures they have in place for minimising 
interruptions to clinical staff  
 Further research is commissioned to establish the organisational policies, 
procedures and practices that help to ensure safe medicines management in primary 
care. 
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Conclusions 
From a 12-month retrospective review of the records of a 2% random sample of patients 
from 15 general practices in England, prescribing or monitoring errors were detected for 
one in eight patients, involving around one in 20 of all prescription items.  The vast 
majority of these errors were of mild to moderate severity, with one in 550 items being 
associated with a severe error.  The following factors were associated with increased 
risk of prescribing or monitoring errors: male gender, age less than 15 years or greater 
than 64 years, number of unique medication items prescribed, and being prescribed 
preparations in the following therapeutic areas: cardiovascular, infections, malignant 
disease and immunosuppression, musculoskeletal, eye, ENT and skin.  Prescribing or 
monitoring errors were not associated with the grade of GP or whether prescriptions 
were issued as acute or repeat items. 
On the basis of interviews with prescribers, focus groups with general practice staff and 
root cause analyses, a number of important error producing conditions, and defences 
against error, were identified.  Error producing conditions were associated with a wide 
variety of factors concerning the prescriber (therapeutic training, therapeutic knowledge 
and experience, knowledge of the patient, perception of risk, and physical and emotional 
health); the patient (including personality, engagement with health services, literacy and 
language issues); the team (including communication problems, interruptions, and the 
‘quasi-autonomous’ role of nurses); the task; the work environment, the computer 
system, and the primary-secondary care interface (significant problems were highlighted 
concerning correspondence about medications particularly at the time of hospital 
discharge). 
The deployment of a wide range of defences against error were identified in relation to 
the multiple stages of the medicines management process.  These defences include 
strategies that can be used by individual prescribers, practice wide strategies, and the 
effective use of health information technology. 
 
As a result of this study a number of recommendations have been made in relation to 
GP training, continuing professional development, clinical governance, the effective use 
of clinical computers, and improving systems to support safe medicines management. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The prescribing of medicines is an essential skill required by doctors.  For every 
prescribing decision the potential for benefit needs to be balanced against the risk of 
harm.  The prescriber must use clinical knowledge and improvisational skills to apply a 
body of rules (e.g. contra-indications, risk factors) to a specific prescribing decision.  The 
challenge of prescribing has increased as new drugs are developed, and older and more 
severely ill patients are treated1. 
The prescription of drugs is the most common form of treatment and errors that occur in 
the prescribing process have the potential to cause significant morbidity and mortality.  
Over 900 million items are dispensed in the community in England each year2.  
However, mistakes happen in the prescription of these medicines.  In primary care, 
reported prescribing error rates vary from less than 1%3 to over 40%4, the later being a 
study conducted in Sweden, where failure to report the indication for a drug was 
considered an error.  This variation in error rates is likely to be significantly affected by 
the definition of error used and the rigour with which detection of error is undertaken.  
Prescribing errors are a potentially preventable source of harm to patients and are 
therefore an important target for improvement.  
There is relatively little known about prescribing errors in general practice in the UK. In 
one study, prescriptions presented to pharmacies were screened for prescribing errors 
by community pharmacists; prescribing errors were identified in 7.5% of prescribed 
items5.  Most of the errors identified in this study were administrative ones but some 
were serious.  Another study (which will be described in more detail in Chapter 2) 
conducted in care homes showed that 39% of 256 residents had one or more 
prescribing errors, with 8.3% of prescriptions (or intended prescriptions) affected6.  
Furthermore, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) has reported that 26% of the 
general practice incidents that were reported to the National Reporting and Learning 
Service (NRLS) were related to medications7.  The National Clinical Assessment Service 
(NCAS) recently reported that over the previous eight years, 34% of their referrals have 
been concerning general medical practice.  However, there is little evidence about the 
prevalence or causes of prescription errors in this area.  Figures published by the 
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Medical Defence Union in 2000 indicated that 25% of adverse incidents that resulted in 
litigation claims in general practice were a result of medication errors, suggesting not 
only a implication for patient safety but an adverse impact on practitioners8.  
There have been relatively few large-scale studies of prescribing errors in general 
practice, or detailed investigation of underlying causes and defences.  
The accident causation model and prescribing errors 
We have previously used Reason’s accident causation model9 to analyse the causes of 
prescribing and administration errors in both primary and secondary care.  Briefly, 
according to this model, ‘latent’ failures within the system, and error-producing 
conditions within the environment, lead to active failures on the part of the person at the 
‘sharp end’ of a system – the prescriber, in the case of prescribing errors.  Active failures 
can be sub-divided into mistakes (selecting the wrong plan to achieve the desired goal), 
slips (intending to do one thing, but doing another), lapses (forgetting to do something) 
or violations (not following the rules).  Defences in the system may, or may not, identify 
an error and rectify it before it results in harm.  Prescribing errors are typically of two 
types.  Firstly, they can occur during the application of clinical knowledge to the 
individual patient in order to reach a prescribing decision; these are likely to be 
knowledge or rule-based mistakes.  Secondly, errors can occur during the process of 
converting the prescribing decision into a prescription.  These prescription writing errors 
are likely to be slips and lapses. 
Contributing factors may include lack of training or environmental, team, technology or 
task factors that affect performance of the prescriber.  These in turn arise owing to the 
‘latent’ conditions that are brought about by wider social factors, such as organisational, 
cultural or professional norms. 
1.1 Aim:  
To determine the prevalence and nature of prescribing errors in general practice; to 
explore the causes, and to identify defences against error. 
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1.2 Objectives: 
 To update a recently completed systematic review of medication errors in primary 
care. 
 To report on a current Cochrane systematic review of interventions in primary 
care aimed at reducing medication-related adverse events. 
 To investigate the prevalence, nature and causes of the prescribing errors made 
by general practitioners. 
 To determine the prevalence, nature and causes of monitoring errors, for 
prescribed medications that require monitoring. 
 To explore whether the prevalence and nature of errors vary according to the 
grade of GP.  
 To explore whether the prevalence and nature of errors vary according other 
factors including the characteristics of general practices, patients and 
prescriptions. 
 To explore how general practices incorporate information from hospital discharge 
prescriptions and any associated errors. 
 To find out what informal or formal safeguards exist in general practice to protect 
patients against potential harm from prescribing errors. 
 To explore systems that are used, or could be used, to report prescribing errors 
in general practice. 
 To explore what might be unique to general practice culture that might have an 
impact on prescribing error rates and incident reporting. 
 To make recommendations for best practice and educational interventions to 
reduce prescribing errors in general practice.   
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Chapter 2: Defining prescribing error in primary care 
2.1 Background 
The definition of medication error has long been a contentious issue, with different 
definitions used by different groups.  For example, a recent systematic review of 
medication error definitions and characteristics found 26 different wordings for a generic 
definition of a medication error10.  Such variation makes it difficult to make comparisons 
within and between studies. 
When conducting research into the prevalence or incidence of specific types of 
medication error, detailed operational definitions are required to clarify what should be 
included, and excluded as an error.  When embarking on a major study of prescribing 
errors in a UK hospital over a decade ago11, we reviewed the definitions of prescribing 
error that had been used in studies of prescribing errors published at the time, and found 
them frequently ambiguous or not stated.  Even where definitions were given, they 
varied widely, and generally included insufficient detail for operational use in a 
quantitative study.  We therefore used a Delphi group to develop and validate an 
operational definition of a prescribing error for research use11, which is now widely used.  
Our definition was published in 2000, and was developed largely with hospital practice in 
mind.  Here we now review this definition in the light of the subsequent literature, and 
our experience of using it in a large number of studies, including in UK primary care in 
the present study.  First, however, we comment on the challenges in defining error.  
2.2 The challenge of defining error 
Whether or not an act is an error is a value judgement, and as such it is subjective and 
contestable.  Any attempt to make a ‘scientific’ definition – one based entirely on 
scientific facts, such as the interaction of a drug with a receptor – will inevitably fail 
because, as Aristotle pointed out, the worlds of facts and values are different.  
Definitions of error therefore use (or imply) words that include value judgments: ‘failure’, 
‘(in)appropriate’, ‘should’, ‘right’ etc.  The less these words are explained or 
operationalised, the more variability there will be in their interpretation.  ‘Error’ needs to 
be unpicked so that there is a greater understanding of the values that constitute it; not 
least in recognising the social, cultural and organisational norms that are embedded in it. 
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We need to find a useful level of explication in the language of errors – not so general as 
to allow wildly different interpretations, yet not so detailed as to become unusable.  We 
need a definition of error that recognises the different contexts and cultures of care – 
one that applies equally in the intensive care unit of a well-funded teaching hospital in 
the West, in a military field hospital and in a hospital in a poor country.  The art in the 
definition of error is to give enough information to help people apply the rules in the real 
world, without trying to define all possible situations. 
We next highlight three important points in relation to error definitions.   
First, an error definition should be appropriate for the purpose for which it is intended.  
For example, a definition of an error to inform staff of what needs to be reported on an 
organisation’s incident report system is likely to differ in scope and detail to a definition 
used in a quantitative research study of error rates.  Hence when Yu12 looked at 
variation in terminology and definitions given by key organisations’ websites, this 
research ended up relating to setting the scope of policy and practice, rather than, for 
example finding operational definitions. 
Second, definition is not the same as classification.  Several researchers have attempted 
to use our list of examples11 of what should, and should not, be included as errors, as a 
classification system.  This is not the purpose for which they were intended.  Definition 
comes first, and classification comes next.  Having agreed those events that should be 
included as error, classifications may then be of several types, depending on the 
purpose of the classification.  Examples include classification in terms of clinical 
consequences, potential clinical importance, psychological cause of the error, and type 
of discrepancy (e.g. wrong drug, wrong dose).  It may be appropriate to classify in 
several ways within the same study in order to describe the errors in a meaningful way, 
and one approach should not necessary exclude the others.  
Third, the literature is potentially confusing, as some authors use different words to use 
the same thing, and/or the same words to mean different things.  In the past, since most 
research focused on medication administration errors, rather than other types of error, 
the term “medication error” has been used to mean “medication administration error”13-15, 
and thus many definitions of a “medication error” have been only of medication 
administration errors.  The context of the research question and methods usually make it 
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clear that the definition just refers to administration.  Other commentators have not 
recognised this and have therefore criticised such definitions as being restrictive10.  
2.3 Our definition of a prescribing error 
Our definition of a prescribing error11 was developed following a Delphi process with 34 
judges, comprising physicians, surgeons, pharmacists, nurses and risk managers.  The 
definition is: “A clinically meaningful prescribing error occurs when, as a result of a 
prescribing decision or prescription writing process, there is an unintentional significant  
 reduction in the probability of treatment being timely and effective or  
 increase in the risk of harm when compared with generally accepted practice”. 
This definition is accompanied by lists of 27 situations that should be included as 
prescribing errors, eight that should not, and seven for which the judgement will depend 
on the individual clinical situation.  These scenarios were not intended to be exhaustive, 
but to provide some clarity on examples of potentially contentious cases in order to help 
decide whether these should be included or excluded as errors. 
Some key points associated with our definition: 
 “unintentional” – this is intended to exclude risk of harm due to malicious acts 
 “compared with generally accepted practice” – this is included as belief in 
preventability depends on it being referenced to generally accepted practice.  
Some authors set extremely high standards for practice which result in a plethora 
of ‘errors’, which have no credibility to practitioners or policy makers, so are not 
an effective tool for change.  For example we could (theoretically) avoid all cases 
of penicillin allergy by never using drugs with a penicillin structure in penicillin-
naive patients.  However, accepted practice is to use penicillin and so according 
to our definition, prescribing penicillin in a patient with no history of allergy would 
not be considered an error provided it was otherwise an appropriate choice of 
drug. 
 “significant” – this word was included for three reasons: (1) it was considered 
important to differentiate between clinically meaningful prescribing errors and 
those cases where some optimisation of treatment was possible but where a 
prescribing error could not be said to have occurred; (2) it was recognised that 
  7 
cognitive errors could occur in the prescribing process without there being any 
adverse consequences for the patient.  For example, a doctor may prescribe 
drug X instead of the intended drug Y, but if both are equally safe and effective 
then the cognitive error is not clinically important.  It was therefore considered 
that the word “significant” was necessary, and that the definition should apply to 
“clinically meaningful” prescribing errors; (3) to ensure that any research findings 
would be thought of as relevant and worthy of addressing. 
2.4 Critiques of our definition 
Although our definition is widely used, there have been a small number of critiques of it 
since it was published.  
First, it has been suggested that developing definitions using consensus-based methods 
such as the Delphi technique is flawed16, 17, 18, being caricatured as definition by 
committee.  However, we disagree, as we believe it is vital that results are credible to 
practitioners so they take them seriously, and so that findings can be a drive towards 
action.  By creating a consensus of professionals we provide validity to our definition.  
We were concerned that otherwise, definitions would lack face validity to many 
prescribers, such as Betz and Levy’s19 definition which includes ‘prescribing a 
medication without sufficient education of the patient’ as a prescribing error.  In 
particular, the Delphi technique was specifically used to eliminate many of the problems 
commonly associated with committee-based decision making, since our group did not 
meet in person and thus dominance by one or more individuals, and concerns about 
‘raising one’s head above the parapet’ were not an issue. 
Second, our inclusion of only “clinically meaningful” prescribing errors has been 
criticised, on the basis that the occurrence of any error may indicate a weakness in the 
system, and that an error which does not harm the individual patient concerned may 
harm others17.  We agree with both of these points, and contrary to suggestions in the 
literature18, our definition does not exclude non-harm errors. 
Third, Ferner and Aronson17 have commented that comparing to “generally accepted 
practice” may not be appropriate, if generally accepted practice is poor.  This was 
something we considered in our original definition work, and included it as it was found 
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that a comparator was needed within the definition as “reduction” and “increase” implied 
a baseline.  Ferner and Aronson instead suggest that an “attainable standard” should be 
used instead, but without specifying what that attainable standard should be, nor in what 
settings, by whom and under which conditions the standard should be attainable.  In our 
definitions paper11, failures to adhere to standards such as hospital or national 
guidelines, or the drug’s product licence, were not considered errors by the Delphi 
group.  This calls into question the validity of prescribing error studies that define errors 
based on deviations from such standards and highlights the complexities of medical 
decision making.  We discuss some of these issues further, later in this chapter. 
Finally, Ferner16 questioned whether our definition would be taken up widely by others, 
citing a survey of adverse event reporting in 132 intensive care units, showing that many 
different definitions are used20.  However, adverse drug events and prescribing errors 
are not synonymous, and the purposes of self reporting and research are different, and 
so we would not expect to see our definition used in this context.  Instead, a recent 
systematic review of studies presenting the incidence or prevalence of prescribing errors 
in handwritten inpatient medication orders revealed that 11 of 65 included studies used 
our definition21; no other definition was quoted as frequently and the majority of other 
studies either used their own definition or did not give any definition at all.  A recent 
search (August 2011) on Web of Science reveals 73 citations of our original paper.   
We next consider in more detail some practical aspects of defining prescribing error in 
research studies, and how these were applied in the present study. 
2.5 Reflections on defining error in practice 
First, we have found that an evolving list of what we have termed “case law” is needed, 
in addition to the definition itself.  This case law is initially based on the published list of 
examples of what should, and should not, be included as an error.  However additional 
case law tends to be needed as a study evolves.  In most studies we have therefore 
used an adjudication panel, and draw up case law for the study in question as we go 
along22.  This was the approach taken in the present study. 
Second, it may be necessary to consider and define the boundary of the system.  For 
example, is a community pharmacist - who “translates” a GP’s Latin abbreviations for the 
  9 
patient - part of the system, or are they in receipt of a prescribing error?  And in a 
hospital in which an admissions pharmacist is often relied upon to ascertain the patient’s 
drug history, is it a prescribing error if the admitting doctor does not prescribe the 
patient’s usual medication correctly on admission?  Assumptions and expectations are 
inevitable, and it is important to make these as explicit and standard as possible within a 
particular study.  This is discussed in more detail later on in relation to the present study.  
Third, it is important to be aware that the definition of what is, and is not, an error can be 
date-specific as a result of developments in clinical knowledge.  For example, use of 
COX-II inhibitors would have considered appropriate in many patient groups several 
years ago.  Now, however, prescribing a COX-II in a patient with a risk of cardiovascular 
disease would probably be judged as being an error.  Similarly, until recently, it was 
recommended that women taking the combined oral contraceptive pill would require 
additional contraception if prescribed a broad spectrum antibiotic, and so prescribing 
such an antibiotic without advising accordingly would be considered an error.  However 
this advice has now been rescinded and so prescribing a non-enzyme inducing antibiotic 
would not be an error.  This raises the issue of how such issues should be dealt with in 
an error study which includes prescribing that was initiated in the past.  For any given 
study, clear guidelines are needed to explain how this will be addressed.  For the 
present study, we decided whether or not something should be counted as an error 
based on the information that would have been available at the time of the relevant 
prescription. 
Fourth, we have found that a reduction in the probability of treatment being “timely and 
effective” can be difficult to identify.  In practice, we have included underdosing of 
antimicrobial agents to be an error, as this might be expected to lead to a treatment 
being less effective, as well as increasing the risk of societal harm due to an increase in 
antimicrobial resistance.  However, underdosing for a condition that is not serious and 
where failure to prescribe the recommended dose is unlikely to have a deleterious effect 
on the patient, was generally not considered an error in the present study. 
Fifth, we have found that prescribing error and documentation are linked, particularly in 
studies where investigators are retrospectively assessing prescriptions and medical 
records.  For example, if a contra-indicated drug, such as a combined hormonal 
contraceptive in a patient with two or more risk factors for thromboembolism, is 
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prescribed with a clear and defensible justification documented, this would not be a 
prescribing error.  However, if no such reasoning is documented, a prescribing error 
would be assumed to have occurred. 
Finally, sometimes there are cases where a lack of information makes it impossible to 
make a valid judgement on whether or not an error has taken place.  In such cases, no 
error should be recorded, and it may also be appropriate to take such cases out of the 
denominator when calculating incidence or prevalence. 
2.6 Specific issues in primary care 
As well as these general issues, the present study highlighted additional specific points 
relating to primary care. 
First, as mentioned above, we have to consider the role of the community pharmacist (or 
dispenser in a dispensing practice), who we assumed would generally “translate” 
instructions to make them meaningful to the patient.  For example, a doctor might 
prescribe metolazone “2.5mg each morning”, which necessitates giving half of a 5mg 
tablet.  A patient could potentially be confused by the instructions to take “2.5mg”.  
However it is reasonable to assume that the dispensing pharmacist will translate this into 
“half a tablet”.  The same applies for the use of Latin abbreviations such as “OD” to 
mean once daily, or prescription of rectal medication as “take one suppository daily”.  
We therefore decided not to include the prescription of brief or abbreviated instructions 
as errors.  However, we recognise that in other contexts, where instructions from the 
prescriber are automatically produced verbatim on the dispensing label (such as with the 
Electronic Prescription Service Release 2), this correction may not always take place.  
For the present study however, we felt that a consistent rule was needed.  For cases 
that involved potential duplication, such as the prescription of both co-dydramol and 
paracetamol, we did count these as errors unless the prescriber clearly stated that they 
should not be taken together.  Although a dispensing pharmacist should include 
appropriate instructions not to take both at the same time, and to remain within a 
maximum of 8 tablets a day of the two combined, it could not be assumed that the two 
prescriptions would be taken to the same pharmacy if written at different times, and thus 
a pharmacist might not identify the duplication.  
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Second, in primary care, we have to consider how to handle items left on repeat 
prescription but not actually requested by the patient.  We were looking only at issued 
prescriptions in the present study, so did not include these cases as errors.  However, 
we recognise that there may be a risk of harm if the patient or carer does request these 
items, and if this request is processed. 
Third, where there was a lack of specific information about dosage instructions and/or 
route of administration, we had to take into account the patient’s likely behaviour, or that 
of a carer.  For example, if a prescription for eye drops did not specify which eye, we did 
not classify this as a prescribing error if this was for a symptomatic condition, since 
patients would be likely to know which eye was painful or infected.  However for drugs 
which were to treat an underlying, potentially asymptomatic, condition such as 
glaucoma, we did judge this as an error. This judgement also depended on the risks 
associated with the drug.  For example, potent topical corticosteroids which did not have 
specific instructions about where to be applied, and how often were counted as errors.  
For medication which is provided with a detailed patient information leaflet and only one 
main indication / administration schedule, and/or is available over-the-counter for the 
relevant indication, such as GTN tablets and paediatric paracetamol suspension, an 
error was not counted if it was felt that the dosage instructions provided on the 
packaging would sufficiently inform the patient.  Another example is the oral 
contraceptive pill, which comes with detailed instructions and is presented as a calendar 
pack clearly showing that one tablet is to be taken daily.  A prescription for “take as 
directed” was therefore not included as a prescribing error.  Similarly, where medication 
was prescribed without stating the number of tablets to be taken each time, e.g. 
furosemide tablets 40mg “once daily”, provided the default dose of taking one 
tablet/capsule each time would be an appropriate dose, this was not counted as an 
error.  Very high risk drugs, and/or those where a wide range of doses are likely, such as 
oral corticosteroids, were judged as errors if the dosage instructions were unclear. 
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Chapter 3: Systematic reviews 
We performed two systematic reviews.  The first was an update of a review published in 
2009 which included 27 studies, focused on the UK literature, and examined studies 
relating to errors at each point in the medicines management process from a primary 
care perspective23.  The second was an update of an international review published in 
2006 of interventions in primary care aimed at reducing medication related adverse 
events and hospital admissions24. 
3.1 Update of systematic review of medication errors in UK 
primary care 
3.1.1 Background 
In 2009, Garfield and colleagues23 reviewed the UK literature to identify medication 
errors and describe them using a ‘systems approach’.  The authors mapped the 
medication errors in primary care and assessed the quality and reliability of the whole 
medicines system at each stage of medication usage.  Quality and reliability of the 
system were determined by the prevalence of: prescribing and other medication errors, 
patients’ non-adherence, and failures in drug effectiveness.  
The study identified several quality issues at every stage of the process.  In particular, 
error rates of 50% or more were identified in areas which included repeat prescribing, 
communication and patient adherence.  Furthermore, it was found that some areas of 
the system seemed to lack research, i.e. assessment of the accuracy of GP medication 
records; it was also concluded that research in areas such as repeat prescribing needed 
updating.  Of particular relevance to the present study, only one study of prescribing 
errors in general practice was identified, with an error rate of 7.46% of prescribed items, 
and one study of medication review, which showed that 72% of patients had not had 
their medication reviewed within 15 months.  
Several methodological issues were identified within the literature explored; some 
studies were not able to detect all errors due to inconsistencies in their error assessment 
methods.  Other methodological pitfalls regarded the sampling strategies applied; in 
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particular, studies that were conducted in a single site, or used a convenience sample; 
or that provided no information regarding the participants’ selection process.  
Based on the shortcomings of the literature, Garfield et al23 identified ways in which the 
medication system could be improved and made safer.  The principles of system 
improvement and quality management would suggest the focus should be on the 
processes that are most important to the patient and the greatest sources of error.  The 
authors also underlined the importance of feedback loops within the system, such as 
medication reviews and monitoring of patients on higher risk medicines, which may 
reduce the avoidable harm that patients may suffer. 
The present study aimed to update Garfield and colleagues’ review of the literature 
maintaining a focus on prescribing errors in primary care in the UK.  
3.1.2 Methods 
We used identical methods to those used by Garfield et al.23 to systematically identify 
relevant papers published in English, from January 2009 to February 2011.  The 
electronic databases Medline, Embase; Kings Fund, International Pharmaceutical 
Abstracts; Pharmline; CINAHL; and Psycinfo were searched using the key words: 
'medication error' or ‘prescribing error’, together with 'primary healthcare', 'general 
practice', 'family practice', 'patient discharge', 'patient admission', 'medical records', 
'continuity of patient care' or 'hospital-physician-relations'.  A manual search of the 
reference lists of relevant papers and reviews was conducted in order to identify any 
additional studies.  
We aimed to include only studies which were conducted in the UK and which reported 
the frequency of medication errors in primary care; these included prescribing errors in 
outpatient referrals or admissions to secondary care, which can affect medication 
prescribing later in primary care23.  All definitions of error were included.  Studies were 
not included if they relied only on spontaneous reports, were not available in national 
libraries, did not report the method used for measuring errors, were studies of 
discrepancies on admission to hospital which only compared medication histories of 
different healthcare professionals in secondary care, or focussed on one medication or 
therapeutic group.  
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One reviewer assessed the title and abstract of all records identified by the electronic 
searches for relevance.  In order to affirm inter-rater reliability a second independent 
reviewer screened 10% of the articles.  We retrieved full text copies of all potentially 
relevant papers and identified studies that met the inclusion criteria. 
3.1.3 Results 
We identified 2,465 potentially relevant studies through database searches and 
reference lists (Figure 1) 
We removed 116 citations that were duplicate references to articles already retrieved.  
We then excluded 2160 further studies based on our exclusion criteria.  This resulted in 
139 references that we reviewed further for preliminary data extraction.  After a detailed 
assessment, we excluded further a 138 papers, which resulted in only one additional 
relevant study published since the earlier review by Garfield et al.  
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Figure 1: Flow chart of papers identified, screened and evaluated 
 
Description of the included study 
The only study that met the inclusion criteria was by Barber and colleagues6.  These 
authors evaluated the incidence of medication errors (prescribing, monitoring, 
dispensing and administration) in a random sample of 256 care home residents from 55 
homes in three different geographical areas of England.  Focusing here on the 
prescribing and monitoring errors, these were identified by medication reviews, which 
were conducted by one pharmacist in each geographical area.  The study then explored 
the causes of errors through observation and from interviews with home personnel, 
doctors and pharmacists.  The severity of the errors was based on potential harm for the 
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patient and was assessed by expert judgement on a validated linear scale ranging from 
0 to 10, where 0 equated to no harm and 10 corresponding to an error that would result 
in death. 
Two thirds of patients suffered at least one medication error of some sort each day.  It 
was found that prescribing errors occurred in 100 residents (39.1%) and in 8.3% of 
prescribing acts.  A total of 153 prescribing errors were identified.  The most common 
types of prescribing error were “incomplete information” (37.9%), e.g. no strength or 
route was specified; ‘‘unnecessary drug’’ (23.5%), ‘‘dose/strength error’’ (14.4%) and 
‘‘omission’’ (11.8%).  Monitoring errors, which were studied in a list of drugs that an 
expert group had deemed to require monitoring, occurred in 27 (18.4%) residents (or in 
14.7% of prescriptions for these drugs).  Of these 32 monitoring errors, 90.6% were due 
to a failure in requesting monitoring.  The drugs most commonly involved in monitoring 
errors were diuretics (53.1%), ACE inhibitors (15.6%), amiodarone (12.5%) and 
levothyroxine (9.4%).  The mean harm scores for prescribing and monitoring errors were 
2.6 and 3.7 respectively.  The mean harm score for prescribing errors was 2.6 (95% CI 
2.4-2.8) and for monitoring errors it was 3.7 (3.4-4.0).  These scores were higher than for 
other types of medication error identified in this study. 
3.2 Update of systematic review of interventions in primary care 
aimed at reducing medication related adverse events and 
hospital admissions 
Our previous systematic review, published in 2006,24 identified 38 relevant studies, 
including 17 pharmacist-led interventions and 13 complex interventions that included a 
component of medication review aimed at reducing falls in the elderly.  Meta-analysis 
found that pharmacist-led interventions were effective at reducing hospital admissions, 
but restricting analysis to the randomised controlled trials failed to demonstrate 
significant benefit.  Pooling the results of studies in other categories did not demonstrate 
any significant effect.  Below we present a summary of our updated systematic review.  
The full version will appear as a Cochrane systematic review. 
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3.2.1 Objectives  
To identify and evaluate studies of interventions in primary care aimed at reducing 
medication-related adverse events that result in morbidity, hospital admission and 
mortality. 
3.2.2 Search methods  
We systematically searched 14 electronic databases for published and unpublished 
data.  Bibliographies of retrieved papers were searched and first authors and experts 
contacted in an attempt to locate additional studies.  There was no restriction on 
language of publication. 
3.2.3 Selection criteria  
All interventions applied in primary care settings which aimed to improve patient safety 
by reducing adverse events resulting from medication overuse or misuse were 
considered.  Randomised controlled trials, controlled trials, controlled before and after 
studies, and interrupted time series studies were eligible for inclusion.  
3.2.4 Data collection and analysis  
Study quality assessment and data extraction were undertaken using the Cochrane 
Effective Practice and Organisation of Care data collection checklist and template.  
Meta-analysis was performed using a random effects model. 
3.2.5 Results  
716 studies were initially identified, of which 43 satisfied our inclusion criteria.  These 
were categorised as follows:  20 pharmacist-led interventions that reported hospital 
admissions as an outcome; 10 educational interventions targeting primary health care 
professionals that reported preventable drug-related morbidity as an outcome; and 13 
complex interventions that included a component of medication review aimed at 
reducing falls in the elderly (the outcome being falls).  Meta-analysis found that 
pharmacist-led interventions were not effective at reducing hospital admissions OR 0.92 
(95% CI 0.76, 1.10 n=15) and adverse drug events OR 0.65 (95% CI 0.26, 1.59 n=3).  
Interventions which included a medicines management component to reduce falls in at 
risk patients did not have significant impact (OR 0.93, 95% CI 0.71 to 1.22, n=10).  
Pooling the results of studies in the other categories failed to demonstrate any significant 
effect on the main outcomes.  No study was found which recorded death as an outcome. 
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3.2.6 Conclusions  
Currently there is no evidence which indicates that medication reviews when combined 
with other interventions are effective in reducing falls in at risk patients.  There is 
currently no evidence for the effectiveness of other interventions which aim to reduce 
hospital admissions or preventable drug-related morbidity. 
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Chapter 4: Methods used to identify the prevalence and nature 
of prescribing and monitoring errors 
The project started in mid February 2010 and was completed in September 2011.  
Research ethics committee approval was obtained from Nottingham Research Ethics 
Committee 1 27th of May 2010.  NHS Research and Development approval was 
obtained from participating primary care trusts. 
4.1 Recruitment 
4.1.3 Recruitment of primary care trusts 
We approached three primary care trusts (PCTs) with differing characteristics (inner-city 
London, urban and suburban/rural) to act as sites for the recruitment of general 
practices.  The following PCTs were approached and each agreed to take part in the 
study: 
 City and Hackney PCT, London 
 Luton PCT 
 Nottinghamshire County Teaching PCT. 
4.1.2 Recruitment and training of pharmacists 
Initially, three pharmacists were recruited to be involved in the data collection; one 
pharmacist for each PCT.  These pharmacists were given a day’s training by the 
research team, which focused on the definition of prescribing and monitoring errors and 
their identification in general practice.  In addition, pharmacists were trained on 
interviewing techniques as well as performing Root Cause Analyses (RCA). 
One of the three pharmacists had to withdraw from data collection due to maternity leave 
in December 2010, therefore another PCT pharmacist was recruited in mid January 
2011.  The newly appointed pharmacist was given half a day training involving the 
definitions of prescribing and monitoring errors, the identification of these errors as well 
as how to conduct root cause analyses. 
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4.1.3 Recruitment of General practices 
All practices within City and Hackney PCT, and Luton PCT were approached about the 
study along with all practices belonging to one of the practice-based commissioning 
clusters in Nottinghamshire County Teaching PCT.  We aimed to recruit 15 general 
practices with five of these from each of the three PCTs.  Practices were sent a letter 
inviting them to take part in the study, and giving them information in the form of a 
practice information sheet (Appendix 1).  
In total, 97 practices across the three PCTs were approached to take part in the study 
and those that did not respond to the mailing were sent a reminder.  Thirty practices 
replied and 20 of these expressed an interest in taking part.  Of these, 5 practices in 
each of the PCTs were purposively selected to be part of the study taking into account 
the differences in demographic characteristics and quality markers to try to ensure a 
reasonable match against characteristics of English general practices. 
4.2 Quantitative data collection 
4.2.1 Data on general practices 
The following information was requested from each practice: 
 Practice list size 
 Age-sex breakdown of practice list with age divided into four bands (0-14, 15-
64,65-74, ≥75 years) 
 Number, gender and type of GPs (and other prescribers) in the practice 
 Whether or not the practice was a GP training practice 
 Whether or not the practice was a dispensing practice 
 Deprivation score (based on combined Index Multiple Deprivation 2007) 
 Whether the practice was urban or rural 
 Practice performance in the quality and outcomes framework:  
o medicines management points, and  
o overall scores 
 Clinical computer system used within the practice. 
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4.2.2 Collection of data to assess the prevalence and nature of medication 
errors 
In each participating general practice, a 2% random sample of patients was selected 
using computer-generated random numbers.  Between August 2010 and April 2011, the 
pharmacists undertook a thorough review of the medical records of these patients to 
identify potential prescribing and monitoring errors for each unique prescription item 
issued in the 12 months prior to the data collection date (n.b. for prescription items that 
had been issued more than once during the 12-month period, only the latest prescription 
was assessed).  We asked pharmacists to err on the side of being overly-inclusive in 
identifying possible errors; it was then the role of the research team to decide whether 
these fitted our pre-specified classification for prescribing and monitoring errors. 
We asked the pharmacists to record data on specially developed data collection forms 
(shown in Appendix 2, Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Appendix 5 and Appendix 6): 
 Appendix 2 presents the form used to record data on the demographics of 
each patient and all the unique prescription items that they had received in the 
12 months prior to data collection 
 Appendix 3 presents the form used to record details of any potential 
prescribing or monitoring errors identified 
 Appendix 4 presents the form used to record details of any omission errors 
relating to failure to prescribe for an existing condition 
 Appendix 5 presents the form used to record data relating to medicines 
reconciliation for patients with a hospital discharge communication in the 12 
months prior to data collection. 
Definition and classification of prescribing and monitoring errors  
A prescribing error in this study was defined as follows11: 
“A prescribing error occurs when, as a result of a prescribing decision  
or prescription-writing process, there is an unintentional, significant: 
reduction in the probability of treatment being timely and effective 
  or  
increase in the risk of harm when compared to generally accepted practice.” 
  22 
This definition is accompanied by a list of examples of what should, and should not, be 
included as an error11. 
In addition, the following definition was used for a monitoring error, based on that of 
Alldred et al25: 
“A monitoring error occurs when a prescribed medicine is not monitored in the 
way which would be considered acceptable in routine general practice.  It 
includes the absence of tests being carried out at the frequency listed in the 
criteria, with tolerance of +50%.  This means for example, that if a drug requires 
liver function tests at 6 monthly intervals, we would class as an error if a test has 
not been conducted within 9 months.  If a patient refused to give consent for a 
test, then this would not constitute an error”. 
When identifying potential monitoring errors, the pharmacists were asked to refer to a list 
we created of medicines needing blood test monitoring.  This list is shown in Appendix 6. 
Classification of different types of error 
In addition to identifying potential prescribing and monitoring errors, the pharmacists 
were asked to classify these into different types of error.  These are shown in Box 1. 
4.3. Identifying errors and other types of prescribing problem 
Each potential error identified by the pharmacists was discussed by a multidisciplinary 
error judging panel (including a GP (AA), a clinical pharmacologist (AF) and three 
pharmacists (NB, BDF and MG)) using the above definitions.  In addition, it became 
apparent that there were some problems that did not fit within our error definition, but 
nevertheless represented less than ideal practice.  We created a category of “suboptimal 
prescribing” for these problems.  The pharmacists also identified prescriptions 
associated with legal issues, but which did not fall into our definitions of error; these 
were given a separate category of “legal problem”. 
Over the course of the project, the error judging panel had 15 meetings by 
teleconference, usually of an hour in length.  Prior to each meeting a set of the potential 
errors was sent round the team.  The panel came to a consensus decision on whether 
the potential error should be classified as:  
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 Prescribing error 
 Monitoring error  
 Sub optimal prescribing  
 Legal problem  
 No problem  
In addition, the panel agreed on whether the classification of the type of error, or 
problem, recorded by the pharmacist (see Box 1) was appropriate, and corrected this 
where necessary.  
In the vast majority of cases, the pharmacists provided sufficient information for the 
panel to make a judgement.  Where this was not the case, we asked the pharmacist to 
go back and provide further details.  
During the study, as a result of the discussions of the error judging panel, we developed 
a more detailed list of “case law”, describing what should, and should not, be included as 
an error, together with justification of these decisions(see Appendix 7).  This cumulative 
document was referred to as the study evolved, to ensure that our judgements were 
consistent and appropriate.  The following principles were established: 
 More than one error could be recorded per prescription. 
 If an overdose involved the addition of more than one prescribed item, e.g. a 
mixture of 50 mg and 100 mg tablets, the error was counted only once. 
 To avoid duplication of errors in the database, any drug interaction error was 
recorded against the second of the two drugs prescribed. 
 Potential errors from dispensing practices were judged in the same way as those 
from non-dispensing practices.  
 The use of Latin on prescriptions was judged not to be a problem as it was 
assumed that these instructions would be converted to English by a pharmacist 
or dispenser. 
 If a case involved a dosing error and a frequency error, this was recorded as just 
one error: a ‘dose/strength’ error.  
 No error was recorded if lack of information made it impossible to make a valid 
judgement on whether or not an error has taken place.  
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Box 1: Classification of different types of errors 
 
Prescribing errors 
 
Monitoring errors 
1. Unnecessary drug 
2  Incorrect drug 
3  Duplication 
4  Allergy error 
5  Contraindication error 
6  Interaction error 
7  Dose/strength error 
8  Formulation error 
9  Frequency error 
10  Timing error 
11  Information incomplete 
12  Generic/brand name error 
13 Omission error relating to failure to 
prescribe concomitant treatment  
14 Not classified 
15 Inadequate documentation in medical 
recordsa 
16 Quantity errora 
17 Inadequate reviewa 
18 Duration errora 
 
1  Monitoring not requested 
2  Requested but not done 
3  Results not available 
4  Results not acted upon 
   
a These classification categories were added after discovering types of error that did not 
fit into those initially listed as 1-13. 
4.4 Collection of data on potential omission errors relating to not 
prescribing for an existing condition 
The pharmacists collected data using a specially developed form (see Appendix 4) to 
identify potential omission errors relating to failure to prescribe for an existing condition.  
An example might be failure to prescribe a statin to a patient with coronary heart 
disease. 
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4.5 Collection of data on discrepancies and potential errors 
relating to hospital discharge communications 
The pharmacists used another specially developed form (see Appendix 5) to record 
detailed information on medicines reconciliation on patients who had been discharged 
from hospital during the 12-month data collection period.  The latest hospital discharge 
was used if patients had more than one during the 12-months. 
4.6 Data entry 
All data received from the 15 participating general practices were entered into a 
Microsoft Access database using custom made forms.  The forms were designed to fit 
the style of the actual hard paper copies of the data collection forms used by the 
pharmacists when collecting data from the patient records reviewed in each practice.  
For example, Figure 2 shows a sample form used to enter patient demographic 
information onto the database (see Appendix 2 for comparison with the paper form).  
This information included practice identity code, patient identity code, age, gender and 
number of months the patient was registered at the practice.  The form also had a drop-
down menu for entering all the prescriptions issued to the patient during the 12 months 
review period of the study.  For each prescription, we were able to enter information on 
the type of prescriber (e.g. GP partner, locum, non-medical prescriber, etc), whether the 
medicine prescribed was a repeat or acute prescription, whether or not the medication 
was on a list we created of drugs requiring blood-test monitoring (see Appendix 6), and 
whether the pharmacist identified a potential prescribing or monitoring error.  
For every medicine with a potential error, we entered information on a custom-made 
form (Figure 3), which was similar to the form shown in Appendix 3.  On this form, we 
captured information pertaining to the name, formulation, strength, quantity and dose of 
the prescribed medicine.  We transcribed the description of the potential problem and 
potential explanations for why the error might have occurred, as recorded by the 
pharmacists collecting data.  We entered information on whether the problem was a 
single or multiple event, associated with an adverse event or had been reported to the 
PCT or NPSA.  We also specified the actual error classification determined by our 
multidisciplinary error judging panel (i.e. prescribing error, monitoring error, suboptimal 
prescribing, legal error or not an error). 
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Figure 2:  Example of a Microsoft Access data entry screen for recording patient 
demographics and prescriptions 
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Figure 3:  Example of a Microsoft Access data entry screen for recording detailed 
information on possible prescribing errors. 
 
4.7 Data cleaning  
Firstly, we reconciled the number of patient information forms received from each 
practice (and entered on the Access database) with the actual list of (anonymised) 
patients randomly selected by the pharmacists for review.  We physically counted all 
patient information forms received and checked to ensure that these represented a 2% 
sample of all patients registered at the practice, and that all forms received had been 
accounted for and uploaded on to the database.   
Secondly, we carefully checked for errors in data entry.  For instance, we listed all 
patient and practice identity codes for each practice and cross checked whether these 
matched information on the physical forms.  We did the same for other demographic 
information like patient age and gender.  Where such information was missing on the 
physical forms, we contacted the practices directly to provide this information.  
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Furthermore, we checked for potential inconsistencies in patient information.  For 
example, we checked for patients whose age was listed as greater than 100 years or 
less than 1 year.  We confirmed whether this was consistent with the actual patient 
information forms and corrected any errors.  We also checked to confirm that all patients 
with prescriptions for gender-specific medications had been assigned the correct gender.  
For instance we checked that patients with prescriptions for female hormonal 
contraceptives (e.g. Microgynon®) had been assigned female in the Access database.  
We examined whether patients with a potential monitoring error had been prescribed 
medicines on the BNF monitoring list.  We created additional queries in Microsoft Access 
to summarise details of all potential medication errors in order to ensure that there was 
no duplication; that all errors had been reviewed by our multidisciplinary panel and that 
the relevant information had been updated or added to the database.  The classification 
of any medication associated with a possible error was checked by carefully reviewing 
the information on the database in relation to recorded judgements made by the expert 
panel.  
Thirdly, we conducted a detailed review of 20 randomly selected data entry forms to 
assess the frequency of data entry errors.  This was found to be greater than 1% and so 
we employed a pharmacist to carefully check the data entry for all forms and make 
amendments where appropriate.  A detailed log was created of any changes made as a 
result of this exercise. 
4.8 Data extraction 
We generated a unique database number for each patient in the database by 
concatenating the patient ID number with the practice ID number.  We designed an 
update query to generate a table of patient demographic information which was then 
exported into Stata Version 11.2.  We then wrote a series of Microsoft Access queries to 
extract further information from the Access database.  These queries included 
information per patient on: 
 Number of drugs prescribed in the 12 months review period, 
 Number of drugs on the monitoring list  
 Number of acute prescriptions 
 Number of repeat prescription 
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 Number of prescribing errors, monitoring errors, legal errors, suboptimal 
prescribing   
 Number of types of prescribers. 
We merged in turn, each of these queries onto the main patient demographics table to 
create a complete dataset of patient level information.  To this we added information on 
the type of computer system, rural-urban score, deprivation score, patient list size and 
the pharmacist who collected information for each patient. 
To create a prescription level dataset, we wrote a selection query in Microsoft Access to 
extract all information on the medicines reviewed.  This query included information on 
the name, strength, quantity, formulation, BNF drug class, BNF drug section, for each 
medicine. In addition, it captured information on the types of problem associated with the 
prescription (if any).  It also included relevant patient level information like age, gender 
and unique patient and practice ID codes, as well as information on whether the 
prescription was issued as a repeat or acute medicine.  We exported this query into 
Stata for further analysis. 
4.9 Assessing the severity of the prescribing errors 
We used a validated method for assessing the severity of medication errors26, adapted 
for use with prescribing errors27.  Briefly, this involves a panel of five judges each 
assessing each error in terms of potential clinical importance, using a visual analogue 
scale.  The scale is numbered from zero to 10, where a score of zero represents an error 
with no potential effects on the patient, and 10 an error that would result in death.  Errors 
with a score of less than 3 are considered to be minor, errors with a score from 3 to 7 
inclusive are classified as moderate, and errors with a score greater than 7 are severe. 
To assess severity, we identified all prescribing and monitoring errors in the study 
database.  Legal issues were excluded from this analysis, as these were assumed, by 
definition, to have no clinical significance.  A brief description of each error was then 
produced, describing the age of the patient if relevant, as well as the prescribed drug, 
dose and strength, and presented alongside a copy of the visual analogue scale (see 
Appendix 8).  Errors that were duplicates of each other were grouped so that only one of 
the errors was assessed, in order to minimise the judges’ workload.  For example, we 
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had multiple errors involving simvastatin being prescribed to be taken “daily” instead of 
“at night”; the judges assessed only one of these and the resulting score was later 
applied to each error of this type. 
We used a panel comprising two pharmacists and three doctors (two GPs and one 
clinical pharmacologist), who were each given a £200 gift voucher as reimbursement for 
their time.  
For each error description, the mean score across all five judges was calculated using 
Microsoft Excel and used as an index of severity26.  The mean severity score for each 
error was added to the Microsoft Access database and each data entry item was double-
checked by a pharmacist who made amendments where appropriate.  A log was created 
of any corrections made as a result of this exercise.  Data were exported to SPSS 16 for 
further analysis.  
4.10 Quantitative data analysis 
The data were analysed based on a framework designed by the research team.  This is 
outlined in Appendix 9. 
Most of the data analysis was undertaken in Stata, Version 11.2 (apart from the analysis 
of severity scores which was done using Microsoft Excel and SPSS Version 16). 
Descriptive statistics were produced for a wide range of variables relating to: 
 Characteristics of the general practices 
 Characteristics of the patients  
 Characteristics of the prescribers 
 Characteristics of the prescriptions examined 
 The types of medication problem identified 
 The types of medication error 
 Medications and British National Formulary chapters associated with 
different types of medication error 
 Severity scores for errors, including percentage classified as minor, 
moderate and severe. 
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Categorical variables were described using frequencies and percentages, and means 
and standard deviations (SD) or medians and interquartile ranges (IQR) were used to 
summarise continuous variables, depending on the normality of their distribution. 
Multivariable analyses modelling the relationships between the risk of error and selected 
predictor variables and apriori confounders were performed at the patient and at the 
prescription-level.  The outcome measures were binary variables indicating the presence 
of one or more prescribing or monitoring errors.  Mixed effects logistic regression models 
were used to estimate odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Further details are 
provided in Chapter 6 and Appendix 9.  
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Chapter 5: Methods used to explore the causes of error and 
associated defences 
This chapter provides details of the methods used for: 
 Face-to-face interviews 
 Focus groups 
 Root cause analysis 
The characteristics of the participants for the interviews and focus groups are also 
provided. 
5.1 Selection of participants for face-to-face interviews 
Members of the research team (AA and MG) examined the potential errors identified by 
the pharmacists and selected examples to be discussed at face-to-face interviews with 
prescribers.  A wide range of different types of potential errors were purposefully 
selected including: 
 Those that were considered particularly serious 
 Different types of potential prescribing and monitoring errors, including a wide 
range of examples of these (Box 1) 
 Potential errors involving problems at the primary/secondary care interface 
 Less serious problems, where GPs might wish to debate whether or not an error 
has taken place. 
Potential participants for the interviews were contacted by letter and were provided with 
an information sheet (Appendix 10).  Prior to interview participants gave informed 
written consent. 
5.2 Selection of participants for focus groups 
We wrote to each of the general practices involved in the study and invited staff to attend 
one of six focus groups; we asked that staff representing a variety of different types of 
practice personnel attend. 
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Potential focus group participants were provided with an information sheet (Appendix 
11) and prior to the focus group all gave informed written consent. 
5.3 Interview schedule for the face-to-face interviews  
The interview schedule for the face-to-face interviews (Appendix 12) consisted of open-
ended questions aimed at exploring the underlying reasons for medication errors.  
Questions and prompts included in the interview schedule were designed to elicit 
information on the following issues: 
 A detailed discussion of the potential errors identified 
 Prescribers’ therapeutic training and knowledge  
 Patients’ characteristics of the potential influence of these on error  
 Prescribers’ knowledge of the patient  
 The way prescribing tasks are organised and structured, including the use of 
information technology  
 Workload and the responsibility for prescribing specialist drugs  
 Team structure and communication  
 Individual factors relating to the prescriber 
 Safeguards that were felt to be particularly important in preventing prescribing or 
monitoring errors.  
5.4 Interview schedule for the focus groups 
The interview schedule for the focus groups is shown in Appendix 13.  The main issues 
explored in the focus groups were: 
 Safeguards in general practice to protect patient against potential harm 
 Reporting prescribing errors in general practice 
 General practice safety culture. 
5.5 Training the interviewees 
The research pharmacists who collected data on potential medication errors in the study 
practices were given training in conducting semi-structured interviews.  This training 
involved instruction in human error theory9, instruction in the use of the interview topic 
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guide (Appendix 12), and practical experience of using the interview topic guide in a 
simulated interview.  
5.6 Conducting the interviews 
Most of the interviews were conducted by the same research pharmacists who collected 
data on potential errors in the study practices, although five were conducted by 
members of the research team (three by AA and two by MG). 
Prior to interview, each participant was contacted to arrange a mutually convenient time 
to meet and provided with an opportunity to ask questions about the study.  All 
participants completed a consent form. 
Before the interviews commenced, each participant was asked if they were willing to be 
audio-taped and reassured that any information supplied would be treated in the strictest 
of confidence.  Thirty-two semi-structured interviews (out of a total of thirty-four) were 
audio-taped with permission. 
Participants were encouraged to speak freely during the interviews without disruption, 
even if this impacted on the planned flow of the interview schedule.  Areas which were 
not covered, or required further exploration, were followed up later in the interview.  All 
participants were asked towards the end of the interview if there was anything else they 
would like to add to increase understanding of the issues discussed.  
5.7 Conducting the focus groups 
Six focus groups were arranged.  After obtaining written informed consent and giving a 
brief introduction one member of the research team (either AA, NB, SC or MG) led the 
discussions while another member of the team kept note of the contributions made by 
each participant so that it was possible subsequently to attribute comments made when 
transcribing the audio recordings.  Participants were encouraged to speak openly and to 
engage in discussion and debate around issues raised. 
5.8 Location of interviews and focus groups 
The interviews and focus groups took place between October 2010 and May 2011 
involving 15 general practices from three Primary Care Trusts in England.  All interviews 
took place in a location of the interviewee’s choice (usually the interviewee’s own office) 
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and without the presence of any other individual or member of practice staff.  An 
unoccupied meeting room was almost always selected by practice staff as the location 
for the focus groups, with little disruption.  The focus groups also took place in general 
practice premises. 
5.9 Interview and focus group participants 
A summary of participant details, including identification code and experience, is given in 
Table 1 and Table 2. 
The participant identification code is in a format that allows for identification of the 
characteristics of the interviewees whereby the first part of the code identifies the 
practice, e.g. PR1, and the second part the type of participant, e.g. GP1 (the first GP 
interviewed in that particular practice).  The abbreviations used for different types of 
participant are as follows:  
 GP = General Practitioner 
 Comm Pharm = Community Pharmacist 
 Med Stud = Medical Student 
 GP Reg = GP Registrar 
 PCT Pharm = PCT Pharmacist 
 Presc Clerk = Prescribing Clerk 
 Prac Manager = Practice Manager 
 Rec Manager = Receptionist Manager 
 Snr Recep = Senior Receptionist.  
For example a participant with the code ‘PR13-GP3’ would be the third general 
practitioner interviewed in practice 13.  
5.10.1 Interview Participants 
A total of 34 participants were interviewed (see Table 1).  Of these, 20 (59%) were male. 
Twenty-eight (82%) of the participants had completed their undergraduate training in the 
UK, while the other six (18%) had studied elsewhere (Australia, India, Italy, Nigeria and 
Sri Lanka).  
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The median number of years these participants had worked as GPs was 20 (IQR 12 – 
23; range 1 - 30), and 13 (38%) worked part time.  
Thirty-eight (85%) of the participants were GP partners (with nine of these describing 
themselves as senior partners), four (12%) were salaried GPs, and one (3%) was a 
nurse prescriber.  
The median length of time of the interviews was 24 minutes (IQR 14.3 – 32.1; range 6.4 
– 46.4). 
Table 1 provides further details of each of the interview participants.  It can be seen that, 
in total, 70 errors were discussed with participants. 
 
5.10.2 Focus Group Participants 
Table 2 shows summarises the participants contributing to the six focus groups.  In total 
there were 46 participants across the six focus groups with 18 (39%) being GPs, seven 
(15%) nurses, seven (15%) reception staff, and 14 (30%) other staff.  These other staff 
comprised: three dispensers, three prescription clerks, two practice managers, and one 
each of the following: community pharmacist, GP registrar, medical student, PCT 
pharmacist, reception manager, and senior receptionist.  Of the 46 focus group 
participants, 35 (76%) were female. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the interview participants 
Interview 
Label 
Length of 
audio 
recording 
(minutes) 
Sex
a
 Medical 
School 
Decade 
Qualified
b
 
Clinical 
interests/speciality 
Number 
Years 
worked in 
profession
c
 
Role 
within 
practice 
Working 
Hours
d
 
Number of 
potential 
errors 
discussed 
PR1-GP1 68.0 M London 1980s Prescribing advisor 15-19 GP partner F/T 4 
PR1-GP2 36.0 M Leicester 2000s Men's health, 
Dermatology 
<5 GP partner F/T 1 
PR2-GP1 21.0 F Nottingham 1980s Gynaecology, 
Depression 
25-29 GP partner P/T 1 
PR2-GP2 31.3 F Nottingham 2000s Women's Health & 
Children 
5-9 GP Partner P/T 2 
PR2-GP3 39.4 M Nottingham 1970s Minor surgery/ 
injections 
20-24 GP partner F/T 3 
PR3-GP1 41.2 M Nottingham 1980s Psychiatry / ENT 20-24 GP partner F/T 2 
PR3-GP2 30.4 F Nottingham 1980s Gynaecology 25-29 GP partner P/T 2 
PR4-GP1 46.4 M Nottingham 1990s None 10-14 GP partner P/T 2 
PR4-GP2 45.5 F London 1990s Palliative Care, 
Contraception, 
Diabetic 
10-14 GP partner P/T 3 
PR5-GP1 19.5 F London 1980s Women's Health & 
Children, Sexual, 
Mental 
20-24 GP Partner P/T 2 
PR5-GP2 29.3 M London 1980s Alcohol, Mental health 20-24 Senior GP 
Partner 
F/T 2 
PR5-GP3 22.3 F Sheffield 1980s None volunteered 10-14 Salaried GP P/T 1 
PR5-GP4 25.6 M Nottingham 1980s None volunteered 15-19 GP partner P/T 0 
PR6-GP1 34.5 F Edinburgh 2000s Gynaecology, 
Dermatology 
<5 GP Partner P/T 3 
PR6-GP2 29.4 F Colombo, Sri 
Lanka 
2000s Gynaecology 5-9 GP Partner F/T 2 
PR6-GP3 12.3 F Luton 1990s None recorded 10-14 Nurse 
Prescriber 
F/T 1 
PR6-GP4 10.1 F London 1980s Paediatrics, Diabetes 10-14 GP Partner F/T 1 
PR7-GP1 26.6 M Newcastle 1980s Skin surgery 15-19 GP Partner P/T 1 
 
PR7-GP2 7.3 M Newcastle 1980s Sports medicine, ENT, 
Diabetes, 
Orthopaedics 
15-19 GP Partner F/T 1 
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Interview 
Label 
Length of 
audio 
recording 
(minutes) 
Sex
a
 Medical 
School 
Decade 
Qualified
b
 
Clinical 
interests/speciality 
Number 
Years 
worked in 
profession
c
 
Role 
within 
practice 
Working 
Hours
d
 
Number of 
potential 
errors 
discussed 
PR7-NU1 27.3 M Glasgow 1970s Chronic diseases 20-24 Senior GP 
Partner 
F/T 2 
PR7-GP3 45.3 F Newcastle 1980s Medicines 
Management 
20-24 GP Partner P/T 5 
PR8-GP1 26.0 M Liverpool 1980s Gynaecology 25-29 Senior GP 
Partner 
F/T 2 
PR9-GP1 22.3 F Leeds 1980s Gynaecology 25-29 Senior GP 
Partner 
F/T 5 
PR10-GP1 19.5 M Italy 1990s Asthma, COPD, 
Diabetes 
20-24 Senior GP 
Partner, 
Clinical 
Lead 
F/T 3 
PR10-GP2 16.1 M India 1970s None volunteered 30-34 Senior GP 
Partner 
F/T 1 
PR11-GP1 N/A M London 1970s None volunteered 25-29 Senior GP 
Partner 
F/T 1 
PR11-GP2 N/A F Cambridge 1980s Women's Health & 
Children 
20-24 Senior GP 
Partner 
F/T 1 
PR12-GP1 10.3 M Australia  2000s None <5 GP Partner F/T 1 
PR12-GP2 12.5 M London 1980s None 25-29 GP Partner F/T 4 
PR13-GP1 13.5 M Cambridge 1970s Gastroenterology, 
Muscular-Skeletal 
25-29 Senior GP 
Partner 
F/T 2 
PR13-GP2 13.3 M Italy 1970s Paediatrics 20-24 GP Partner F/T 3 
PR14-GP1 14.6 M Sheffield 2000s Diabetes, 
Dermatology 
<5 Salaried GP P/T 3 
PR14-GP2 19.2 M Nigeria 1990s Minor surgery, CVD 5-9 Salaried GP F/T 2 
PR14-GP3 6.4 F London 1980s Women's Health 20-24 Salaried GP 
Clinical 
Lead  
P/T 1 
a
 M=male; F=female; 
b
 Actual dates of qualification are not given in order to preserve anonymity; 
c
 actual number of years in the profession are not given in order 
to preserve anonymity; 
d
 FT=Full-time; PT=Part-time. 
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Table 2: Summary of participants contributing to the six focus groups  
Focus 
group 
Number 
Length of 
focus 
group in 
minutes 
Number of 
participants 
in each focus 
group 
Number 
of GPs 
Number 
of 
nurses 
Number 
of 
reception  
staff 
Number 
of other 
Staff 
FG1 42 7 3 0 1 3 
FG2 56 9 3 2 0 4 
FG3 60 9 4 1 1 3 
FG4 72 7 3 1 2 1 
FG5 45 5 2 1 1 1 
FG6 35 9 3 2 2 2 
Total Not 
applicable 
46 18 7 7 14 
 
5.11 Transcription of interviews and focus groups 
All audiotaped interviews and focus groups were transcribed verbatim by a trained 
transcriber.  Any personal details or information, which could lead to a participant being 
identified, were removed at the data transcription stage and an identification number 
applied as discussed in the previous section.  All transcribed interviews and focus 
groups were re-checked for accuracy by a second member of staff (CR).  Interviewees 
were given the opportunity to review their transcripts, but this offer was taken up in only 
one case and there was no dispute about the contents.  
5.12 Qualitative data analysis 
This section discusses the analysis of data from both the semi-structured interviews and 
focus groups.  A robust and complete analysis was carried out using the framework 
provided by Reason’s Accident Causation Model9. 
This systematic and rigorous process was initiated and concurrent with data collection.  
Throughout the interviewing process, and in discussion with members of the research 
team (AA and MG) the interviewers thought about the data being gathered, refined 
questions, pursued ideas and investigated further areas in greater depth.  
On completing data collection, we reviewed and sorted the data to make it more 
manageable.  This involved reading and re-reading the transcripts, and identifying 
themes within each transcript, a concept known as ‘content analysis’28.  Consideration 
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was given throughout this analysis to the study objectives and the identified themes of 
‘prescribing responsibility’, ‘safety culture’, and ‘safeguards and defences’. 
5.12.1 Identifying a Conceptual Framework 
Two members of the team (SC, TA) then generated an index or ‘conceptual framework’28 
by which the raw data could be labelled and sorted.  Development of the conceptual 
framework or index involved identifying the recurring themes and concepts in the 
transcripts together with terms used in the interview schedules and surrounding 
literature.  A workable list of main- and sub-themes was developed and applied 
systematically to the whole data set by three researchers (SC, RH, MG) with the aid of 
the computerised qualitative data analysis software QSR N-Vivo version 8.0.  The field 
notes taken those interviews, which were not digitally-recorded, were also coded and 
analysed.  The index was then mapped to the categories outlined in Reason’s Accident 
Causation Model, and the coded data were then sorted and synthesised by grouping 
data with similar content together under the different themes and sub-themes.  
5.12.2 Mapping and Interpretation 
Two researchers (SC, RH) synthesised the main findings by looking across all practices 
for data coded against a particular theme, for example ‘patients’ characteristics’, and 
understanding the range of views and experiences shared by interviewees.  The 
researchers began to build explanations for the recurring patterns and associations in 
the data.  This process involved interrogating the dataset as a whole to identify linkages 
between sets of phenomena and exploring why such linkages occurred.  These linkages 
were displayed on a series of maps (SC) or memos (RH) to further improve 
understanding and clarity.  For example, Figure 4 illustrates the multiple error-producing 
conditions within the category of ‘The Prescriber’ that were perceived to contribute to an 
increased risk of prescribing errors.  The researcher moved backwards and forwards 
between the data, using the ‘constant comparison’ technique, and evolving explanations, 
until a fit was clearly made.  Participants’ own reasons for particular phenomena were 
investigated and the diversity of their explanations explored.  
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Figure 4: A Map illustrating the multiple error-producing conditions within the category of ‘The prescriber’. 
Causes  
of  
error 
The 
Prescriber 
Therapeutic 
training 
Poorly taught Picked up on the job  
Dependency on 
others 
Patient conditions that need to 
be observed over time  
Drug 
Knowledge & 
Experience 
New, unusual, & unfamiliar drugs  
Paediatrics 
Changes in clinical evidence over time Prescribing habits 
Knowledge of 
the patient 
Long-term knowledge of patients Complacency issue 
Made a similar error in the past 
Perception of 
risk 
Physical  & 
emotional 
health 
Tied to more specific conditions 
Different local drug preferences 
Walk-in patients or new patients No information 
Perceived severity of adverse effects associated with the drug 
The length of time the drug prescribed for 
Tiredness 
Anxiety 
Lack of physical exercise 
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5.13 Root Cause Analysis  
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) offers a thorough and systematic approach through which the 
root cause(s) of a patient safety incident can be identified.  With this information, solutions 
can be developed and implemented to reduce the chances of those incidents occurring 
again. 
The pharmacists involved in collecting data in the practices were given training on how to 
conduct root cause analysis, based on materials available on the NPSA website 
(http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/collections/root-cause-analysis/ ).  
The following approach was taken: 
1) Identification of the problems.  The study team selected a range of the prescribing 
and monitoring errors that had been identified by the pharmacists in order to cover 
different types of error and to focus on some of the more serious errors.  
2) Gathering information.  The following approaches were used: detailed review of 
patients’ medical record; interviews with GPs, practice staff and sometimes hospital 
and community pharmacy staff; examination of protocols and guidance (from the 
practices themselves, local health communities, or nationally). 
3) Mapping information.  The pharmacists were encouraged to create a chronological 
narrative of the events associated with the error.  
4) Analysing information.  The pharmacists were asked to undertake a comprehensive 
review of the evidence in relation to the errors, to identify contributory factors and 
root causes, and to consider this in the light of local and national procedures and 
policies.  
5) Generating solutions.  The pharmacists were asked to suggest ways in which similar 
errors might be prevented in the future. 
The pharmacists documented the RCAs and the research team then analysed these to 
summarise the cases; to identify themes arising from the RCAs, and to consider these in the 
light of the findings from the analysis of interviews and focus groups. 
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Chapter 6: The prevalence and nature of medication errors 
 
Summary 
 
The study involved examination of the records of 1,777 patients.  Of these, 1,200 (67.5%) 
had at least one prescription during the 12 month retrospective review of their records. 
 
Collectively, the pharmacists reviewed 6,048 unique prescription items and the following 
numbers of medication problems were detected: 247 prescribing errors; 55 monitoring errors; 
427 examples of sub optimal prescribing, and eight legal problems. 
 
The prevalence of prescribing or monitoring errors for different groups of patients over the 12 
month data collection period was as follows: 
 
 All patients (n=1,777): 12% (95% CI 10.5%-13.6%) 
 Patients who had received at least one medication (n=1,200): 17.8% (95% CI 15.7%-
20%) 
 Patients aged 75 years and older who had received at least one medication (n=129): 
38% (95% CI 29.5%-46.5%) 
 Patients who had received five or more drugs over the data collection period (n=471): 
30.1% (95% CI 26.6%-35%) 
 Patients who had received 10 or more drugs over the data collection period (n=172): 
47% (95% CI 39%-54%) 
The prevalence of prescriptions with prescribing or monitoring errors was 4.9% (95% 
confidence intervals (CI) 4.4%-5.4%). The most common types of prescribing error were 
‘incomplete information on the prescription’ (77; 31.2%); ‘dose/strength errors’ (43; 17.4%) 
and timing errors (26; 10.5%). The most common type of monitoring error was ‘failure to 
request monitoring’ (38; 69.1%). 
The severity of the 302 errors was judged on a validated 0-10 scale (0=no risk of harm; 
10=death):128 (42.4%) were deemed to be minor; 163 (54.0%) moderate; and 11 (3.6%) 
severe. Thus, 0.18% of all prescriptions (11/6048, or one in 550) were associated with 
severe error. 
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Summary Continued 
Modelling of associations between prescribing and monitoring errors (compared with no 
prescribing or monitoring problems) was undertaken at the patient-level and the prescription-
level using mixed effects logistic regression techniques. The following significant associations 
were found in the patient-level model: 
 For each additional unique medication item that the patient had received over the course 
of the 12 month retrospective data collection there was 16% increased risk of error (odds 
ratio 1.16, 95%CI 1.12-1.19, P<0.001)  
 Women were less likely than men to have a medication error (odds ratio 0.66, 95%CI 
0.48-0.92, P=0 .013) 
 The following age groups were more likely (than age group 15-64 years) to have a 
medication error: 
o 0-14, odds ratio 1.87 (95%CI 1.19-2.94, P=0.006) 
o 65-74, odds ratio 1.68 (95%CI 1.04-2.73, P=0.035) 
o ≥ 75, odds ratio 1.95 (95%CI 1.19-3.19, P=0.008) 
 Compared with a list size of 5000-10,000, patients in practices with a list size of > 10,000 
had reduced risk of error: odds ratio 0.56 (95%CI 0.31-0.99, P=0.47) 
 
The following significant associations were found in the prescription-level model: 
 For drugs on the monitoring list there was an increased risk of error (odds ratio 3.18, 
P<0.001) 
 For the following drug groups (compared with gastrointestinal drugs) there was an 
increased risk of error: 
o Cardiovascular (odds ratio 2.37, 95%CI 1.03-5.45, P=0.042) 
o Infections (odds ratio 2.67, 95%CI 1.17-6.11, P=0.02) 
o Malignant disease and immunosuppression (odds ratios 6.77, 95%CI 1.71-
26.84, P=0 .006) 
o Musculoskeletal (odds ratio 6.97 95%CI 3.06-15.88, P <0.001) 
o Eye (odds ratio 4.92, 95%CI 1.12-21.62, P=0 .035) 
o ENT odds ratio 4.6, 95%CI 1.29-16.42, P = 0.019) 
o Skin (odds ratio 5.78, 95%CI 2.04-16.36, P = 0.001) 
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6.1 Sample characteristics 
The following subsections provide details of the characteristics of the general practices, the 
patients, the prescriptions and the prescribers prior to any analysis of errors. 
6.1.1 Characteristics of general practices  
The characteristics of the 15 general practices involved in the PRACtICe study are shown in 
Table 3. 
 
Key points are highlighted below: 
 The mean list size was 5,916 (standard deviation: 3,014); the smallest practice had 
1,600 patients and the largest 11,984. 
 Ten (66.7%) of the practices were involved in GP training. 
 Two (13.3%) practices were dispensing. 
Key characteristics of the practices are compared informally in Table 4 with national figures 
for England.  General practices involved in the PRACtICe study were similar to other English 
practices in terms of mean list size and number of GPs and Quality and Outcomes 
Framework scores.  The general practices involved in the PRACtICe study appeared to have 
higher deprivation levels. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of the 15 English general practices involved in the PRACtICe 
study 
GP 
Practice 
code
a
 
Practice list 
size
b
 
Is the 
practice a 
GP 
training 
practice? 
Deprivation 
score
c
 
Is the 
practice 
urban or 
rural?  
Whether a 
dispensing 
practice? 
Clinical 
computer 
system used 
within the 
practice 
PR1 10,500 No 12.6 Rural No EMIS LV 
PR2 7,100 Yes 17.48 Rural Yes EMIS LV 
PR3 5,300 No 6.62 Rural Yes EMIS LV 
PR4 8, 800 Yes 16.53 Urban No TPP SystmOne 
PR5 5,000 Yes 4.23 Urban No EMIS LV 
PR6 12,000 Yes 43.23 Urban No Isoft Premiere  
PR7 3,500 Yes 7.93 Urban No EMIS LV 
PR8 1,600 Yes 38.74 Urban No TPP SystmOne 
PR9 9,400 No 18.33 Urban No EMIS PCS 
PR10 4,200 No 47.51 Urban No EMIS PCS 
PR11 6,000 Yes 44.23 Urban No EMIS PCS 
PR12 3,300 Yes 53.99 Urban No EMIS PCS 
PR13 4,700 No 58.64 Urban No EMIS LV 
PR14 4,700 Yes 44.62 Urban No EMIS LV 
PR15 2,800 Yes 41.4 Urban No EMIS LV 
 a 
Code used for the purposes of the
 
study only; 
b
 Numbers rounded to the nearest 100 to help preserve 
anonymity of the general practices; 
c
 Based on 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation figures. 
Table 4: Comparison of characteristics general practices involved in the PRACtICe 
study with National figures for England 
Characteristic Mean (standard deviation) 
across GP practices studied 
Mean National Figure 
a
 
Practice List Size 5,916 (3,014) 6,487
a
 
Number of GPs 5 (2.3) 4.8
b
 
   
Deprivation using Index of 
Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2007 
score 
 
30.4 (18.2) 21.7
c
 
QoF medicines management 
points per practice 
 
99.2% (2.0) 97.2%
d
 
QoF total points per practice 92.5% (6.8) 93.7%
d
 
a 
Calculated from figures for England 2008 (available from http://www.ic.nhs.uk/webfiles/publications/)  
b 
Calculated from figures from the NHS Information Centre for 2010: total GPs in England: 39,409; total general 
practices: 8,305 (http://www.ic.nhs.uk )  
c
 Mean IMD score for English Lower layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs)(available from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100410180038/http://communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourho
odrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/);  
d
 2010 Quality and Outcomes Framework figures for England (available from: http://www.ic.nhs.uk/qof ) 
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6.1.2 Characteristics of patients 
The study involved examination of the records of 1,777 patients.  These patients had a mean 
age of 39.3 years (standard deviation: 22.7 years), and 884 (49.8%) were female.  The age 
distribution of the patients is shown in Table 5 compared with 2010 figures for the English 
population.  It can be seen that the age distributions were similar. 
Table 5: Age distribution of patients 
Age categories Frequency Percentage for study 
patients 
Percentage for the English 
population 2010a 
0-14 years 297 16.7 17.6 
15-64 years 1,197 67.4 66.1 
65-74 years 147 8.3 8.5 
75 and over 136 7.7 7.9 
Total 1,777 100.0 100.0 
a
 Figures calculated from national data for 2010 available from: http://www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-
data-collections/population-and-geography/gp-registered-populations/attribution-dataset-gp-
registered-populations-2010 
Of the 1,777 patients, 1,200 (67.5%) had at least one prescription during the 12 month 
retrospective review of their records.  
6.1.3 Characteristics of the prescriptions reviewed 
Collectively, the pharmacists reviewed 6,048 unique prescription items for 1,200 patients. Of 
these, 2,929 (48.4%) were acute prescriptions; 3,119 (51.6%) were repeat prescriptions; 770 
(12.7%) were items that were considered to require blood test monitoring (see Appendix 6).  
Including those patients with no prescriptions, the median number of prescriptions per 
patient was 2 (interquartile range (IQR) 0,5) and the maximum number of unique items 
prescribed to any patient during the 12 month review of their records was 32.  The majority 
of prescriptions were for females (3,459; 57.2%).  
Acute prescription items were recorded for 988 patients and the median number of unique 
acute prescription items per patient was 2 (IQR 1,3), with the maximum being 19.  Repeat 
prescriptions were recorded for 722 patients the median number of unique repeat 
prescription items per patient was 1 (IQR 0,4), with the maximum being 24. 
The different categories of drug prescribed (by chapter of the British National Formulary) are 
shown in Table 6.  It can be seen that the most commonly prescribed drugs were for 
cardiovascular disease, central nervous system (CNS), infections and skin. 
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Table 6: Distribution of prescription items reviewed by British National Formulary 
chapter 
Chapter of the British National 
Formulary 
Frequency Percentage 
Gastro-intestinal system 484 8 
Cardiovascular system 1,047 17.3 
Respiratory system 503 8.3 
CNS 987 16.3 
Infections 732 12.1 
Endocrine 369 6.1 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 222 3.7 
Malignant and immunosuppression 21 0.4 
Nutrition and Blood 208 3.4 
Musculoskeletal 289 4.8 
Eye 150 2.5 
ENT 144 2.4 
Skin 699 11.6 
Immunology and vaccines 170 2.8 
Anaesthesia 23 0.4 
Total 6,048 100.0 
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The top 20 drugs most commonly prescribed are shown in Table 7. It can be seen that these 
drugs made up almost a third of the prescriptions.  
Table 7: Top 20 drugs most commonly prescribed 
Preparation name Frequency Percentage 
Amoxicillin 209 3.5 
Paracetamol 169 2.8 
Simvastatin 155 2.6 
Aspirin 136 2.3 
Salbutamol 136 2.3 
Influenza vaccine 107 1.8 
Omeprazole 107 1.8 
Ibuprofen 102 1.7 
Ramipril 90 1.5 
Flucloxacillin 87 1.4 
Levothyroxine 86 1.4 
Lansoprazole 76 1.3 
Amlodipine 75 1.2 
Bendroflumethiazide 73 1.2 
Prednisolone 60 1.0 
Cetirizine 55 0.9 
Co-amoxiclav 51 0.8 
Metformin 48 0.8 
Atenolol 47 0.8 
Diclofenac Sodium 46 0.8 
Total 1,915 31.7 
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Table 8 shows the distribution of different formulations for the 6,048 prescription items. It 
can be seen that oral medication made up over 70% of prescriptions. 
Table 8: Distribution of different types of formulation 
Formulation Frequency Percentage 
Solid oral 3,916 64.8 
Topical 850 14.1 
Inhalers 411 6.8 
Liquid oral 376 6.2 
Injections 258 4.3 
Eye /ear drops 183 3.0 
Pessaries 30 0.5 
Rectal 24 0.4 
Total 6,048 100.0 
 
5.1.4 Types of prescriber 
The distribution of different types of prescriber for the 6,048 prescription items is shown in 
Table 9.  It can be seen that the vast majority of prescription items were issued by were GP 
partners. 
Table 9: Types of prescriber that issued the prescription items in the study 
Prescriber type Frequency Percentage 
GP Partner 4,858 80.3 
Salaried GP 779 12.9 
Locum GP 185 3.1 
Training GP 133 2.2 
Non-medical prescriber 60 1.0 
Other/Unknown 33 0.6 
Total 6,048 100.0 
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6.2 Prevalence of medication problems 
From the 6,048 prescription items on the database we identified the following numbers of 
medication problems: 
 247 prescribing errors 
 55 monitoring errors 
 427 cases of sub optimal prescribing 
 8 legal problems 
The prevalence of prescribing or monitoring errors for different groups of patients over the 12 
month data collection period was as follows: 
 
 All patients (n=1,777): 12% (95% CI 10.5%-13.6%) 
 Patients who had received at least one medication (n=1,200): 17.8% (95% CI 15.7%-
20%) 
 Patients aged 75 years and older who had received at least one medication (n=129): 
38% (95% CI 29.5%-46.5%) 
 Patients who had received five or more drugs over the data collection period (n=471): 
30.1% (95% CI 26.6%-35%) 
 Patients who had received 10 or more drugs over the data collection period (n=172): 
47% (95% CI 39%-54%) 
Table 10 below shows the percentage prevalence of prescriptions with different types of 
medication problem along with 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 10: Percentage prevalence of prescriptions with different types of medication 
errors 
Variable Observations Percentage 
prevalence 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Prescribing error 6,048 4.0 3.5 4.5 
Monitoring error 6,048 0.9 0.7  1.1 
Prescribing or monitoring 
error 
6,048 4.9 4.4 5.4 
Legal problem 6,048 0.1 0.03 0.2 
Suboptimal prescribing 6,048 6.9 6.3 7.6 
Any of the above 
prescribing problems 
6,048 11.8 11.0 12.6 
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Restricting the analysis to the 770 prescription items that require blood test monitoring in 
certain circumstances showed a percentage prevalence of monitoring errors of 7.1% (95% 
CI 5.3, 9.0).  
6.3 Types of prescribing and monitoring errors 
The distributions of different types of prescribing and monitoring errors are shown in Table 
11 and Table 12 respectively.  It can be seen that almost a third of prescribing errors were 
associated with information being incomplete on the prescription. Two thirds of prescribing 
errors were associated with the top four categories of error. 
 
Table 11: Distribution of different types of prescribing errors 
Types of prescribing error Frequency Percentage 
Incomplete information on prescription 74 30.0 
Dose/strength error 44 17.8 
Timing error 26 10.5 
Frequency error 20 8.1 
Omission error due to failure to prescribe 
concomitant treatment 
19 7.7 
Unnecessary drug 12 4.9 
Contraindication error 12 4.9 
Incorrect drug 10 4.0 
Duplication 9 3.6 
Interaction error 9 3.6 
Allergy error 3 1.2 
Inadequate documentation in medical 
records 
3 1.2 
Quantity error  3 1.2 
Formulation error 2 0.8 
Generic/Brand name error 1 0.4 
Total 247 100.0 
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Table 12: Distribution of different types of monitoring error 
Type of monitoring error Frequency Percentage 
Monitoring not requested 38 69.1 
Requested but not done 12 21.8 
Results not available 5 9.1 
Total 55 100.0 
 
Table 13 shows the drugs most commonly associated with prescribing errors.  In total there 
were 134 different drugs associated with prescribing errors, and the 25 shown in the table 
account for half of the errors. 
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Table 13: Drugs most commonly associated with prescribing errors 
Preparation name Frequency Percentage 
Simvastatin 26 10.5 
Amoxicillin 7 2.8 
Influenza vaccine 6 2.4 
Prednisolone 6 2.4 
Betamethasone Valerate 5 2.0 
Diclofenac Sodium 6 2.4 
Ibuprofen 5 2.0 
Aciclovir 4 1.6 
Allopurinol 4 1.6 
Flucloxacillin 4 1.6 
Fucibet® (fucidic acid and 
betamethasone cream) 
4 1.6 
Hydrocortisone cream 4 1.6 
Meloxicam 4 1.6 
Naproxen 4 1.6 
Co-amoxiclav 3 1.2 
Dalacin T® (clindamycin topical 
solution) 
3 1.2 
Elocon® (mometasone topical 
preparations) 
3 1.2 
Fucidin H® (fucidic acid and 
hydrocortisone cream) 
3 1.2 
Gabapentin 3 1.2 
Paracetamol 3 1.2 
Sofradex® ear/eye drops 3 1.2 
Carbamazepine (Tegretol®) 3 1.2 
Timolol 3 1.2 
Trimovate® cream 3 1.2 
Xalatan® (latanoprost) eyedrops 3 1.2 
Others 125 50.6 
Total 247   
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Table 14 below shows the proportion of prescribing errors from different BNF chapters. The 
top four BNF chapters were those that also accounted for the highest numbers of 
prescriptions (see Table 6).  
Table 14: Proportion of prescribing errors from different British National Formulary 
chapters 
British National Formulary 
Chapter 
Frequency Percentage 
Cardiovascular system 41 16.6 
Skin 39 15.8 
CNS 33 13.4 
Infections 29 11.7 
Musculoskeletal 28 11.3 
Endocrine 15 6.1 
Eye 15 6.1 
Respiratory system 13 5.3 
Gastro-intestinal system 8 3.2 
ENT 8 3.2 
Immunology and vaccines 6 2.4 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 4 1.6 
Nutrition and Blood 5 2.0 
Malignant and 
immunosuppression 
3 1.2 
Total 247 100 
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Table 15 shows the drug preparations associated with monitoring errors. It can be seen that 
simvastatin, warfarin, ramipril and bendroflumethiazide accounted for over 60% of the errors. 
Table 15: Drugs associated with monitoring errors 
Preparation name  Frequency Percentage 
Simvastatin 10 18.2 
Warfarin 9 16.4 
Ramipril 8 14.6 
Bendroflumethiazide 7 12.7 
Furosemide 5 9.1 
Azathioprine 2 3.6 
Atorvastatin 2 3.6 
Perindopril 2 3.6 
Candesartan 1 1.8 
Amiodarone 1 1.8 
Bumetanide 1 1.8 
Carbimazole 1 1.8 
Valsartan and hydrochlorothiazide (Diovan®) 1 1.8 
Levothyroxine 1 1.8 
Lisinopril 1 1.8 
Losartan Potassium 1 1.8 
Methotrexate 1 1.8 
Lithium carbonate 1 1.8 
Total 55 100.0 
 
Table 16 shows the proportion of monitoring errors coming from different BNF chapters.  It 
can be seen that the vast majority of monitoring errors concern drugs from the 
cardiovascular chapter. 
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Table 16: Proportion of monitoring errors from different British National Formulary 
chapters 
British National Formulary 
chapter 
Frequency Percentage 
Cardiovascular system 49 89.1 
Endocrine 2 3.6 
Malignant and immunosuppression 2 3.6 
CNS 1 1.8 
Musculoskeletal 1 1.8 
Total 55 100.0 
Further information is provided below on drug preparations most commonly associated with 
different types of prescribing error.  Table 17 shows the drugs most commonly associated 
with incomplete information being given on the prescription. Rather than giving specific 
dosage instructions, these prescriptions often stated “as directed”, or gave similar non-
specific instructions. 
Table 17: Drug preparations most commonly associated with information incomplete 
on the prescription 
Preparation name Frequency Percentage 
Prednisolone 6 8.1 
Betamethasone valerate topical preparations 4 5.4 
Gabapentin 3 4.1 
Sofradex® ear/eye drops 3 4.1 
Trimovate® cream 3 4.1 
Xalatan® (latanoprost) eyedrops 3 4.1 
Bisoprolol Fumarate 2 2.7 
Colchicine 2 2.7 
Fucidic acid (Fucidin®) cream 2 2.7 
Lumigan® (bimatoprost) eye drops 2 2.7 
Timolol 2 2.7 
Tramadol Hydrochloride 2 2.7 
Others 40 54.1 
Total 74 100.0 
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The BNF chapters most commonly associated with information incomplete on the 
prescription is shown in Table 18.  It can be seen that skin preparations made up a fifth of 
this type of error. 
Table 18: British National Formulary chapters associated with incomplete information 
on prescriptions 
BNF chapter Frequency Percentage 
Skin 15 20.3 
CNS 14 18.9 
Eye 12 16.2 
Cardiovascular system 7 9.5 
Endocrine 7 9.5 
Respiratory system 6 8.1 
Infections 4 5.4 
ENT 3 4.1 
Musculoskeletal 3 4.1 
Gastro-intestinal system 2 2.7 
Obstetrics and gynaecology 1 1.4 
Total 74 100.0 
The 44 dose/strength errors involved 35 different drug preparations.  Of these, 6 (14%) were 
associated with oral antimicrobial agents; 4 (9%) with allopurinol (excessive doses in renal 
impairment); 3 (7%) with paracetamol (incorrect dose in children) and 2 (5%) with 
rosuvastatin (40mg dose in patients without “severe hypercholesterolaemia with high 
cardiovascular risk under specialist supervision”).   
There were just two drug preparations associated with the 26 timing errors.  All of these 
were due to simvastatin not being prescribed ‘to be taken at night’ (in 25 cases the 
prescription was for simvastatin and in one it was for Inergy®, which is a combination of 
simvastatin and ezetimide). 
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The drug preparations associated with frequency errors are shown in Table 19. 
Table 19: Drug preparations associated with frequency errors 
Preparation name Frequency Percentage 
Fucibet® (fucidic acid and betamethasone cream) 3 15 
Aciclovir 2 10 
Dalacin T® (clindamycin) topical solution 2 10 
Flucloxacillin 2 10 
Hydrocortisone 2 10 
Clotrimazole with hydrocortisone cream 1 5 
Chloramphenicol 1 5 
Co-amoxiclav 1 5 
Dovobet® (calcitopriol and betamethasone topical 
preparations) 
1 5 
Elocon® (mometasone) topical preparations 1 5 
Fucidin H® (fucidic acid and hydrocortisone) cream 1 5 
Lansoprazole 1 5 
Morphine sulphate modified release tablets 1 5 
Promethazine 1 5 
Total 20 100 
There were nine drug combinations that were judged to be interaction errors.  These 
included the following: 
 Three cases involving aminophylline (two of these were with macrolides and one with 
ciprofloxacin). 
 Two cases involving co-prescription of two non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs at 
the same time. 
 One case of a patient receiving co-amilofruse (a potassium sparing diuretic) with 
valsartan when the patient had a recent history of having potassium levels above the 
reference range. 
 One case of a patient prescribed calcium and a bisphosphonate to be taken at the 
same time (calcium reduces the absorption of bisphosphonates). 
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Notable points from analysis of the other types of prescribing error are highlighted below:  
 Of the 19 omission errors relating to failure to prescribe concomitant treatment, 16 
(84%) of these involved not prescribing an ulcer-healing drug to protect against 
gastrointestinal bleed in patients taking non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. 
 Of the 12 errors associated with prescribing contraindicated drugs, four (33.3%) were 
for combined oral contraceptive pills where the women concerned had two or more 
risk factors for thromboembolic disease. 
 Of the nine duplication errors, five (55.6%) of these were for influenza vaccine, where 
records indicated that a patient had received two prescriptions (although there was 
no clear evidence that any patient had actually received two influenza vaccine 
injections in the same season). 
 Of the three allergy errors, two were associated with penicillin containing products 
and one was for aciclovir (in each case, there had been clear documentation of 
previous allergy in the patient's medical record; in none of these cases was there 
evidence that the patient had been harmed by the prescribing error). 
 The single generic/brand name error was associated with carbamazepine being 
prescribed generically to a patient with grand mal epilepsy.  
6.4 Severity assessment of medication errors 
The judges assessed 241 different cases, representing a total of 302 prescribing and 
monitoring errors (since some errors were identical and only one representative case was 
assessed).  The distribution of severity scores was somewhat skewed, with more errors 
having lower severity scores; descriptive statistics are therefore presented using median and 
inter-quartile ranges.  However we also calculated mean scores where appropriate, to aid 
comparison with the existing literature. 
For the 302 errors, the mean severity score was 3.5, and the median was 3.3 (IQR 2.2, 4.4).  
The minimum severity score was 0.7; the maximum was 8.6.  The 55 monitoring errors had 
a median score of 3.8; the 247 prescribing errors had a lower median score of 3.0. 
Overall, 128 (42.4%) errors had scores of less than 3, and were thus deemed to be minor; 
163 (54.0%) had scores of 3 to 7 and were thus moderate; 11 (3.6%) had scores greater 
than 7 and were thus severe.  Table 20 presents in more detail how the minor, moderate 
and severe errors were distributed across different types of error.  
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Table 20: Error types most commonly associated with severe, moderate and minor 
errors 
Error type Error sub-category Minor Moderate Severe 
Monitoring 
errors 
Monitoring not requested 4 29 5 
Monitoring results not available 0 1 4 
Monitoring requested but not done 2 10 0 
Prescribing 
errors 
Allergy error 0 1 2 
Information incomplete 41 32 0 
Dose/strength error 17 27 0 
Failure to prescribe concomitant treatment 1 19 0 
Contraindication error 0 12 0 
Interaction error 1 8 0 
Frequency error 14 6 0 
Unnecessary drug 6 6 0 
Incorrect drug 6 4 0 
Inadequate documentation in medical 
record 
1 2 0 
Quantity error 1 2 0 
Formulation error 0 2 0 
Duplication 8 1 0 
Generic/brand name error 0 1 0 
Timing error 26 0 0 
 Total 128 163 11 
An illustrative sample of minor and moderate errors, and descriptions of all eleven severe 
errors, is presented in Table 21.  Of the eleven severe errors, nine involved warfarin 
monitoring and two involved prescribing a drug to which the patient had a documented 
allergy.  Of the nine warfarin-monitoring errors, eight occurred in three patients from the 
same GP practice, where it was routine practice to prescribe warfarin without knowledge of 
the patient’s INR.  There was no documented evidence of harm arising from any of these 
severe errors.  
Moderate errors mainly involved monitoring; incomplete information on the prescription; 
dose/strength errors, and failure to prescribe concomitant treatment (mainly failure to 
prescribe gastroprotection to older patients receiving regular NSAIDs).  
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Table 21: An illustrative sample of minor and moderate errors, and all eleven severe 
errors 
Minor errors Moderate errors Severe errors 
1-year old girl prescribed 
amoxicillin 125mg/5ml 
suspension twice during same 
consultation.  One was for 
2.5ml TDS
a
 for one week, and 
the other for 5ml
a
 for one 
week. 
 
Topical betamethasone 0.1% 
prescribed in adult patient.  No 
directions given relating to 
frequency of application. 
 
Betamethasone cream 0.1% 
prescribed "to be applied 
sparingly for one week" for a 5 
year old child. No frequency of 
use specified. 
 
29 year old patient prescribed 
co-amoxiclav tablets 21 x 
500mg/125mg for sinusitis. 
Dose and frequency not 
specified on prescription. 
 
Indapamide 1.5mg MR
b
 
tablets prescribed "as 
directed".  No other dose 
instructions given on 
prescription. 
64-year old patient was 
prescribed ibuprofen 400mg to 
be taken one tablet three 
times daily after a road 
accident. No concomitant 
medication was prescribed for 
gastric protection. Patient also 
on aspirin for peripheral 
vascular disease. 
 
Indometacin 50mg prescribed 
with dosage instructions 'as 
directed', with no instructions 
on frequency or maximum 
daily intake. Patient diagnosed 
with alcoholic cirrhosis of the 
liver. 
 
Patient was prescribed 
levothyroxine 25mcg to be 
taken one tablet a day. 
Thyroid function tests were 
requested but not done. 
 
4 year old girl seen in March 
2010 with continuous vomiting 
and some loose stools.  
Prescribed metoclopramide 
liquid 5mg/5ml, to be taken as 
5ml twice daily. This should be 
used with caution in children, 
and recommended dose for 
4yr old is 2mg 2-3 times daily. 
62 year old patient with 
documented allergy to 
penicillin; prescribed a course 
of oral flucloxacillin. 
 
Aciclovir 200mg prescribed to 
be taken one tablet five times 
a day for a widespread 
coldsore, to a patient coded 
with a severe allergic reaction 
to aciclovir. 
 
Elderly patients on warfarin.  
Last documented INR
c
 was 
more than two years 
previously (n=7 errors). 
 
93 year old patient on 
warfarin. Last documented 
INR
c 
was more than a year 
previously.  Patient failed to 
attend three consecutive 
anticoagulant appointments, 
but warfarin prescription 
continued. 
 
76 year old patient on 
warfarin. Last INR
c
 
documented more than 6 
months previously. 
a
TDS: three times daily; 
b
MR: Modified release; 
c
INR: International Normalised Ratio 
 
6.5 Modelling the risks of prescribing or monitoring errors 
We used mixed effects logistic regression techniques to model the relationships between the 
risk of medication error and selected predictor variables and apriori confounders.  We 
performed analyses at both the patient level and the prescription level. The outcome 
measures were binary in nature.  For the patient-level models the outcome was defined as 
patients with one or more prescribing or monitoring errors versus patients with no prescribing 
or monitoring errors. The outcome for the prescription-level models was similarly defined 
with the outcome being prescriptions with one or more prescribing or monitoring errors 
versus prescriptions with no prescribing or monitoring errors. 
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Initially for all models, the risk of error was be fitted against each predictor variable and 
apriori confounder in several univariate models.  A parsimonious model, including the most 
clinically relevant confounders and predictor variables, was then fitted in a multivariate mixed 
effects logistic regression model.  Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for the adjusted 
risk of error were then reported.  
In the patient level models, we included practices in the random effects portion of the model 
in order to adjust for the clustering effect of patients within practices.  Patient and practice 
characteristics as well as relevant apriori confounders were modelled as fixed effects.   
In the prescription levels model, we included patients in the random effects portion of the 
model in order to adjust for the clustering effect of prescriptions within patients.  Prescription 
and practice characteristics as well as relevant apriori confounders were modelled as fixed 
effects.  In some models we were unable to adjust for clustering effect by patients because 
the models would not converge.  We have therefore presented the results of two 
multivariable models, one which does not adjust for clustering by patients, and one that does 
but adjusts for fewer variables. 
The findings from the patient level model are shown in Table 22.   
 64 
 
Table 22: Patient level model of risks associated with prescribing or monitoring errors 
 Univariate models  Multivariable models 
Factor Odds ratio 95%CI P value  Odds ratio 95%CI P value 
sex1 0.76 0.56 1.02 0.064  0.66 0.48 0.92 0.013 
Number of drugs 1.17 1.13 1.20 <0.001  1.16 1.12 1.19 <0.001 
Age2          
0-14 years 1.53 0.99 2.35 0.053  1.87 1.19 2.94 0.006 
65-74 years 2.69 1.73 4.20 <0.001  1.68 1.04 2.73 0.035 
75 years and over 4.26 2.80 6.47 <0.001  1.95 1.19 3.19 0.008 
Dispensing 
practice3 
1.05 0.73 1.51 0.781  0.70 0.26 1.88 0.476 
Not a training 
practice4 
1.33 0.98 1.81 0.065  1.39 0.97 2.01 0.075 
Practice size5          
<5000 patients 0.83 0.58 1.17 0.281  0.88 0.58 1.33 0.553 
>10000 patients 0.74 0.49 1.11 0.147  0.56 0.31 0.99 0.047 
Urban or rural 
practice6 
1.03 0.74 1.44 0.849  1.06 0.43 2.58 0.905 
Baseline categories: 1Male; 215-64 years; 3Non dispensing practice; 4Training practice; 55000-10000 patients; 6Urban practice 
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There were a number of significant associations from the multivariate analysis of the 
patient-level model: 
 For each additional unique medication item that the patient had received over the 
course of the 12 month retrospective data collection there was a 16% increased risk 
of error (odds ratio 1.16, 95%CI 1.12-1.19, P<0.001) 
 Women were less likely than men to have a medication error (odds ratio 0.66, 95%CI 
0.48-0.92, P=0 .013) 
 The following age groups were more likely (than age group 15-64 years) to have a 
prescribing or monitoring error: 
o 0-14, odds ratio 1.87 (95%CI 1.19-2.94, P=0.006) 
o 65-74, odds ratio 1.68 (95%CI 1.04-2.73, P=0.035) 
o ≥ 75, odds ratio 1.95 (95%CI 1.19-3.19, P=0.008) 
 Compared with a list size of 5000-10,000, patients in practices with a list size of > 
10,000 had reduced risk of error: odds ratio 0.56 (95%CI 0.31-0.99, P=0.047) 
The findings from the prescription level model are shown in Table 23.  There were a number 
of significant associations from the multivariate analysis: 
 For drugs on the monitoring list, there was an increased risk of error (odds ratio 3.18, 
95%CI 2.66-11.49, P <0.001) 
 For the following drug groups (compared with gastrointestinal drugs) there was an 
increased risk of error: 
o Cardiovascular (odds ratio 2.37, 95%CI 1.03-5.45, P=0.042) 
o Infections (odds ratio 2.67, 95%CI 1.17-6.11, P=0.02) 
o Malignant disease and immunosuppression (odds ratios 6.77, 95%CI 1.71-
26.84, P=0 .006) 
o Musculoskeletal (odds ratio 6.97 95%CI 3.06-15.88, P <0.001) 
o Eye (odds ratio 4.92, 95%CI 1.12-21.62, P=0 .035) 
o ENT odds ratio 4.6, 95%CI 1.29-16.42, P = 0.019) 
o Skin (odds ratio 5.78, 95%CI 2.04-16.36, P = 0.001) 
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Table 23: Prescription level model of risks associated with prescribing or monitoring errors 
Factor Univariate models  Multivariable model 1a   Multivariable model 2b  
 Odds 
ratio 
95%CI P value  Odds 
ratio 
95%CI P value  Odds 
ratio 
95%CI P value 
On monitoring list 3.57 2.68 4.75 <0.001  3.18 2.05 4.94 <0.001  3.63 2.65 4.98 <0.001 
Repeat 
prescriptionc 
1.39 1.08 1.79 0.011  1.25 0.91 1.72 0.168  0.98 0.73 1.31 0.903 
Formulationd               
Eye/ear drops 2.01 1.21 3.33 0.007  1.43 0.39 5.23 0.586      
Inhalers 0.41 0.21 0.81 0.01  0.51 0.21 1.27 0.149      
Injections 0.51 0.24 1.10 0.447  0.41 0.06 3.07 0.387      
Liquid oral 0.82 0.49 1.38 0.087  1.08 0.60 1.95 0.794      
Rectal 0.80 0.11 5.95 0.827  1.93 0.24 15.42 0.535      
Topical 0.98 0.70 1.37 0.905  0.66 0.31 1.42 0.287      
Prescriber typee               
Salaried GP 0.64 0.41 1.00 0.051  0.71 0.46 1.11 0.13  0.76 0.47 1.22 0.258 
Locum GP 1.12 0.55 2.27 0.761  1.16 0.60 2.28 0.655  1.23 0.60 2.54 0.576 
Training GP 1.34 0.63 2.85 0.441  1.42 0.67 3.01 0.353  1.66 0.74 3.72 0.218 
Non-medical 
prescriber 
0.87 0.25 3.06 0.832  1.55 0.47 5.13 0.469  1.09 0.30 3.91 0.898 
Other/Unknown 1.78 0.50 6.43 0.376  1.78 0.52 6.14 0.358  1.97 0.54 7.23 0.305 
Continued overleaf 
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Factor Univariate models  Multivariable model 1a  Multivariable model 2b 
 Odds 
ratio 
95%CI P value  Odds 
ratio 
95%CI P value  Odds 
ratio 
95%CI P value 
British National 
Formulary chapterf 
              
Cardiovascular 
system 
5.53 2.66 11.49 <0.001  2.37 1.03 5.45 0.042      
Respiratory system 1.58 0.65 3.84 0.315  2.26 0.83 6.17 0.11      
CNS 2.06 0.94 4.49 0.07  2.09 0.95 4.63 0.068      
Infections 2.37 1.07 5.24 0.034  2.67 1.17 6.11 0.02      
Endocrine 2.87 1.23 6.73 0.015  1.91 0.78 4.72 0.159      
Obs_Gynae 1.09 0.33 3.66 0.887  1.41 0.41 4.80 0.584      
Malignant and 
immunosuppression 
14.00 3.84 51.07 <0.001  6.77 1.71 26.84 0.006      
Nutrition and Blood 1.17 0.35 3.92 0.803  1.22 0.36 4.15 0.752      
Musculoskeletal 6.38 2.87 14.21 <0.001  6.97 3.06 15.88 <0.001      
Eye 6.61 2.74 15.92 <0.001  4.92 1.12 21.62 0.035      
ENT 3.50 1.29 9.50 0.014  4.60 1.29 16.42 0.019      
Skin 3.52 1.63 7.59 0.001  5.78 2.04 16.36 0.001      
Immunology and 
vaccines 
2.18 0.74 6.37 0.155  5.91 0.60 58.00 0.127      
Computer systemg               
EMIS PCS 1.17 0.83 1.64 0.371  1.06 0.79 1.42 0.706  1.13 0.80 1.60 0.501 
Isoft Premiere 0.64 0.40 1.00 0.051  0.68 0.46 1.01 0.055  0.64 0.40 1.01 0.058 
TPP 1.06 0.68 1.65 0.812  1.05 0.71 1.56 0.803  0.94 0.58 1.52 0.81 
a
 Model unadjusted for clustering by patient; 
b
 Model adjusted for clustering by patient but formulation and chapter not included in the model; Baseline categories:  
c Acute prescriptions; d Solid oral medication (pessaries category omitted); e GP partner; f Gastrointestinal (anaesthesia chapter omitted); g EMIS LV. 
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6.5 Analysis of omission errors related to failure to prescribe a drug 
for an existing clinical condition 
Following the review of case notes of 1777, the pharmacists identified 15 patients with 
possible omission errors relating to failure to prescribe a drug for an existing clinical 
condition.  These were cases where there was no documentation to suggest that a decision 
had been made not to prescribe the drug, e.g. due to patient preference or a previous 
adverse reaction. They were different errors to those associated with failure to prescribe 
concomitant treatment.  Three of the cases were not considered to be errors by the research 
team.  Eleven of the remaining 12 were associated with failure to prescribe cardiovascular 
drugs: 
 Failure to prescribe a statin in patients with >20% 10-year risk of developing 
cardiovascular disease (n=5)  
 Failure to prescribe aspirin in patients with coronary heart disease (n=4) 
 Failure to prescribe glyceryl trinitrate spray in a patient with angina who had been 
prescribed this medicine at a previous general practice (n=1) 
 Failure to prescribe warfarin in patient with atrial fibrillation (n=1)  
The remaining case involved failure to prescribe metformin to a patient with diabetes mellitus 
who had received the drug in the past, but had then stopped receiving the medication with 
no documented reason for this.  
6.6 Analysis of data regarding reconciliation of hospital discharge 
medication 
The pharmacists identified 38 patients who had at least one hospital discharge during the 
12-month retrospective review of their medical records. Sixteen (42.1%) patients were from 
Luton, 14 (36.8%) from Nottinghamshire and seven (18.4%) from City and Hackney PCT.  
One patient did not have a discharge summary in the case notes and was, therefore, 
excluded from the analysis.  Of the remaining 37 patients, 21 were female (56.8%).  The 
median number of medications on each discharge summary was 7 (range 1-15, IQR 5-9) 
and the total number of medications present in the discharge summaries for all the patients 
combined was 252.  Before hospital admission, the patients were taking a total of 194 
medications.  Of these, 29 (15%) appeared to be discontinued by the hospitals.  
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In 36 patients (97%) there was a difference between the medications that the patient was 
taking before admission and those listed in the discharge summary.  In reference to the 
medication record at the time of hospital discharge, Table 24 summarises similarities and 
differences with the medicines patients were taking before hospital admission. 
Table 24: Similarities and differences between medications at hospital discharge and 
those that patients were taking prior to admission 
Similarities and differences in medications Proportion 
(%) 
How many of the 
changes were 
highlighted on the 
discharge 
communication? 
Proportion of drugs on the discharge summary that were 
prescribed pre-admission and appear to have been 
continued by the hospital at the same dose 
139/252 
(55.2%) 
Not applicable 
Proportion of drugs on the discharge summary that were 
prescribed pre-admission and appear to have been 
continued by the hospital at a different dose 
26/252 
(10.3%) 
0 
Proportion of drugs on the discharge summary that 
appear to have been newly prescribed by the hospital 
87/252 
(34.5%) 
7/87 
(8%) 
Total 252/252 
(100%) 
7/113 
(6%) 
 
In six patients, it was unclear from the case note review when the hospital discharge 
medications were registered on the patient record.  For the remaining patients, the median 
number of days it took the practices to record on the practice computer the medications the 
patient was taking at the time of discharge from hospital was less than one day (IQR 0, 4.25; 
range 0 - 60).  
Table 25 provides a summary of the issues/problems that the pharmacists detected in 
relation to medications in the discharge summaries.  Also, as can be inferred from Table 24, 
in 92% (80/87) of cases the discharge communication did not specifically highlight drugs that 
had been newly prescribed by the hospital.  There were no cases where the discharge 
communications specifically highlighted changes in dose for drugs that patients were taking 
before admission. 
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Table 25: Summary of the issues noted in the medications in the discharge summary 
communication 
Issue noted Proportion of discharge medications where 
an issue was noted (%)  
Name of drug unclear 1/252  (0.4) 
Drug form missing 157/252  (62.3) 
Drug form unclear 11/252  (4.4) 
Dose missing  2/252  (0.8) 
Dose unclear 4/252  (1.6) 
Dose instructions missing 0  
Dose instructions unclear 2/252  (0.8) 
Suggested duration of use missing 55/252  (21.8) 
Suggested duration of use unclear 5/252  (2.0) 
When reviewing the case notes of patients, the pharmacists were asked to assess whether 
there were discrepancies between the hospital discharge communication and those 
subsequently prescribed to the patient.  Discrepancies were found in 16 patients (43.2%).  
Of the 87 drugs newly prescribed by the hospital, 21 (24%, median 1 and IQR 1-2) were not 
continued by the practice.  Also, of the 87 drugs newly prescribed by the hospital one was 
not prescribed subsequently by the practice at the dose suggested by the hospital; one was 
not prescribed subsequently with the dosage instructions suggested by the hospital, and one 
was not prescribed by the practice for the duration suggested by the hospital.  Thus, of the 
87 drugs newly prescribed by the hospital, 24 (28%) were either not continued, or there was 
some discrepancy between the prescribing advice of the hospital and the subsequent 
prescription.  
Of the 26 drugs that patients were taking before hospital admission, where the hospital had 
suggested a change in dose, this suggested dose change was not made by the practice in 
nine (35%) cases. 
For the drugs that appear to have been stopped by the hospital, none appeared to have 
been restarted by the practice within a month of hospital discharge. 
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Chapter 7: Error producing conditions 
  
Summary 
In this chapter, the seven main error-producing conditions perceived to contribute to an 
increased risk of prescribing errors were described and explored in-depth.  Such an 
exploration enabled a diverse range of conditions within each of these categories to be 
presented and the perceived challenges experienced by practice staff explained.  The 
main findings presented for each high-level condition were as follows: 
The Prescriber - five conditions were found to affect ‘The Prescriber’, namely their 
therapeutic training, drug knowledge and experience, knowledge of the patient, 
perception of risk, and physical and emotional health.  Undergraduate therapeutic 
training was felt by many to have been insufficiently taught at University. The “jump” 
from being a GP trainee to a salaried GP was also perceived to have been quite high.  
One example, in particular, emphasised not only the importance of hands-on 
experience with chronic disease patients during VTS training, but also the need for 
trainees to have experience treating a range of patients at varying stages of their 
illnesses.  Some established GPs admitted becoming ‘slightly blasé’ about prescribing 
for their long-term patients, thus running the risk of overlooking certain things.  
Prescribers’ perception of risk appeared to be influenced by previous experience of a 
similar situation and the perceived severity of potential adverse effects associated with 
the drug.  
The Patient - patient characteristics (including personality, literacy issues, and 
language barrier) and the complexity of the individual case were found to have 
contributed to prescribing errors.  Some particular examples highlighted a tension 
between the GP’s responsibility to improve or maintain their patient’s health, and their 
view on the patient's responsibilities for their own health. 
The Team - poor communication and nurses’ quasi-autonomous role within the team 
were considered to be two key conditions influencing the occurrence of prescribing 
errors in general practice.  The communication between practice colleagues appeared 
to vary widely, with some feeling isolated whilst others felt very close and supported by 
their colleagues.  Two important factors may explain these different GPs’ perspectives, 
including the length of time the GP had been working in the practice and the frequency 
of formal / informal meetings within the practice.   
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  Summary Continued 
Nurses’ ‘quasi-autonomous role’ in chronic disease management was felt to be associated 
with an increased risk of prescribing errors in general practice, particularly because of the 
need to interrupt GPs to have prescriptions signed when the patient had not been assessed 
by the GP.   
The Working Environment – High workload, time pressures and associated stress were 
felt to be important factors making error almost inevitable. The failure of appointment 
systems to cope with patient demand was perceived as a particular source of stress. 
Distractions and interruptions were common for some GPs and thought to be an important 
cause of error because of their effects on disrupting prescribers’ thought processes. 
The Task – We focused on repeat prescribing systems and patient monitoring. Some safety 
issues were identified in the ordering and processing stage of repeat prescribing, but failure 
to properly review some patients was probably the most important cause of error. General 
practices had various systems aimed at ensuring timely blood-test monitoring for patients, 
but sometimes these broke down. The most important problem identified was in a practice 
where GPs prescribed warfarin without access to INR results. 
The Computer System – There were many positive comments about the role of clinical 
computer systems in preventing error, but some problems were highlighted including 
selecting the wrong drug or wrong dosage instructions from pick lists; overriding important 
drug-drug interaction alerts; unnecessary/inappropriate alerts; the need to maintain an 
accurate electronic health record, and staff sometimes expecting too much from the 
computer system. 
The Primary Secondary Care Interface - The quality of secondary care correspondence 
appeared to vary a lot, depending on the hospital and department. The ambiguous wording 
of hospital letters was also felt to be partly responsible for why some GPs failed to make 
changes recommended by specialists.  GPs recognised the need to update their patients’ 
computer records promptly with hospital information (once received), and individual 
practices’ processes to be in place verifying that these changes have been made.  Three 
important factors appeared to influence GPs’ decisions to prescribe medications 
recommended by specialists, including local guidance, whether the drugs were commonly 
used in general practice, and whether the GP perceived the harms to outweigh the benefits 
for the patient. 
 73 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In our analysis of the causes of prescribing and monitoring errors in general practice, we 
have identified a number of different error-producing conditions.  These have been classified 
into seven high-level categories: ‘the prescriber’, ‘the patient’, ‘the team’, ‘the task’, ‘the work 
environment’, ‘the computer system’, and ‘the primary/secondary care interface’. 
7.2 The Prescriber 
Five factors were found to impact on ‘The Prescriber’, namely their therapeutic training, drug 
knowledge and experience, knowledge of the patient, perception of risk, and physical and 
emotional health.  
7.2.1 Prescribers’ therapeutics training 
Many GPs recalled how their therapeutic training at university was poor.  One GP in 
particular felt it had been “extremely badly taught” (PR2-GP2) to him as an undergraduate, 
and admitted feeling a “little nervous” about his therapeutic knowledge since.  Other GPs’ 
accounts expressed similar views, with one stating how their therapeutics lectures did not 
occupy “a huge chunk of [the] syllabus” (PR3-GP2) and another how “Ten one hour lectures 
at 5.30 on a Friday evening didn’t a) guarantee interest or b) attendance”. (PR3-GP1) 
All GPs, both at a junior and senior level, agreed that a lot of their therapeutics knowledge 
had been picked up on the job in rather an ‘ad-hoc’ way, by talking amongst their peers and 
eliciting help from both the nursing and pharmacy staff.  One GP who reflected on her 
rotational training (in hospital) spoke overly about her dependence on others to tell her what 
to prescribe.  She explained how she had acted on the advice given to her by nurses, 
pharmacists and other people, according to what she understood to be “how things were  
[done] then” (PR3-GP2), but emphasised that this ‘over dependence’ might not have been 
appropriate.  She also felt that she was not formally taught how to prescribe whilst 
participating in the Vocational Training Scheme (VTS - a specialty training programme for 
General Practice), but perceived it more to be tied to specific conditions.  
“… before you get on the VTS it’s very much on the hoof, isn’t it?(…) in the old days, 
you were dependent on being told what to prescribe and dependent on the nurses 
and the pharmacists and other people, who shouldn’t necessarily have been telling 
you what to do, telling you, double checking that you were doing the right things but 
that was kind of how things were then, which wasn’t correct, don’t get me wrong but 
you were dependent on people. On the VTS I don’t think, we had a bit but we didn’t 
have a huge amount, it was more, well you did, it wasn’t prescribing so much a chunk 
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of time on how to prescribe it was more, it was all tied to conditions”. (PR3-GP2)  
In further analysis of the same interview, this GP’s most pressing concern was getting to 
grips with the management of long term patients with chronic conditions following training.  
She described how, as a trainee, she only experienced managing patients with chronic 
conditions up to a certain point, emphasising the short timescale for her training (six 
months).  For her, the “big jump” from being a GP trainee to a salaried GP was quite high 
and her experience of using a range of different medicines limited.  
“And I think also when you go from being (…) a trainee to being salaried it was quite 
a big jump because when you’re a trainee you’re only in a practice for six months 
maximum, well that’s what it was like, it’s changed now a bit, and so you never got 
any of the chronic conditions beyond a certain point so even if you diagnosed 
someone as diabetic you only had them on metformin and that would be it (…). 
There’s a lot of chronic conditions that you didn’t actually get to grips with or the 
medication properly”. (PR3-GP2) 
This particular example emphasises, not only the importance of hands-on experience with 
chronic patients during VTS, but also the need for trainees to have experience treating a 
range of patients at varying stages of their illnesses.  
7.2.2 Prescribers’ drug knowledge and experience  
Our analysis suggests that GPs tended to develop a repertoire of drugs over time that they 
were comfortable prescribing.  In their accounts, GPs explained how such behaviour was 
usual, reflecting on how it made it “easier to manage the risk” as they became familiar with 
their side effects.  Caution was exercised when using new, unusual or unfamiliar drugs, with 
one GP recounting how he would have to check the dosage and potential side effects of 
these drugs before prescribing. 
“if we go into esoteric areas then I’ve either got to sit down and scratch me head and 
have a think or I’m either going to get the BNF out and look or I’ll look online to see 
what the instructions are regarding the treatments. So for instance, if you’re dealing 
with eczema, so I’m quite familiar with all the steroid verbiage but if I wanted to use 
one of the new tacrolimus things then I would look it up because I don’t use those 
often enough to remember all the pros and cons in me head and what the dosages 
are”.(PR7-GP3)  
This was echoed by a second GP who admitted knowing very little about the drug 
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Herceptin® (trastuzumab) which was prescribed for one of her patients.  
“it’s really helpful to have a kind of baseline of drugs you’re familiar with. I think new 
drugs are a night-mare because I think new drugs or unusual drugs, I had a lass 
today who’s on Herceptin® and I don’t know Herceptin® so when she’s talking about 
potential side effects I don’t even know where to start [looking]”. (PR4-GP2)  
In both accounts, GPs appeared to recognise the risk of prescribing certain drugs that they 
were unfamiliar with, highlighting a need to check their side effects and dosages before 
prescribing.  As far as one GP was concerned, some people were often unwilling to do this, 
and would “just go ahead anyway instead of stopping a moment, checking the BNF to see 
what it says, and then following that advice”. (PR7-GP2) 
Two factors appeared to influence GPs’ prescribing of unfamiliar drugs.  Firstly, patients 
moved between practices, sometimes coming from different parts of the country where there 
were possibly “different local preference[s]”. (PR4-GP2)  Some GPs also highlighted how 
this could be ‘tricky’, with one acknowledging how her practice never uses any drugs that 
have not “gone through the formulary PCT process”. (FG5-GP2)  Secondly, several doctors 
described the difficulties around paediatric prescribing, emphasising how some drugs are not 
licensed, dosages often need to be calculated based on age and weight, and perceived the 
paediatric BNF as difficult to navigate their way through.  
One GP admitted taking a “short cut” for paediatric patients and instead of specifying a 
specific dosage on the prescription, she just wrote “as directed” without calculating the 
child’s weight.  Although admitting that she had previously taken a child’s weight into 
account whilst prescribing in hospital, she perceived the work environment in general 
practice had made it difficult for her to do this with various time constraints.  Her perception 
of risk also appeared to be shaped by whether the particular drug could be purchased over 
the counter, and thus presumably with dosage information included within the patient 
information leaflet.  When examining her account in detail, it is clear that this GP identified a 
breach in her prescribing process and acknowledged how this could possibly escalate into 
further problems, with the patient either being over-dosed or under-dosed.  
“yes, it’s not ideal and certainly part of the problem there is that, in hospital, I always 
used to do it on children’s weight, but time constraints there getting the child to put, 
you know, and then working it out, not having a calculator to hand or looking in the 
BNF, so sometimes it can be a bit of a short cut just to put ‘as directed’ in this 
particular case. When it’s actually a drug that can’t be bought over the counter then 
 76 
 
it’s much more important I think (…) There is the potential for overdose yes, or even 
equally not giving her enough and then she’s still in pain”. (PR8-GP1) 
This incident illustrates what some implied as an underling tension between trying to 
prescribe safely and the pressure of time-constraints, task prioritisation, which will be 
explored in greater depth later in the chapter.  
Prominent in prescribers’ accounts was an awareness of how a patient’s management 
changes over time.  As far as one GP was concerned, the management of elderly patients 
had completely changed over the last 30 years; a change he felt was appropriate.  
“I think when I first started I don’t think we were as aggressive in managing elderly 
patients, you know, we worked on the basis they’d got to their eighties, they’re doing 
quite well just let’s not put them at risk of side effects from these tablets. Their blood 
pressure’s running a bit high, they’re fine because if you make it too low they’ll 
probably fall anyway. And I think that’s certainly changed in that I feel that we deal 
with our ninety year old patients probably a lot more aggressively than we did before. 
Which is fine because we’ve got a lot of ninety year olds in the practice and they’re 
sparky individuals whose families still want them around so, yes”. (PR2-GP3) 
Other GPs offer similar evidence of the importance of changes in prescribing policy.  One 
GP admitted struggling with the concept of prescribing beta blockers to patients with heart 
failure, a concept which in the past was considered inappropriate as it was believed to cause 
a deterioration in the patient’s symptoms.  
“if I could have projected myself in a few years time there’d be medications I’ve not 
heard of or things I wouldn’t dream of doing now which would become normal. It’s 
like giving, I can’t remember, I still struggle with giving beta-blockers for heart failure, 
I mean it’s just ingrained in my mind it’s a ‘No’ ‘No’ but it’s a ‘Yes Yes’ now, you 
know. So I think you learn so much on the job, you learn so much from consultants’ 
letters, some are better than others and guiding you and saying, “Look this is a new 
practice” or whatever. “I suggest we do this for such and such a reason”. (PR2-GP1) 
This particular example emphasises not only the importance of keeping up to date with 
current evidence, but also the role of secondary care physicians in guiding GP prescribing: 
“Sometimes it’s from hospital letters that come through and they’ve managed something and 
I think “oh right that’s how it’s being done now”. (PR2 – GP3) 
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Another GP, who had only recently taken over the management of long-term diabetic 
patients from a retired colleague, offered an insight into the uncertainties surrounding his 
decision-making, due to historical differences in prescribing.  He described how these 
patients had been started on gliclazide rather than metformin (which is nowadays considered 
first line), and he was unsure whether he should be change their existing treatment in line 
with current guidance.   
“I think you do see historical differences in prescribing, so again patients that have 
been on, diabetic patients, Type 2 diabetics now, it’s more common these days to 
start with metformin whereas I don’t know, wind the clock back 5 or 10 years 
gliclazide was very popular and there’s a lot of people are on gliclazide that you see 
at review that have never been on metformin and their control’s slipping a bit and you 
think well should I just start again? Restart them on metformin? Should I crack back 
on the glitazones? So there’s a few historical things”. (PR1-GP1)  
Whilst moving beyond the descriptive analysis to further explore the meanings conveyed in 
these GPs’ accounts, it is important to ascertain a possible linkage between the length of 
time a GP had been practicing for and their personal clinical judgment.  In the narratives 
above, the first GP (PR2-GP1) had been qualified 23 years, whilst the second (PR1-GP1) 
had only been qualified 15 months, having taken over from a GP partner approximately 
seven months prior to being interviewed.  Prescribing habits appear to emerge over time and 
possibly become “entrenched” in those practicing for a long time.      
“we get entrenched habits and actually it’s changing somebody’s habits and moving 
them on that’s the difficult bit because what they were doing 10 or 15 years ago was 
what you did 10 or 15 years ago but isn’t necessarily appropriate now or there are 
other things you could do before that now. And in some areas we all move on really 
quickly and in other areas we just stick to those old habits. And it’s difficult to move 
on”.(PR7-GP2) 
These cases also illustrate the point that practice processes need to be in place to highlight 
drug choices made, for example, “10 or 15 years ago” which may not fit with current 
evidence and guidance, and perhaps need to be changed.   
7.2.3 Prescribers’ knowledge of the patient  
Most GPs agreed that long-term knowledge of the patient reduced the likelihood of 
prescribing errors.  Many GPs explained how this knowledge allowed them to recognise 
those “who are sensible” and those who they felt they need to be “more wary of” (PR1-GP1).  
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Several doctors described how difficult it was to prescribe for urgent walk-in patients or new 
patients when “you’ve [got] absolutely no information on them” (PR8-GP1).  In their 
accounts, each GP described how they would resort to a patient’s previous repeat 
prescription list or possibly rely on their word, which they admitted was somewhat risky.  One 
GP recalled a situation where the patient had incorrectly told him that they had been taking a 
particular drug.  Another GP felt that sometimes patients could do a “circuit of all the doctors 
for the same thing to get the answer that they want”. (PR7-GP1)  As far as he was 
concerned, not having the information to hand at the time of prescribing or being unable go 
through the patient’s history before the consultation, made him feel uncomfortable. In the 
example given below, he felt it was safer not to prescribe for a particular walk-in patient but 
to ask them to make an appointment to see their regular doctor.    
“And a classic example would be somebody who’s got some major condition that 
instead of making the appointment to follow up with the regular doctor they see, they 
suddenly come in as an urgent walk-in patient on the day wanting something dealt 
with and that can sometimes be problematic and sometimes you have to, they might 
not be acutely ill, they might just have decided to do that and you do have to quietly 
tell them, ‘Look if you’re coming for this you do need to see the regular person’”. 
(PR7-GP1) 
Although GPs’ discourses clearly privileged long-term knowledge of patients and the 
relationship that they had built up over time with them, some GPs admitted becoming 
“slightly blasé” (PR1-GP1) about prescribing for some long-term patients and possibly ran 
the risk of overlooking certain things. 
“So I think on the one hand that [long-term knowledge of the patient] is a positive, on 
the other hand, clearly you’ve got the complacency issue that you’ve know[n] 
someone for so long and things have never been a problem that, you know, you can 
clearly overlook issues”.(PR2–GP2)  
Another GP reflected on how he had possibly overlooked proton pump inhibitor (PPI) cover 
for one of his long-term patients who developed a gastro intestinal (GI) bleed last year, 
admitting how if the patient had been new to him, the outcome might have possibly been 
different.  
“I mean knowing a patient more could increase the chances of not looking deeply. I 
say that because there’s perhaps one of our patients virtually sees me very 
frequently and then last year had a GI bleed and it made me go back to look at what 
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had happened before then. And even though we had talked about it at one stage 
before she was on aspirin and clopidogrel for good reasons and at some stage she 
was on a PPI cover but I think the PPI got left out and if it were a new patient it would 
probably be something that I would think about more”.(PR14-GP2)  
Other doctors’ accounts offered similar evidence, with one explaining how “I would engage 
my brain more with somebody I didn’t know” (PR4-GP1).  This is an important finding as it 
highlights GPs’ awareness of potential inconsistencies in patient management.  One might 
also hypothesise that the existence of practice processes to review the drug management of 
long-term patients, as previously discussed, might be beneficial in alleviating such problems.  
7.2.4 Prescribers’ perception of risk 
Our study illustrates the argument that the occurrence of prescribing errors may also have 
been related to how GPs thought about and responded to risk.  One GP acknowledged how 
GPs’ perception of risk is subjective, with different GPs perceiving and managing risk 
differently.  He admitted being much more “laissez faire” about things than his other GP 
colleagues, spending far less time worrying about his choices of medication.  That said, he 
was still keen to point out how he regarded his prescribing decisions to be safe.   
“GPs tend to be quite good at managing uncertainty, some are, some aren’t, and I 
suppose prescribing risk comes into that whole genre of how you feel about things. 
And so there’ll be some doctors, like X, who’s very thorough and really spends a lot 
of time on these things and there’ll be some doctors, like me, at the other end 
probably who are much more laissez faire about this.  Hopefully still safe but less 
worried about medication in general and more, I suppose, I feel that the day’s full in 
so many other ways that spending 10 minutes thinking about quite whether it should 
be this one or that one”.(PR4–GP1) 
At a later point in this interview, the GP was asked at what point he would start to worry 
about one of his patient who was prescribed valsartan and had a low blood pressure 
reading.  
“GP: If they start falling over. 
Interviewer: Right so you wouldn’t worry about particularly low blood pressure if 
they’re on BP meds? 
GP: Erm, not unless they start feeling faint, No. I mean that is quite low isn’t it to be 
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fair but has she got a history, had she fallen recently, do you know?” (PR4-GP1) 
In this example, the GP appeared dismissive of concerns regarding his patient’s low blood 
pressure reading.  Crucially, what might have determined his decision to intervene in this 
patient’s management was not how low the blood pressure reading was but whether the 
patient had been feeling faint or had fallen recently.  
Two important factors appeared to influence an individual’s perception of risk.  Firstly, if the 
GP had previously “run into trouble” (PR4–GP1), experiencing a similar situation and made 
an error that they were aware of.  According to one GP, “it takes an error to actually pull you 
up sharp” and, although unpleasant, it makes you realise that “you do just have to be a little 
bit careful”. (PR2–GP3)  Risk perception also appeared to be influenced by the perceived 
severity of potential adverse effects associated with the drug, with one GP drawing a 
distinction between emollient creams, which he felt were absolutely fine to prescribe with no 
directions or just ‘PRN’ on them, and potent steroid creams, which were in his view “a 
different story” (PR3–GP1) and they needed specific directions.  In his view, it didn’t matter a 
lot how often one of his patients had been using clotrimazole cream for, but emphasised that 
“something of importance”, like methotrexate, “would have gone further up my priority radar” 
(PR3–GP1).  For other GPs, the length of time the patient was going to be on the medication 
for had a crucial bearing on whether it would be initiated.  Acknowledging the existence of a 
possible drug-drug interaction, one GP took some reassurance from the fact that the patient 
would only be on an antibiotic for a relatively short time, and how the patient had been 
informed of the interaction and to contact the GP if she became unwell.  
“if there’s an interaction then it goes ping, then you think well actually it’s only for 6 or 
7 days and if you warn the patient, you know, if they were using it for years on end 
that would be very different but if it’s only going to be for a week then you can 
counsel the patient accordingly and say, “Look there could possibly be a reaction but 
you’re only taking it for 7 days, if you have any worries or any symptoms or whatever, 
you’re not happy about it for goodness sake let me know and we’ll stop them”.(PR2 –
GP1) 
7.2.5 Prescriber’s physical and emotional health  
The prescriber’s physical health was another factor found to contribute to prescribing errors.  
Our analysis shows how tiredness and anxiety may have impacted on some GPs’ ability to 
concentrate.  One GP admitted worrying about certain patients who had just left her 
consulting room, saying “you’re still thinking about that [patient] rather than focusing on the 
next person that’s coming in”.(PR2–GP3)  Another GP pointed out how he had struggled to 
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find some time recently to do any physical exercise, explaining how he “used to be able to 
go to the gym twice a week, I haven’t been to the gym for 2 months now”.(PR2-GP1) This, in 
his view, was due to recently taking on more responsibilities at the practice which, he felt, 
just “eats away at your time”.(PR2-GP1) 
7.3 The Patient  
Our analysis indicates that patient characteristics (including personality, literacy issues, and 
language barriers) and the complexity of the individual case contributed to prescribing errors.  
7.3.1 Patient characteristics 
GPs perceived some patients to be assertive and demanding, and this, they felt, impacted 
on their prescribing.  A deliberative attempt was made by one GP to try and take his patient 
off the combined oral contraceptive pill, explaining how he did not “like the idea of it”.(PR11-
GP2)  Despite discussing this several times with her and pointing out the risks, he was met 
with what he perceived to be a certain reluctance, saying “she’s the kind of patient that 
knows what she wants and she tells you what she wants”.(PR11-GP2)  This finding was also 
echoed by a second GP who explained how one of his patients had insisted on being given 
a large amount of painkillers.  He recounted feeling “very reluctant to give [her] all this” but 
admitted that it was “very difficult and she’s in a lot of pain”.(PR12-GP2) 
Some patients’ lack of ability to read or speak English was also highlighted as a possible 
cause of errors.  One GP recalled how surprised he was at the number of patients he had 
picked up and said: “There’s no point writing things down because I can’t read it, Doc”.(PR6-
GP2) 
7.3.2 The complexity of the individual clinical case 
Other cases in our study offered similar evidence of the importance attached to perceived 
patient characteristics (including personality, knowledge, intelligence) and the patient’s 
compliance with their medication regime.  These issues were particularly brought to the fore 
in more complex clinical cases, where patients were on lots of medication and needed to 
attend outpatient clinics for drug monitoring. 
“I would say absolutely 100% the patient personality, knowledge, intelligence, insight 
are all going to be key factors in maintaining sort of appropriate prescribing and we 
know that compliance is a massive issue, whatever. So all of those I would say are a 
given but quite obviously the more complex the clinical case, like in the last one we 
discussed where you’ve got, you know, all those multiple neurological agents being 
used, sort of intervention from secondary care, lots of clinics, we’ve identified the fact 
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that patients don’t always attend clinics so that’s a major issue as to the responsibility 
of follow-up”.(PR2-GP2)  
An exemplar case involved a 93 year old man.  This patient was portrayed by the GP as 
quite a wilful man who had refused, in the past, carers to call to his home, declaring how he 
“just want[ed] to be left alone”.(PR6-GP2)  There appeared to be a long history of unease 
between this GP and his patient, with the GP recalling how he had tried to change him onto 
a multi-compartment compliance aid (NOMAD®) to improve his medication compliance but 
the patient had refused.  These struggles appeared to acquire particular significance when 
the patient ended up collapsing and being admitted to hospital.  
“I mean the patient’s quite a difficult character anyway. I mean he’s 93 but he lives 
alone, he’s very much against contacting the surgery or any of the sort of the 
professionals really, he likes, he just wants to be left alone (…) He’s in the past 
refused carers many a time and I think, I mean he’s been highlighted as being a high 
risk of developing problems really for the last ten years or so. (…) I remember one 
occasion quite serious concern that he was going to be in danger being left alone at 
home but he refused to be admitted or refused any intervention.(…) it wasn’t until he 
went into hospital having collapsed or something he came out with a NOMAD® pack 
that it was only then that, you know, we were happy with the medication that he was 
taking”.(PR6-GP2) 
The GP was also eager to show the patient’s lack of compliance, recalling how he had 
received a letter from the anti-coagulant clinic saying that the patient had missed three of his 
hospital clinic appointments to get his INR checked and that if he missed a fourth they would 
suspend him.  Despite acknowledging how the patient often was confused with his warfarin 
dosages and how his eyesight was poor, he continued to prescribe this drug insisting that 
the colours of the tablets were probably helping him remain compliant.  
“I’ve no doubt he does get confused with the warfarin dosages. And I think it may not 
be written on it but I think his eyesight isn’t that good anyway so there is a bit of 
concern that can he actually read what dosage he’s supposed to be taking. And I 
think this is where the colours of the tablets probably come in useful”. (PR6-GP2) 
A similar situation had also occurred with another one of this GP’s patients, emphasising 
how his “hands were tied” when the patient refused to allow him to come to his home.  Whilst 
this GP recognised that he had an obligation to treat these patients, he also reflected on the 
risks associated with prescribing warfarin for a patient with low compliance and whether 
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these risks could, in certain situations, outweigh the benefits. 
 “I remember another patient who had a similar sort of thing and again when he was 
in a similar sort of position where, you know, we’d ring him up and he’d say actually I 
don’t want you to come round. So, you know, our hands were tied, we can’t just 
impose ourselves on people and say, ‘Look, you’re not taking your warfarin, what are 
you doing?’ So, you know, this chap although he’d let us in he wasn’t always 
amenable to us just sort of saying “yes I’ll do as I’m told” sort of thing.(…) one of the 
things I looked at to say well what are the risks of not, of stopping the warfarin. I’m 
trying to think whether that was thought of at any stage because he’s over 90 and 
there is this thing about well is aspirin going to be safer?”. (PR6-GP2) 
The importance of balancing risk was evident in other accounts, with one GP admitting that 
he had to “compromise” with the patient in order for her to agree to have regular blood tests 
done.  The patient was presented in his account as a “poor responder” who was a “lot of 
trouble” to get in and refused to have her lithium monitoring done every three months.  The 
fact that this patient had been stable on lithium for quite a long time, and had agreed to 
follow instructions if her results were found to be abnormal, solicited just enough leniency 
from her GP to have her blood tests extended to every six months.  He agreed to this, 
perhaps aware that a more stern approach may have threatened the integrity of their patient-
physician relationship.  
“I had this discussion with her about how she’s not having blood tests being done 
and she said she refused to have them every 3 months so I compromised with her 
having them every 6 months, which I thought was better than nothing. (…) we’ve only 
now found a first instance of problems with the thyroid.  So now we’ve got that I think 
we can be much more serious in terms of complying with the recommendations.  But 
up until now I’ve not felt any reason to push it, she’s been on this drug I think for 
about 20 years.  So I felt no reason to say to her, “Well if you’re not going to comply 
with that I’m going to refuse to prescribe the drug”.  I thought that was a bit far 
reached”. (PR11–GP1) 
This finding highlights a tension between the GP’s responsibility to improve or maintain the 
patient’s health, and the patient's responsibilities for their own health.  GPs expressed 
foreboding about some patients “who actively change their medication on a regular basis 
because they think know best” (PR1-GP1) and others who don’t take their medication at all. 
In one particular case, the patient had waited until she was completely out of her combined 
oral contraceptive pill before requesting a further supply.  Unable to carry out all the checks 
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due to the timing of this request, the GP in question recounted how she felt pressurised into 
releasing a prescription “because you don’t want an unplanned pregnancy”. (PR6-GP4) 
7.4 The Team   
In this section, we focus on the immediate general practice team (GP, nurse, practice 
manager, receptionist).  Poor communication and nurses’ ‘quasi-autonomous’ role within the 
team were considered to be two key factors influencing the occurrence of prescribing errors 
in general practice. 
7.4.1 Poor communication 
Several GPs’ accounts highlighted the importance of feeling comfortable within the practice 
team and sharing any anxieties or worries that they might have about a particular patient 
with colleagues.  Formal and informal ‘coffee’ meetings were described as a “very useful 
tool” (PR2-GP1) to nurture this communication in practices and facilitate discussions about 
particular issues.  
One GP, however, reflected on the isolation he felt whilst working in his practice.  According 
to him, he rarely saw his GP colleagues and reflected on how he had far more contact with 
his clinical colleagues whilst working in a hospital setting and also was more familiar with 
their prescribing habits.  
“once you’re out of the hospital environment where you’ve got lots of other people 
around you, it is difficult to know what everyone else is doing because you never see 
anyone else, we only see our patients. (…) I suppose you do, we do become a bit 
isolated from others and others’ prescribing habits”. (PR1-GP1) 
In contrast, a second GP in another practice offered a different perspective, speaking openly 
about the special relationship he had with his GP partners, referring to them “more [as] 
friends than colleagues”. (PR2-GP1)  He described how attendance at their informal ‘coffee’ 
meetings were absolutely essential every morning, portraying them as opportunities for 
gaining answers to any problems that you may have.  In his account, he was keen to show 
the helpfulness of his fellow GPs and appeared reliant on their advice to guide his decision-
making.  
“We always meet for coffee, it is absolutely sacrosanct that we meet for coffee at 
twenty to 11, some of us are there sooner than others and it is an extremely, I cannot 
express how important that session is to, you know, you have a problem and you 
don’t really know what to do or what medication to use and you just go in there and 
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you’ll have two or three like-minded people and you say, ‘What would you do in this 
situation?’ and in a flash all these suggestions, “Yeah, I never thought of that”, “Yeah, 
that’s a good idea” and it works fantastically well”.”.(PR2-GP1) 
Two important factors may explain these different GPs’ perspectives, including the length of 
time the GP had been working in the practice and the number of formal / informal meetings 
which had been arranged.  Taking the example above, the latter GP (PR2-GP1) had been 
working as a GP for 23 years, with the majority of his colleagues having worked in the 
practice for 15 years.  However, the former GP (PR1-GP1) had been qualified 14 months, 
joining the practice approximately 10 months prior to being interviewed.  This latter GP 
(PR2-GP1) also was keen to report how his colleagues had noticed his temporary absence 
from practice meetings in the past and expressed their concern for his welfare.  
“I remember myself once doing that, where I didn’t go in there [to meetings] because 
I was just stressed and I was feeling quite low and one of my partners came out and 
said, “X, you’re not right”. (…) loss of [my] sense of humour is the first thing that will 
go and it was picked up straight away so it’s almost like we support each other very 
well and it’s fantastic to have”. (PR2-GP1) 
This is an important finding, as working in group practices clearly seems to provide an 
important ‘support structure’ for some GPs.  
7.4.2 Nurses’ ‘quasi-autonomous’ role  
GPs from four practices felt that (what one GP termed) nurses’ “quasi-autonomous role in 
chronic disease management” (PR3-GP1) was associated with an increased risk of 
prescribing errors in general practice.  These data offered insights into how, and under what 
circumstances, their role in assessing the patient, generating prescriptions, and obtaining the 
GPs’ signature for those prescriptions, could lead to potential errors.  One GP who 
recognised the importance attached to nurses’ input in developing, understanding and 
following very clear protocols for prescribing, pointed out how he felt a bit uncomfortable with 
the overall process.  In his account, he felt that it had become customary in general practice 
to sign prescriptions generated by nurses, but questioned the safety of this process when he 
had not actually seen the patient for himself.   
“I suppose nowadays [I find it] a little bit uncomfortable because I’m not actually 
seeing the patient myself but it’s the nature of General Practice, it’s the way it’s 
happened for many years. That’s not to say it’s the right way but, you know, at the 
moment these particular girls haven’t, can’t prescribe for themselves. I suppose, I 
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mean the only alternative is for that patient to be seen by me and I think we decided 
as a practice that we have very clear protocols that are written down and the nurses 
understand, they’ve been written by us in conjunction with the nurses saying this, this 
and this, if it’s all completely straightforward then I’m happy for you to go ahead and 
do this, and yes I need to sign it”.(PR2-GP1) 
Both this narrative, and that of other GPs, suggests that trust is a crucial element in the 
relationship between nurse and GP, and that nurses have to ensure that they have a “good 
handle on” things and input “a reasonable level of knowledge”. (PR1-GP1)  Several doctors 
also described how difficult it was when nurses “loiter outside your door” (PR3-GP1) or “put 
their head round the corner” (PR2–GP1) and ask them to sign prescriptions.  There was a 
concern amongst these GPs that such interruptions could lead to errors if they did not take 
sufficient time to stop and look and see what it is that the nurse had prescribed, as “you 
know, we’re responsible if our name’s at the bottom, we’re responsible”. (PR2-GP3)  For 
others, their most pressing concern was how, following these interruptions, they may not 
have adequate time to properly write up their patients’ notes from the previous consultation, 
highlighting how they might lose track of what they had been entering before they got 
interrupted.  These interruptions acquired particular significance when one GP admitted 
cutting corners to gain back lost time. 
“you get interrupted in-between times, the minute somebody sees your door open 
they pounce, or sees a patient leave they pounce and you’re filling in the notes and 
suddenly somebody’s pounced, then that distracts you from completing the notes 
properly or completing the task properly because you don’t write all the notes in with 
the patient. And then you’re running late so you, I suppose cut corners would be a 
way of describing it, you try, and then that’s when it goes wrong”. (PR3-GP1) 
In further analysis of the same interview, this GP presented himself as a victim of his own 
approach in which he would normally meet patients at reception and escort them to his 
office.  As far as he was concerned, this exposed him to a bombardment of requests from 
nursing staff who would catch him in the corridor and ask him to sign prescriptions.  He 
found the whole process of getting prescriptions signed in his practice to be sub-optimal, 
exposing the fact that he was asked to sign prescriptions without his glasses, for emphasis. 
“I think being caught on the hoof as I’m going out to, I tend to get caught more 
because I’m one of the doctors that actually walks out to get patients.(…) So I’m out 
to collect a patient or I’m out at reception to pick up a result or whatever (…) so I’m 
task focused on doing that, in comes the nurse saying “Can you sign this please?” 
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(…) if they catch me in the corridor without my glasses I can’t see the bloody 
prescription. No genuinely, I mean that’s a fatuous example I have to say but it’s a 
factor, “Hang on a minute, I haven’t got my specs, what does it say?”(…) they just 
say, “Sign here”.  We, I have significant issues with that”. (PR3-GP1) 
He also raised concerns about whether or not requested changes to the nurse generated 
prescriptions were actually completed, saying “I don’t know unless it’s been brought back to 
me whether that’s been re-signed”. (PR3-GP1)  The responsibility associated with signing 
these prescriptions appeared to weigh on a few GPs’ minds, with some more comfortable 
with the idea of having independent nurse prescribers who signed their own prescriptions.    
“I don’t like it because it interrupts me, I don’t like it because I’m not sure that it’s 
entirely safe and we’re in essence having nurse prescribers acting autonomously 
when they’re not nurse prescribers because they’re making a prescribing decision, 
they’re doing everything but the signature really. Aren’t they?”. (PR3-GP1) 
Similar evidence around trust in the relationship between GPs and nurses, and the 
importance of GPs completing the task in-hand without interruption, reoccurred throughout 
the dataset.  One GP reflected on how arduous the whole process of getting prescriptions 
signed could be for nurses too, commenting on how they can often spend a lot of time 
waiting outside the doctor’s office to speak to them.  He was also keen to point out that some 
nurses were, perhaps, better than others at prescribing and put this down to experience.  
“I have to say from the nursing point of view it’s an absolute pain in the neck because 
they have to wait outside for a doctor until they can rush in and get it signed or 
whatever, you know, so it wastes their time standing outside the doctor’s surgery. 
(…) there’s no doubt there are some nurses who are better than others. (…) And I 
think that comes with experience”. (PR2-GP1)   
Findings such as these raise important concerns over the process of signing prescriptions 
generated by nurses in the practice and the nurses’ quasi-autonomous role. 
7.5 The Working Environment 
 
In this section, we focus on the workload of GPs and practice staff, and the time pressures 
they faced. We shall discuss in detail two important conditions that were felt to contribute to 
this workload: the appointment system and patient demand. We will also discuss the 
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distractions and interruptions that GPs faced both during and between their patient 
consultations, and how this may have influenced the occurrence of prescribing errors. 
7.5.1 Workload and time pressures 
 
GPs and practice staff regularly experienced periods of high workload, with several 
explaining how they got “flooded with messages, you know, left, right and centre”. (PR6-
GP2) One GP disclosed how it would not be unusual to have “80 to 100 pieces of paper a 
day to look at” (PR2-GP2) in a busy practice. Another GP admitted often “not concentrating 
on one thing” but trying to do “several things at a time”. (PR4-GP2) The effective completion 
of these tasks under various time constraints, pressurised GPs with some describing how 
they have to “live with a degree of risk” (PR2-GP2) as there is “not always a lot of time to 
think” (PR4-GP2) or “deal with the patient properly”. (PR6-GP2) 
 
“for example, this morning I’ve got all these patients to see and then I’ve got a load of 
phone calls to make, you’ve got visits to do, then you get a medication query and you’re 
always in a rush, you’re always stressed, etc, etc. So I don’t think the environment helps 
at all, I think there’s a lot on GPs’ minds. (…) I think there’s a real risk that things can get 
overlooked”. (PR6-GP2) 
 
This inherently stressful environment “rather than ignorance” (PR13-GP1) or “a lack of 
knowledge” (PR6-GP4) was felt to contribute to errors being made. As one GP explains “if 
I’m running an hour late, (…) the first lady didn’t get much of a clinical entry or got a very 
badly typed one”. (PR3-GP1) 
 
GPs perceived these mistakes or errors as almost inevitable saying how there is always 
going to be the “occasional” prescription “that you don’t get exactly right and perhaps you’re 
not quite as specific as you should be”. (PR2-GP1) One GP felt that time pressure was the 
“biggest potential reason” for him making a mistake, but hoped that these mistakes did not 
turn out to be a “big issue” or “anything major”. (PR2-GP2)  
 
“the critical use of time is for me the biggest single stress factor in General Practice. The 
fact that there’s so much to do in such a short space of time, that you are almost 
inevitably going to make some mistake. But now I hope that they are just small mistakes 
but I don’t think there could be zero mistakes for anyone, honestly, I genuinely don’t”. 
(PR2-GP2)  
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Two important conditions were felt to contribute to this stressful working environment; the 
appointment system and patient demand. 
 
One GP acknowledged how their patient appointment system was “not done as well as it 
could be” (PR3-GP1) in his large practice and felt that this added to the pressure. He 
recognised that they had an obligation to offer patients an appointment within a specified 
period of time, in order “to satisfy the external issues of access”, but questioned this 
necessity when patients often turn up with only “routine issue[s]”. (PR3-GP1) Several GPs 
also felt a lot of pressure from patients who wait in reception and “demand” (PR6-GP4) to be 
seen, or just “want everything now”. (PR7-GP2) This created difficulties for those who were 
already working at maximum capacity:  
 
“So you can offer a planned appointment but that won’t suit, they want to be dealt with 
that day. And you can’t, it’s difficult to build in the staffing structures to cope with all of 
that, you know, because we can sometimes have 40 odd patients wanting to be seen by 
the duty doctor on a duty day in the afternoon, you know, on one afternoon. It just goes 
on and on and on, people walk in and “Well no, I must be seen”.” (PR7-GP2) 
 
All GPs working in one practice were highly critical of their walk-in centre. One GP explained 
how it “only takes three [patients] to come in at once (…) for you to know that you’re under 
pressure”. (PR14-GP1) As far as his colleague was concerned, the “silly” walk-in centre had 
increased the likelihood of errors:   
 
“Yes, I think the fact that it is a walk-in centre and the insane business of it and it’s a 
crazy, crazy system, I think errors are more likely, I think well we all think, we’ve all 
been forced to work this, we don’t think it’s a good system. I think it’s got a huge 
potential for errors”. (PR14-GP3)   
 
A third GP in the same practice admitted how “at the back of your mind you’re thinking I 
need to deal with the walk-in (…) [and] sometimes it does stop you from looking fully as you 
would want to”. (PR14-GP2) Another GP shared a similar view, reflecting on the fact that a 
high volume of patients (waiting to see her) would increase her stress levels and put her 
“more at risk of making errors”. (PR7-GP2) 
 
“So, for example, a duty day when you know the waiting room is absolutely heaving 
outside, you know, you do start to become a bit dysfunctional if you’re not careful, so 
that’s a problem. So if you can keep things under control and manageable levels then 
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obviously you’re going to be a lot safer but that isn’t always possible”. (PR7-GP2) 
 
Practice staff shortages and the knock-on effects of closing the practice for bank holidays, 
for example, were also felt by one GP to have a crucial bearing on their workload. One GP 
admitted that her practice had been particularly poor at planning for these knock-on effects.   
 
“you know after a Bank Holiday everybody wants to be seen so we should clear the 
decks and make sure everybody can be seen. We don’t always do that but I think we 
could do more of that really. (…) if you’ve got poorly trained staff or shortage on another 
level, you know, reception level short staffed or nursing level short staffed, then there’s 
knock on effects on the doctors. Likewise, if the doctors are short staffed, there’s knock 
on effects on everybody else”. (PR7-GP2) 
 
7.5.2 Distractions and Interruptions 
 
GPs felt that the potential to be distracted and interrupted by other practice staff and patients 
was “enormously high”. (PR2-GP2) One GP explained how he got interrupted by reception 
staff, practice nurses, health care assistants “once or twice [daily], sometimes lots” but 
accepted that this was just “part of the job”. (PR1-GP1) Other GPs felt more strongly about 
these unplanned distractions and interruptions as they perceived them as the cause of 
errors. According to one GP, distractions “knock us out of our stride” and things “go wrong 
because you’re not in that closed zone and giving it your entire attention”. (PR3-GP1) Even 
without being interrupted, he admitted that his error rate “would never be zero” but it would 
be “down lower”. (PR3-GP1) 
 
Distractions and interruptions caused by practice staff 
 
GPs were interrupted by practice staff both during and after their GP – patient consultations. 
They insisted that being interrupted during the consultation only happened on occasions for 
more “urgent issues”. (PR3-GP1) Instant computer messages could also flick up on their 
screen or “the phone might well go and they [receptionists] say I’ve got so-and-so to speak 
to you”. (PR2-GP2) The majority of interruptions took place in-between patients, however, 
when practice staff would often be “hovering outside the door” (PR3-GP2) waiting to speak 
to them. As mentioned previously in Section 7.4.2, nurse prescribers would seek a GP’s 
signature for prescriptions they had generated, as part of their ‘quasi-autonomous’ role. 
Although one GP did not “really view it as an interruption, (…) [but] just part of the day really” 
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(PR4-GP1), the majority found it “intrusive” (PR2-GP1) and believed it “contribute[d] to 
errors”. (PR7-GP3) 
 
“I’m really worried that I’ll forget to do something or I’ll forget to write down that I’ve got to 
refer them because your train of thought’s just gone. And then if you’ve forgotten it and 
you move on and, you know, that letter will never get done and four weeks later the 
patient phones up and says “I still haven’t heard from the cardiologist”.” (PR2-GP1) 
 
One GP attempted to sort out this “thorny issue” (PR3-GP1) by raising it at their bi-monthly 
practice meetings on a number of occasions and sending out specific instructions to staff to 
keep the number of interruptions down. Despite noticing a temporary improvement, he 
reflected on how it got “worse again, you know, it creeps back [up]”. (PR3-GP1) He 
perceived certain practice staff as reluctant to change, explaining that they felt 
“uncomfortable” leaving a problem “unsorted”. While it is arguable whether this is in fact the 
case, it raises important concerns around satisfying patient demand.  
 
“we have to say if it’s an urgent situation sure, absolutely, but otherwise, no. Stick it in 
my tray and I’ll deal with it at the end. But certain staff feel uncomfortable in doing that, 
they don’t like leaving a problem unsorted with a patient in front of them. They don’t wish 
to dissatisfy the patient by saying, “Oh the doctor will deal with it at midday”.  But one 
patient’s satisfaction is the patient who’s in front of me’s prescribing error because I’ve 
got it, you know, because I’ve been distracted and I’ve missed something”. (PR3-GP1) 
 
This GP may have failed to appreciate the persuasive nature of some patients in certain 
situations as mentioned earlier and their need for “everything now”. 
 
Distractions and interruptions caused by the patient  
 
Our analysis suggests that the patient was also a source of potential distraction for GPs 
whilst prescribing. Some GPs presented their patients as the talkative type who were often 
unable to rationalise their particular issues: “you know that Mrs so-and-so is a real whittler”. 
(PR2–GP3) Several doctors described how difficult it was to concentrate on prescribing 
when your patients are “sort of nattering in your ear” (PR7-GP1) or “bombarding you with 
lots of different things”. (PR3-GP2) GPs also showed their tolerance and patience by 
sometimes asking patients to “just hold that thought”. (PR7-GP2) They also considered 
trying to get through things quickly so as to “clear the patient out” (PR3-GP1) when you are 
“pressurised for time”. (PR6-GP4) One GP admitted that it would be very easy to spend “a 
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lot more than 10 minutes” on one particular consultation if, for example, the patient felt “tired 
all the time”. (PR6-GP4) In another example, the GP demonstrated how difficult it was to 
maintain concentration when the patient “comes and presents you with a whole battery of 
symptomology”. (PR3-GP1) This patient was presented in his account as taking every 
opportunity to discuss all kinds of issues with him, although it was clear that her recent 
bereavement lay beyond this GP’s prime area of interest. Although disclosing how hard it 
was for him to concentrate in this situation, his previous consultations with this patient 
appeared to enable him to manoeuvre the more recent ones with less difficulty.    
 
“This lady brings an awful lot to the table. And she persistently overruns her consultation. 
She, how can I put it, she comes up with sort of multiplicity of problems and so trying to 
fit it all in is very difficult. And it’s often the ‘whilst I’m here’ scenario, ‘oh by the way’ or 
you get so cluttered up in your 10 minute task with other things (…) all the time, she 
gives you that feeling ‘Oh God, she’s back again!’ and so what happens is you get 
distracted and you don’t complete the task because you’re just relieved and you’re 20 
minutes late, and you just quickly sort things out”. (PR3-GP1) 
 
In further analysis of the same interview data, this GP makes the argument about extending 
the time for a patient consultation to potentially 15 minutes, as there is “so much more in the 
task now than I ever did before”. (PR3-GP1) 
 
7.6 The Task 
 
In this section, we focus on two main tasks in general practice: repeat prescribing and 
patient monitoring. We shall break down the process of repeat prescribing into ‘Ordering’, 
‘Processing’, ‘Signing’ and discuss in detail the conditions that we felt contributed to errors in 
these main stages. We will also discuss the various conditions that influenced the 
occurrence of errors in monitoring patients. 
7.6.1 Repeat prescribing – Ordering stage 
 
Many practices received requests in different ways for repeat prescriptions. They were either 
hand delivered in person or by a representative, requested over the phone, or submitted by 
e-mail or through System 1. Staff at the patient’s pharmacy also hand-delivered or faxed 
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repeat prescription slips through to practices. Some methods were perceived to be safer 
than others. One GP highlighted how they had as a practice “stopped receiving requests on 
the phone because of the potential for medication errors”. (FG2-GP2) Some practice staff 
regarded written requests (via e-mail) to be safer and to work “fantastic[ally]” well (FG4-
Presc Clerk 2). Staff in another practice offered a different perspective, reflecting on the fact 
that the responsibility was with them to tick the right box (following the information received 
in the e-mail). As far as one receptionist in this practice was concerned, it was possible to 
tick the wrong box and give out the wrong medicine if, for example, you have “aspirin and 
amitriptyline next to one another” (FG2-Receptionist 1). Aware of this risk, one GP in this 
practice explained that System 1 gave patients the responsibility to tick the items they 
wanted and he encouraged more patients to sign up to, what he perceived to be, a safer 
system.  
 
“So we’ve been on emails for a few years. The problem with emails, of course, is that 
they’ve [patients] got to write it and then we’ve [practice staff] got to tick the right box, 
whereas System 1 does have a choice for them [patients], yes, which we’re trying to get 
more people to sign up to, where they can actually just tick on their own screen the one 
they want”. (FG2-GP2) 
 
Another GP also pointed out how pharmacists have requested items in the past on behalf of 
their patients and ticked “everything that’s on their repeat”. (PR6-GP2) He reflected on these 
actions as inappropriate, explaining how the patient did not actually need some of these 
requested items.  
 
“So we’ve got two examples right here next to me about how the pharmacy’s just ticked 
and faxed it to the surgery and our prescription clerk has phoned the patient and [asked] 
“Have you actually requested these?” and the patient has said “No, I haven’t”. (PR6-
GP2) 
 
7.6.2 Repeat prescribing – Processing stage 
 
On receiving a request for a repeat prescription, administrative staff were allowed to issue 
them in the practices studied if the items had been previously authorised by a GP. For an 
item(s) that was not included on the patient’s repeat prescription list, then the GP needed to 
be asked. One GP felt that their practice system of reauthorization was “fundamentally safe”, 
as their prescription clerk was “pretty good”. (PR6-GP3) This view was shared by his GP 
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colleague who explained how they probably have “fewer errors because we have a 
dedicated Prescribing Clerk who’s very used to dealing with the repeat prescription 
requests”. (PR6-GP1) Although perceived to be safe, our analysis suggests however that 
process issues often arose around reauthorisation. One GP recalled how a “few significant 
events” had occurred around multiple prescriptions for the same patient getting mixed up or 
separated, but appeared to take some consolation in the fact that it had been a process 
issue rather than somebody writing “the wrong thing”. (FG2-GP2) In his account, he 
described how some patients did not have received the items they wanted because their 
multiple prescriptions got separated.   
 
“some people have said, “I ordered some of these and I got some of those, and I didn’t 
ask for that but I wanted this”. So a patient would say that and you look back and you try 
and figure out what’s happened and it’s generally because some things have been 
reauthorized and some things have been within date and have been printed (…) they 
haven’t both gone to the Pharmacy at the same time”. (FG2-GP2) 
 
The receptionist’s account similarly showed her awareness of this issue, adding how the 
prescription “might sit in Reception for a bit because it’s not acknowledged where it’s going” 
and also explaining how “you can’t catch them all”. (FG2-Receptionist 1) 
 
7.6.3 Repeat prescribing – Signing stage 
 
One GP had a personal strategy of not signing “a prescription unless [he was] in front of a 
computer”. (PR14-GP2) He felt this was particularly important for repeat prescriptions 
because you could “just [so easily] issue them”. (PR14-GP2)  
 
“a patient was on a steroid, a topical steroid for psoriasis and was requesting a lot, and 
one day I just picked it up and thought to myself, hang on a minute why is this 
happening? So he requested last week and then this week again, and this is like 100 
grams per week so that’s a lot. So I put a stop to it and invited him in so that we 
discussed it”. (PR14-GP2) 
 
Another GP, who also shared this GP’s view, felt it was also important to reply to requests 
for a repeat prescription on the computer rather than on “little bits of paper”. (PR2-GP3) It 
was also felt that not having “enough time to look at [repeat] prescriptions before [you] sign 
them” (PR14-GP3) could lead to errors. In one particular example, one GP explained how 
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“short courses can become long ones” (PR3-GP1) when you are not giving the task your full 
attention and replying verbally to the receptionist’s request in the corridor.  
 
“inattention creeps in because they [patient] come in, “Oh, I’m just getting over a knee 
replacement”, you give them, you know, 2 weeks, 3 weeks whatever of Ibu [Ibuprofen] or 
any other NSAID and then they come back and they don’t necessarily come back face-
to-face, they come to the desk, “Can so-and-so have an extra repeat?” or “They’ve just 
run out of this”, “Can they have that?”, it goes on. That then somehow ends up in 
perpetuity because it can get put on repeat”. (PR3-GP1) 
 
Another GP also felt it was “crucial right at the beginning when you initiate a new medication 
that the patient understands the instructions and how you want them to take it (…) [because] 
once it’s on repeat you don’t tend to look at that quite so much” (PR2-GP1) 
 
7.6.4 Patient monitoring 
 
Patient monitoring appeared to be influenced by a number of conditions including the 
practice system, the patient, the communication between healthcare settings, and the 
prescriber.   
 
The practice system and the patient 
 
Some GPs appeared to use the medication review or reauthorisation process as the ‘trigger’ 
to check if their patients’ monitoring had been done. The frequency of these medication 
reviews appeared to vary between patients, with one GP explaining how elderly patients 
would get a six monthly review and “the younger ones would be 12 monthly”. (PR7-GP2) A 
patient’s annual medication review was regarded by another GP as their “one shot of glory in 
the year” (PR3-GP1) to ensure that they were being monitored. Some GPs appeared to be 
reassured by the fact that, at a particular point in time, the computer would not let the 
receptionists reissue a repeat prescription “because it’s run out of steam and you need [a 
GP] to reauthorise it”. (FG2-GP2) This was perceived as an opportunity to catch up with the 
monitoring. 
 
A deliberate attempt was made by one practice to involve the reception staff in their drug 
monitoring process. They were provided with a list of drugs and allowed to proactively “book 
an appointment for a blood pressure and a U&E or whatever” (FG2-Nurse 1) when the 
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patient’s review date came up. In contrast, a GP in another practice admitted being “slightly 
[more] on the ad hoc side” (FG2–GP2) when it came to monitoring; relying more on the 
patient turning up.   
 
“we could probably sit down here and think which drugs do we want to actively monitor 
and we could just run a search on them every month and who’s, somebody could just 
check has everything right happened. And it wouldn’t be a huge job but we’ve never got 
round to it. So we rely on patients”. (FG2–GP2) 
 
His colleague felt that it was the “absolute bane of everybody’s life” (FG2–GP3) trying to get 
patients to come in and have their chronic disease bloods done. She explained that some 
patients “will come in on time and we don’t have to chase them and there are others that 
don’t.” (FG2-GP3). Patients on warfarin were felt to be “dreadfully hard” (PR7-GP2) to keep 
track of, in particular. One GP admitted becoming quite “panicky” (FG6-GP2) when he found 
out that one of his patients had not attended the warfarin clinic for six months. According to 
one GP, the source of these issues could be traced back to the general practice system 
where “you can be issuing warfarin and have no idea what the patient’s INR is and no idea 
whether they’re turning up anywhere, and we’re not automatically getting results through and 
advice that the clinics are giving”. (FG4–GP2) He was keen to point out that one could place 
trust in this system and mistakenly assume that the patient is regularly attending the clinic for 
monitoring. The warfarin clinic at one particular hospital site was regarded as “an absolute 
nightmare”, with one GP admitting that he “almost [felt] reluctant to refer” patients to what he 
perceived was a “very poor service”. (PR6-GP2) The results of a recent practice audit helped 
illustrate how unsafe the system actually was to one GP and how it needed to be changed.  
 
“certainly as we’ve been going through this audit in recent weeks it just flags up to you 
how unsafe it is because there are people that aren’t obviously being monitored, we 
have no idea whether they’re being monitored or not, and so now they’re being flagged 
up to be chased up to see what’s happening. So huge potential for problems. We haven’t 
actually found many that have had adverse effects but that’s probably good luck”. (FG4–
GP2)  
 
Communication between healthcare settings 
 
Although some practices monitored their own patients’ INR (International Normalized Ratio) 
levels and advised them of any dosage changes, others relied on the INR clinic at the 
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hospital to do this. One GP recognised the importance of not duplicating these activities 
carried out by the clinic but later revealed how the “link between the INR clinic and us [just] 
isn’t there”, with the communication between them being “a bit off”. (FG4-GP3) According to 
her “the book where the INR is written down, the dose, doesn’t get to be seen by us unless 
they come in for something else [and] then we check it”. (FG4-GP3) This view was shared 
by her colleague who felt that the “system really should be flagged up as a whole area [of] 
risk”. (FG4–GP2) Despite this, some GPs appeared to place trust in the system: “We issue 
prescriptions but we don’t prescribe the dose, we just go by what the [warfarin] clinic tells us 
to give”. (PR9-GP1) Another GP felt it was “usually straightforward” to just prescribe 
according to the Yellow Anticoagulant Book which “states what dose they should be on”. 
(FG6-GP3) 
 
The prescriber 
 
Monitoring to some extent “depends on the GP” (PR6-GP2) or the individual who 
responsibility it was.  
 
“So some people monitor everything and other people you’ll find things like that slipping 
through and people have prescriptions for years without, you know, not being seen. But 
we try”. (PR7-GP2)  
 
Two conditions appeared to influence the responsibility individual prescribers took for 
monitoring: the number of hours they worked (e.g. whether full-time or part-time) and their 
role in the practice (e.g. locum or partner). One GP who only worked part-time perceived his 
colleagues as reluctant to take on the “absolute responsibility” of his patients’ monitoring in 
his absence and “make the decisions that matter”. (PR6-GP2) He drew a distinction between 
his GP partners who were “OK because they realise how important things are” and some of 
the junior doctors or locums who were poor at following things through. 
 
“you want to pass on responsibilities for the patient to a particular doctor and because 
they may only be here for a few months they think well actually why should I take 
responsibility, make myself extra work etc, etc.”. (PR6-GP2) 
 
In further analysis of the same interview, he offered a way of understanding this perceived 
reluctance by describing the complexity of some particular patient cases and the high 
workload involved. Locum doctors and trainees where portrayed as aware of this workload 
but avoided taking it on. 
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“So for some people that [are] potentially quite complicated, I think, there’s a real risk 
that patients get lost to follow-up if their regular doctor isn’t here all the time like I’m not 
(…) there’s a range of social services [issues for some of them] that (…) can be a lot of 
work and I dare say sometimes the GP in question says, “Crikey, stay well clear out of 
this one” sort of thing”. (PR6-GP2) 
 
GPs in other practices offered similar evidence of how locums did not appear to take on the 
necessary monitoring. One GP highlighted how their familiarity with using the practice 
computer system was importance because “if they don’t know the system [then] there could 
be a problem. We try and get most of them to come beforehand and make sure they know 
the computer system”. (FG4-GP3) 
 
“she came for her regular review in June of 2010, unfortunately we had a locum doctor 
here and he did, the form he did was lipid profile, full blood count, U&Es, he didn’t tick 
the LFTs. I don’t know why, I can’t explain that”. (PR9-GP1) 
 
7.7 The computer system  
 
There were several accounts of the importance of computing as a method of improving 
safety, however in this section we address computer-related issues which were mentioned 
as error producing conditions.  The issues can be broadly summarised as problems in first 
generating a prescription, additional problems related to repeat prescriptions, problems with 
maintaining an accurate patient record, and issues associated with the computers and 
software – in practice many of these were interconnected. 
 
7.7.1 Generating the first prescription 
 
A well recognised problem with computerised prescribing systems can be the picking of the 
wrong product from a list.  An example was seen in this extract from a focus group: 
 
GP: “We’ve had another one with the wrong insulin, it was meant to be a short acting 
and she was getting the long acting.” 
(FG4-GP2)  
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The practice nurse commented: 
 
“I always find it’s very difficult with insulin because what you want isn’t always on the 
choice list, on the pick list it is?  And you’ve got to find the right word to start with or 
you don’t get the right pick list.” 
(FG4-Nurse 1) 
 
Sometimes computer hardware or networking problems may have been associated with 
errors. 
 
“Our problem here is our computers are rubbish.  They work really, really slowly so 
sometimes you can press a button and it can take a long time for that, like if I was to 
prescribe something for that patient and it was when our computers were running 
slowly, sometimes it will crash entirely or it takes a long time to come through so we 
scroll down an option, a pick list, it can pick the wrong thing which is very frustrating.”  
(PR3-GP2) 
 
Sometimes medicines were associated with default dose regimes, which might not be 
appropriate on all occasions. 
 
“Sometimes it automatically gives the dose and the frequency when you don’t 
particularly want that frequency, like I don’t think it would be a major error or anything 
but sometimes, doxycycline, it depends what you are prescribing it for.  If it’s like a 
respiratory type thing or sinus it says two now and then one for 8 days, whereas if 
you are doing it for Chlamydia or PID there’s a hundred twice [a day] so you just, 
yeah, I think you’ve just got to be a little bit careful.” 
(PR8-GP1) 
 
A theme which commonly occurred was that of important alerts being missed.  In one case 
penicillin had been prescribed by a locum for a patient with a documented penicillin allergy. 
The GP being interviewed tried recreating the prescription, and a red exclamation mark 
came up with a note that the patient was allergic to penicillin, proving that the system was 
working correctly. 
 
“The prescriber here, who was doing a locum for a year with us …. He's overridden it, 
hasn't explained why.” (PR6-GP3) 
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He goes on to say:  
 
“If you have too many warnings from the computer then that makes you tend to 
override them, you become a bit more cavalier and that's a danger.” 
(PR6-GP3) 
 
There were many other reasons given for alerts being overridden; it could be because the 
warnings were inappropriate. 
 
“You can have a steroid cream and you get antihypertensives interaction and ‘do you 
want that?’ And ‘yes I bloody do’.” 
(FG2-GP2) 
 
And in some cases there are alerts which can be safety overridden, however important ones 
can be missed. 
 
“Say for example that you're prescribing … for someone and they are on amitriptyline 
10 mg and I prescribed something that interacted with it that raised the level of 
amitriptyline slightly, but as he was on only 10 mg it didn't matter. And if there's 3 of 
those going on then you missed the one that says, the more important one that's in 
the middle.” 
(FG3-GP2)  
 
Even ‘strong’ warnings could be missed. 
 
“Although the information is flagged up you'd be surprised how many doctors, nurses 
ignore how many warnings come up because if you prescribe something on our 
system for example it says contra indications for this/that drug, it says strong or you 
know gives it 3 out of 3, you'd be surprised how many times it says 3 out of 3 and yet 
the doctors don't actually look at it.” 
(PR6-GP2) 
 
Tiredness and workload could also affect vigilance 
 
“But we do reach the point where we do get, if you’re tired, or a busy surgery, where 
you actually stop registering what its saying.” 
(PR7-GP2) 
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7.7.2 Generating repeat prescriptions 
 
The problems of picking from a list, which exist when first generating a prescription, are still 
present 
 
“It's just ticking boxes so if you've got aspirin and amitriptyline next to one another it’s 
ticking the wrong one.” (FG2 – Receptionist 1) 
 
This surgery had introduced the ordering of repeats by email; however, this had introduced a 
transcription stage which could be another source of error 
 
“We've been on e-mails for a few years, the problem with e-mails of course is that 
they've got to write it and then we've got to tick the right box”. 
(FG2-GP2) 
 
In one case a doctor had re-prescribed eye drops at the high initial dose, instead of reducing 
the dose appropriately 
 
“Being honest, I think probably I just hit re-prescribe on that.” 
(PR14-GP1) 
 
7.7.3 Maintaining an accurate patient record 
 
All the above causes of error could lead to the patient record being incorrect. There were, 
however, several other ways in which errors could be introduced.  Once the record is 
incorrect any error is likely to be reproduced by repeat prescribing, or transfer of information 
to a hospital, for example.  Causes of error included putting information into the record of 
someone with a similar name. 
 
“We had one diabetic lady who was having hypos and when the nurse went back to 
work out what was going on I think, if I remember rightly, the daughter’s insulin was 
put on the mother’s name, they were very similar.” 
(FG4-GP2) 
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Updating the medicines in patient records following discharge from hospital could also lead 
to problems. 
 
“So if the hospital decides to change somebody’s drugs, if you don’t, at the time you 
receive the letter, go in there and make the appropriate additions and subtractions 
then if you see that patient and you don’t know that patient you might not necessarily 
cotton on to the fact that their medication’s been changed”.  
(PR7-GP1) 
 
In that practice the updating of the record under these circumstances was done only by 
doctors.  He explained that the hospital had electronic discharge letters, which were received 
quickly, but which could lead to problems because they were not on the screen at the same 
time as the patient record: 
 
“The trouble is you can’t read the letter and make the alterations on the computer at 
the same time because a) the screens just aren’t big enough and it’s just, you end up 
having to have the paper copy to update the computer, because it’s just not possible 
to do”. 
(PR7-GP1) 
 
Once a prescribing error had been identified, there was a risk that it would remain in the 
patient record. 
 
“A chemist may phone and say ‘By the way doctor, do you really mean to say bd?’ 
and then the doctor will go ‘Oh yes, whoops, sorry’ and that won’t necessarily get 
documented”. 
(PR14-GP3) 
 
Lack of familiarity with the computer system could lead to information being entered but not 
becoming an effective part of the safety alert system. 
 
“With locums and registrars entering the data accurately is important because 
someone might present to them and say ‘I’ve got an allergy’, or they think this rash is 
an allergy to whatever and it’s no good putting it in free text, it’s got to go, it’s got to 
be coded properly otherwise nobody else can use it in the future”. 
(FG4-GP2) 
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7.7.4 Other issues 
 
It is often difficult to untangle the causes of errors associated with computer systems, as it is 
not clear whether the problems are to do with the hardware (processing ability, network 
speed and reliability etc), or the way the software has been locally implemented, or the 
training of regular and occasional users, or a combination of the above.  In an earlier extract 
the delays in the computer system were seen as a potential cause of picking errors.  In the 
next case, the problem of lack of information for a “walk in” patient is highlighted.  
 
“The only problem with walk in patients is that we don’t always have their acute 
medication on the screen so then they are telling us what they’re on and we don’t 
have that sort of safety net … you’ve got to be  a little more careful”. 
(PR8-GP1) 
 
GPs and their staff had expectations of the computer system and could overestimate its 
ability to prevent errors.  The following is from an interview with a GP about a prescribing 
error from his practice which involved a lack of dose instructions for co-amoxiclav.  
 
“I’m surprised you can get through the system without doing that actually.  I thought it 
would have kept going, flashing back to that position saying ‘fill in this box’”. 
(PR7-GP2)  
 
7.8 The Primary Secondary Care Interface  
7.8.1 Secondary Care Correspondence 
The poor timeliness, legibility, content and layout of secondary care correspondence were all 
felt to increase the risk of prescribing errors in general practice.  Our analysis suggests that 
patients often visited their GPs before this correspondence was received by the practice, 
thus resulting in many GPs trying to piece together what changes in patient management 
had been made with little or no information.  The quality of secondary care correspondence 
appeared to vary a lot, depending on the hospital and department, with several GPs in one 
area raising important concerns about their local ophthalmology department.  These GPs, 
from different practices, described how difficult it was to decipher between medicines which 
had been stopped intentionally by the hospital clinician and those which they might not have 
realised that the patient was on when admitted to hospital.  One GP felt that she needed to 
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separate out the correspondence received from this ophthalmology department from that of 
others, but admitted that this was easy to do when received electronically. 
“I think when they’ve been in and out of hospital is a real time of uncertainty because 
they’ve had things stopped and started, you’ve not got or had anything come 
through, you don’t know, sometimes they’ve stopped things deliberately, sometimes 
they just haven’t realised they’re on it, (…) I am very cautious about (…) the 
ophthalmology letters, I tend to put those to one side and actually have to come to 
the computer and look at them because it’s quite a common error, area for errors, I 
think in terms of prescribing. (…) I’ll look at them together which was fine with the old 
system when we were getting the paper, (…) we’re now getting the electronic mail 
through and I think that’s not quite as easy”. (PR4-GP2) 
Another GP in a different practice also shared this view, describing her uncertainties around 
whether particular medicines had been stopped, or as another GP put it: “[trying] to work out 
exactly why three drugs are now no longer on their list”. (FG2-GP4)  She explained how she 
would often phone up patients to seek further details from them on what they were taking, 
but admitted feeling still a little uncertain even after their conversation.  
“Certainly some of the ophthalmology letters (…) are somewhere between ridiculous 
and useless.  They’re just appalling (…) They’re the worst, they don’t say what 
they’ve stopped, they say medication has been changed and they give you a list.  I 
mean I rarely get one of those without having to phone somebody up and say, ‘What 
are you taking?’ And even then I’m not sure that it’s right”. (FG3-GP2) 
Prominent in GPs’ accounts was the need for any medication changes to be made 
immediately obvious to them (e.g. they suggested in bold type or in capital letters) or clearly 
marked at the very onset of the letter and not “buried in lots of other stuff” (FG4-GP2).  GPs 
were usually tasked with the job of looking through the whole list of discharged medicines 
and deciphering what medication had actually changed.  They recounted the difficulties of 
marrying up a list of drugs in alphabetical order (on their computer system) with those in a 
random order (on the hospital letter), and the possibility of errors occurring when there is a 
large volume of information in the hospital letter.   
“the biggest problem that we face is in assimilating the information and making a 
judgment and the more complicated, the more long winded and the more volume, the 
higher volume and the less time you’ve got to deal with it in a busy working day, I 
think leads to errors”. (PR2-GP2) 
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One GP was keen to show the ambiguous wording of a hospital letter he received and 
admitted failing to pick up on the fact that the hospital clinician was “sort of suggesting” that 
he should prescribe a lower dose of the drug risperidone.  He explained how it stated, on the 
top of the letter, what the patient’s current medication was and how there was no change to 
medication.  However, lower down in the text, he noted how the hospital clinician had 
discussed the possibility of reducing the dose of risperidone to half with the patient, 
suggesting that this might be something he would like to consider.  
“I’m reading this out, it says “Current medication: PRN risperidone 1 milligram. 
Change of medication: None”, it says at the top of the page. Within the text of the 
letter, it says “We discussed the option of using 0.5 milligrams to see if it reduced. 
Would be grateful if you could kindly issue a repeat as and when required”.”. (PR6-
GP3) 
When this GP’s account is examined in detail, it is clear that he perceived the hospital 
clinician to be “thinking aloud” whilst writing the letter and that this suggestion was 
something he might like to consider but it was “not essential”. (PR6-GP3)  He recounted the 
thoroughness and care he usually takes when reading letters, and felt that the ambiguous 
wording of this letter was partly responsible for why he had failed to make the change: 
“Because on the one hand he says “it might be a good idea to use a lower dose 
because he was tired afterwards”.  On the other hand, he hasn’t made it explicit, in 
fact he’s actually said “No changes”.  So no change was actually made and I have 
actually, here we are, because when I read letters I do try and put a little comment or 
two about them on to what I’ve written, ‘Annual review stable, occasional use 
risperidone if agitated, enjoys work placement’. So that’s what I’ve done, I haven’t 
highlighted the fact that he suggested he might try a lower dose”. (PR6-GP3) 
This example of ambiguity is rich in its potential to offer insight into how and under what 
circumstances errors may occur.  In the example given below, another GP highlights his 
uncertainty around whether to continue prescribing a medicine (started in hospital) for a 
patient.  After much deliberation, this GP decided not to add the additional medicine to the 
patient’s repeat prescription list, conscious that they were on quite a large number of 
medicines already.  
“Everybody but everybody comes out on omeprazole, you know, so do you want 
them to carry on with the PPI or are they only hav[ing] that because of the stress 
response while they were in hospital? So there are some times when we don’t put on 
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as a repeat something because they’re already on fifteen items and you don’t really 
want them on sixteen”. (FG4-GP2) 
Both these cases suggest that the wording of hospital correspondence needs to be clear and 
accurate, with any changes in medication stated explicitly.  The reason for these changes, 
together with the length of time they should be on the additional medication, should also be 
clearly specified.  
Although several GPs recognised the need to update patients’ computer records promptly 
with the information (once received), they also acknowledged how some may “fall through 
the net”. (FG4-GP2)  Time was considered to be an important factor impacting on whether 
these records were updated, as one GP highlighted:  
“We might get hospital letters and not have enough time to really look at them and 
think gosh they’ve changed some, (…) yes, it’s mad, it’s dangerous”. (PR14-GP3) 
Another GP in a different practice also explained how some GPs may be more diligent than 
others at making these changes promptly. One GP also highlighted how if the patient was on 
a large number of medicines this could increase the chances of overlooking something 
important.  
“And when there’s twenty-five drugs on that list, it’s just disheartening isn’t it?  So, of 
course, you try your best but equally I think that I could probably, I reckon sometimes 
it slips a bit. [The more complicated the patient] the more dreadful it is, yes”. (FG2-
GP2) 
Another GP offered a different perspective, reflecting on the fact that some GPs’ ability to 
use the practice computer system may be poor.  The unclear layout of hospital 
correspondence, as mentioned previously, was also felt to impact on their ability to make 
these changes, with the layout of the ophthalmology department’s correspondence “certainly 
[considered] a risk” as they had a “vast array of ticks of various boxes”. (FG3-GP1) 
These accounts demonstrate an awareness on the part of the GPs that hospital 
recommendations need prompt action, whilst also raising important concerns over individual 
practices’ processes of verifying that necessary changes have been made. 
7.8.2. Secondary care recommendations 
A number of GPs recounted being asked to prescribe unlicensed or specialist drugs without 
adequate information.  Some GPs admitted finding this situation a little “tricky” and appeared 
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reluctant to prescribe these drugs, saying “you need to be very careful because [if] we’re 
prescribing, we’re responsible”.(FG4-GP1)  Three important factors appeared to influence 
GPs’ decisions to prescribe, including local guidance (sometimes referred to as the ‘Red-
Amber-Green’ document), whether the drugs were commonly used in general practice, and 
whether the GP perceived the harms to outweigh the benefits for the patient.  One GP 
admitted feeling “very de-skilled” (PR14-GP3) compared to the hospital specialists and 
would prescribe more than the BNF recommended amount of a drug if requested. In her 
account, she perceived the prescribing of a higher dose of a drug for epilepsy, for example, 
to be “in the patient’s best interests in terms of controlling their fits versus the risks”. (PR14-
GP3)  This particular case was not considered an error by the research team, but the 
following quote shows the GP’s uncertainty: 
“I think we feel very de-skilled as compared to the specialists ultimately I would go 
with their advice even if it was to prescribe more than what the BNF said if it was 
clear that they knew what they were doing, do you know what I mean?  If they said, 
“We are suggesting that we up his dose to 3.5 which is more than normally is 
recommended”.  So then I would probably just go with it.”. (PR14-GP3) 
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Chapter 8: Findings from the root cause analyses 
Fifteen root cause analyses were undertaken and a brief description of the cases is shown in 
Table 26.  It can be seen that a wide range of different types of prescribing and monitoring 
errors were covered along with two cases that were judged to represent sub-optimal 
prescribing and one that was subsequently judged to be not an error.  
A number of error producing conditions were identified from the root cause analyses.  These 
were mapped onto those identified during the interviews and focus groups with GPs and 
practice staff.  For the purposes of presenting summary findings from the analysis of RCAs 
we have created a separate category of ‘communication’ (the issues identified at the 
primary/secondary care interface fit into this category along with other communication 
problems) and we have not separately presented the ‘computer system’ category.  Table 27 
summarises the contributing factors in each of the root causes analyses and key points are 
outlined below, with illustrative RCAs highlighted. 
8.1 Prescriber factors 
In 12 of the RCA cases, individual factors relating to the prescriber were thought to 
contribute to errors.  These included knowledge and training on the appropriate use of 
medication (RCAs 1 and 6); drug-drug interactions (RCA 4), and (over)-reliance of decision 
support systems for alerts of drug interactions and contraindications (RCAs 7 and 8).  Failure 
to carefully check dosages was an issue in some cases (RCAs 13 and 14); failure to 
carefully check the accuracy and appropriateness of the wording on the prescription before 
signing it was an issue in others (RCA 10).  
8.2 Patient factors 
In 12 RCA cases, factors relating to the patient contributed to the occurrence of error.  These 
were commonly related to the complexity of the patient’s clinical condition and in several 
cases may also have been related to the patient having an existing mental health disorder 
(RCA 2).  Furthermore, sometimes errors were related to factors such as the patient being 
house-bound (RCA 4), or not fully engaging with services, particularly in terms of the need 
for blood-test monitoring (RCAs 9 and 11). 
8.3 Team factors 
In 11 RCA cases, it was apparent that team factors, such as lack of coordination of care 
within the general practice was an issue, and contributed to errors happening.  Examples 
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included the failure to ensure adequate blood test monitoring for patients on high-risk 
medications (RCAs 3, 9 and 11). 
8.4 Communication factors 
In 11 RCA cases, communication appeared to be an issue, whether this was between the 
prescriber and the patient (RCA 10), within the primary health care team (RCA 12), or 
between primary care and secondary care (RCA 3).  Lack of availability of a shared care 
document stating requirements for monitoring a patient taking azathioprine was an issue in 
one case (RCA 9). 
8.5 Work environment 
In ten RCA cases, working conditions were thought to contribute to errors.  Problems 
identified included the heavy workload of GPs with multiple competing demands on their 
time and specific time pressures in relation to responding to prescription requests.  There 
were also thought to be problems relating to use of locum doctors because of lack of 
knowledge of patients and inadequate information exchange.  
8.6 Task factors  
In nine RCA cases, contributing factors were related to the task itself.  Examples included 
failure to undertake rigorous medication reviews (RCA 1); failure to check whether a 
prescription was safe in terms of cautions (RCA 6) contraindications (RCAs 7 and 8) and 
drug-drug interactions (RCA 4), and lack of robust systems for helping to ensure timely blood 
test monitoring (RCAs 9 and 11).  In some cases, guidelines and protocols were not easily 
available; for example, in RCA 10 the general practice did not know that (according to PCT 
guidance) they were not supposed to be prescribing tacrolimus to a lung transplant patient.  
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Table 26: Descriptions of potential errors where Root Cause Analysis was undertaken 
RCA
a
 code Type of error/problem Brief description 
RCA1 Unnecessary drug 88 year old male prescribed aminophylline 225mg SR 
tablets one to be taken twice daily since 1993 at the same 
dose without having a documented clinical indication for it 
(i.e. asthma/COPD).  
RCA2 Unnecessary drug 31 year old male with a history of psychosis was prescribed 
testosterone decanoate caps 40mg, one daily for impotence. 
Consultation notes state that Patient has low serum 
testosterone (5.4nmol/L (normal range 8.4-28.7) and 
“difficulty with erection”. The error judging panel felt that 
there were more appropriate ways of managing impotence 
in this case. 
RCA3 Monitoring error – result 
not available 
93 year old male prescribed warfarin 1mg tablet “as 
directed” without the practice having any knowledge of the 
INR level. 
RCA4 Drug-Drug interaction 72 year old male who was regularly taking aminophylline 
225mg modified release, two to be taken twice a day, was 
prescribed antibiotics with potential for serious interaction 
(erythromycin, clarithromycin, ciprofloxacin) on three 
separate occasions, on home visits.   
RCA5 Omission error – failure 
to prescribe concomitant 
medication 
78 year old male prescribed aspirin dispersible tablets 75 
mg daily, with a history of gastrointestinal bleeding.  The 
error judging panel felt that the patient should have been 
prescribed an ulcer-healing drug to protect against further 
gastrointestinal bleeding.  
RCA6 Dose/strength error 73 year old male prescribed rosuvastatin 40mg for CHD 
since an admission in 2003 (where she was swapped from 
simvastatin 40mg). Patient did not have “severe 
hypercholesterolaemia” and was not under specialist 
supervision (BNF advice for 40mg dose). Most recent 
cholesterol level was 2.7 mmol/L.  
RCA7 Contraindication error 82 years old female prescribed allopurinol 300 mg once 
daily. Patient has an impaired renal function (e-GFR 
40mL/min). BNF advises maximum 100 mg daily in renal 
impairment, increased only if response inadequate. Given 
impaired renal function and age the error judging panel felt 
that the GP should have tried reducing the dose to see if 
control of gout could be maintained. 
RCA8 Two contraindication 
errors and a 
dose/strength error 
77 years old female prescribed simvastatin 80mg once daily 
and alendronic acid 70mg once weekly. These are 
contraindicated as the patient has eGFR of 25ml/min (BNF 
advises that simvastatin doses above 10mg daily should be 
used with caution if e-GFR <30ml/min, and that alendronic 
acid should be avoided if e-GFR <35ml/min). In addition, 
dose of digoxin 250 micrograms once daily puts the patient 
at unnecessary risk of digoxin toxicity given the age and 
renal function of the patient. 
RCA9 Monitoring error – 
monitoring not 
requested 
61 year old male prescribed azathioprine 50mg three to be 
taken daily. Full blood count had not been requested in the 
previous 10 months.  
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RCA
a
 code Type of error/problem Brief description 
RCA10 One formulation error 
 
One dose/strength error 
59 year old male prescribed tacrolimus post lung transplant 
as generic modified release formulation instead of Prograf®, 
despite the discharge letter emphasising brand-name 
prescribing and not to prescribe the modified release 
formulation. 
Also, in the GP prescription records, the tacrolimus dose 
was written ambiguously as “2 in the morning and 1pm”. The 
discharge letter stated the dose should be “2mg at 8am, and 
1mg at 8pm”. The error judging panel felt that for such a 
critically important drug, the failure to accurately transcribe 
the dose recommended by the hospital could have put the 
patient at risk. 
RCA11 Monitoring error – 
monitoring not 
requested 
 
66 year old female prescribed Priadel®. This is a lithium 
based medication that requires three monthly monitoring of 
lithium levels to ensure safe and effective dosing. At the time 
of data collection, the patient was receiving Priadel® on 
repeat prescription, but lithium levels had not be requested 
in the previous 11 months. 
RCA12 Suboptimal prescribing -  
two potential drug 
interactions; one 
example of inadequate 
documentation in the 
medical record. 
29 year old female prescribed fluoxetine 60mg once daily 
while also taking diclofenac and tramadol. BNF states there 
is increased risk of CNS toxicity when SSRIs are taken with 
tramadol, and there is known to be an increased risk of 
gastrointestinal bleeding when SSRIs are taken with 
NSAIDs. 
The medical record was unclear in terms of whether the 
patient should be taking 40mg or 60mg fluoxetine each day. 
RCA13 Dose/strength error 11 year old male prescribed Tamiflu® (oseltamivir) 30mg 
twice daily for treatment of influenza. This is lower than that 
recommended for age/weight of patient. Age at the time of 
oseltamivir prescribing was 11yrs and weight recorded a 
year previously was >36kg.  The suggested dose according 
to the BNF should have been at least 60mg twice daily. 
RCA14 Dose/strength issue -  
Judged to be sub-
optimal prescribing 
10 year old male prescribed griseofulvin 125mg twice daily. 
BNF states that if bodyweight is <50kg then dose should be 
10mg/kg daily for dermatophyte infections and 15-20mg/kg 
daily in tinea capitis. The child has been given a dose 
appropriate for a child of 24Kg or less. At 10 years old the 
child is likely to be at least 32kg, which would suggest the 
need for a dose of at least 320mg once daily, or 160mg 
twice daily. The panel judged this as suboptimal prescribing 
as it was felt that the risks of harm to the patient were low. 
RCA15 Dose/strength issue – 
judged to be not an error 
 
40 year old male prescribed levetiracem tablets 3.5g daily 
(in divided doses) for epilepsy. BNF states that maximum 
daily dose is 3g. Patient under specialist supervision and the 
3.5g daily dose was recommended by the specialist. The 
error judging panel felt that this was probably not an error. 
The case was included as a root cause analysis before the 
error judging panel had discussed this case.  
a
 RCA: Root cause analysis 
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Table 27: Summary of categories associated with different error producing conditions for each root cause analysis 
RCAa code Categories associated with different error producing conditions 
 
 Prescriber 
factors 
Patient 
Factors 
Communication 
factors 
Task factors Team factors Work 
Environment 
RCA1       
RCA2       
RCA3       
RCA4       
RCA5       
RCA6       
RCA7       
RCA8       
RCA9       
RCA10       
RCA11       
RCA12       
RCA13       
RCA14       
RCA15 N/Ab N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
a
 RCA: Root cause analysis; 
b
N/A: not applicable, because RCA15 was judged not to be an error. 
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Chapter 9: Defences against medication errors in general practice 
 
 
Summary 
 
Defences against medication errors in general practice have been identified at multiple 
stages in the medicines management process: 
 Issuing new prescriptions 
 Supporting patient decision making 
 Dispensing prescriptions 
 Repeat prescribing 
 Monitoring patients 
 Amending prescriptions based on outside correspondence 
 Processes supporting medicines management. 
 
These defences have been grouped as: 
 Personal prescriber strategies 
 Practice-wide strategies 
 Health Information Technology (HIT) strategies. 
 
Key personal prescriber strategies include: 
 Read aloud printed prescriptions to help ensure patient understanding and to allow 
the prescriber to check the accuracy of the prescription 
 Clarify prescribing recommendations made by specialists where these go beyond 
the GP’s comfort zone 
 Review newly prescribed medicines within six weeks 
 Add medicines to the repeat list only when patients are stable on them 
 Confirm important information with patients even when they are well known to the 
prescriber 
 Ensure that prescribers are competent to use all of the important features of e-
prescribing and other IT-support systems. 
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Summary continued 
 
Key practice-wide strategies include: 
 Adopt a formulary to increase familiarity with medicines prescribed 
 Strongly discourage verbal requests for repeat prescriptions 
 Train non-medical staff to manage requests for non-repeat prescriptions and 
consider using dedicated staff to manage repeat prescriptions, with additional 
staff trained as back-up 
 Highlight repeat prescriptions with queries so they receive more attention when 
considered for signing off by GPs and other prescribers 
 Perform face-to-face medication reviews 
 Check INR results before generating repeat prescriptions for warfarin 
 Do not delegate responsibility for difficult patients to junior or locum GPs 
 Schedule necessary blood tests for one week before medication reviews 
 Update prescribing records as soon as possible (within 48 hours) of receiving 
correspondence from specialists 
 Clarify prescribing changes with specialists if correspondence not available 
 Build and maintain a strong safety culture based on open, blame-free, 
communication 
 Appoint a prescribing lead for each practice to lead on protocol reviews and best 
prescribing-practice. 
 
In addition, secondary care strategies include: 1) Ensuring that specialists’ 
correspondence highlights new medicines, changes to medicines and reasons for 
changes; 2) Ensuring that specialists’ requests for unusual medicines state duration, 
key side effects, and monitoring requirements. 
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Summary continued 
 
Key health information technology strategies include: 
 Code allergies in electronic clinical records 
 For high risk medicines: programme robust alerts to highlight risky 
prescribing; block inappropriate medication request intervals; automatically 
insert weekly dosage instructions for methotrexate 
 Provide on-line access to clinical/medicines information resources, linking 
directly from clinical computer systems 
 Embed an electronic-formulary within the e-prescribing system 
 Use the electronic-formulary to guide prescribing to safer alternatives  
 Avoid similar drug names being adjacent in pick-lists  
 Allow drug interaction alerts with severity gradings and brief descriptions of 
the problems associated with specific interactions 
 For general practices using the EMIS computer system, use ‘practice notes’ 
to improve communication and provide an audit trail for unauthorised repeat 
prescribing requests, errors, and new prescribing information 
 Run searches on clinical records system to identify potential prescribing 
errors, and patients requiring blood-test monitoring 
 Programme computer to alert when patients taking warfarin go 12 weeks or 
longer since their last INR test  
 Use screen alerts and repeat prescribing dates to highlight need for 
monitoring 
 Amend e-prescribing records if accepting community pharmacists’ 
interventions 
 Familiarise locums with health information technologies available in practices. 
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9.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the defences against medication errors identified from the focus 
groups and interviews with individual practitioners.  The defences are ordered and grouped 
according to the medicines management processes which they protect, with a final section 
detailing the defences which provide overall support to the medicines management process.  
Headings for each section within this report are derived from the medicines management 
processes illustrated in Figure 5.  Within each section, defences have been grouped 
according to whether the defence is based on a personal strategy, practice-wide strategy, or 
a HIT strategy. Summaries of the defences are presented in tables throughout this chapter.  
Within these tables, some defences are marked with !; these are defences in many 
situations, but based on the interview and focus group data,  in certain prescribing scenarios 
they can also become error producing conditions. Some defences are marked with ; these 
defences were considered desirable by one or more interviewees but, according to data from 
the interviews, were not being used in any of the practices. 
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Figure 5:  Medicines management processes in general practice derived from 
interview data 
  
 118 
 
9.2 Issuing new prescriptions 
The process of issuing new prescriptions includes many steps where there is potential for 
error (see Figure 5).  For each step, defensive strategies were identified and summarised in 
Table 28 and described in detail further below. 
Table 28:  Defensive strategies which can improve the safety of issuing new 
prescriptions 
Medicines 
management 
processes 
Personal 
strategies 
Practice-wide 
strategies 
IT-based strategies 
Reviewing 
medical history 
(allergies, 
medicines, co-
morbidities)  
 
Confirm important 
information with 
all patients 
(including well 
known patients) 
Ensure competent 
with supporting 
features of 
prescribing 
system 
Contact previous 
surgery for summary 
information about 
new patients 
Read-code allergies on 
prescribing system 
Summary care record 
valuable for “walk-in” 
patients  
Programme robust alerts 
for high risk medicines  
Checking clinical/ 
medicine 
information 
resources 
Ensure clinical 
knowledge 
regularly 
updated 
Ensure competent 
with supporting 
features of 
prescribing 
system 
Provide easy access 
to clinical/medicines 
information 
resources 
Provide on-line access to 
clinical/medicines 
information resources, 
linking from prescribing 
system 
Selecting 
appropriate 
medicine, dose 
and duration 
Where possible, 
prescribe familiar 
medicines 
Pay attention to 
prescribing 
system-
generated 
interaction alerts 
! 
Refer to 
prescribing 
information if 
unfamiliar with 
medicine 
Adopt formulary to 
increase familiarity 
with medicines 
prescribed 
Prescribe single 
strength of high risk 
medicines ! 
Issue no more than 
two months of 
medicine on first 
prescription 
Block inappropriate 
intervals for high risk 
medicines  
Embed formulary in 
prescribing system 
Programme ScriptSwitch 
to give safety advice 
Automatically insert 
dosage instructions for 
high risk medicines ! 
Allow interaction alerts 
with severity grading 
and brief descriptions of 
interaction ! 
Signing 
prescription  
 
Read printed 
prescription to 
patient to confirm 
accuracy 
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9.2.1 Reviewing patient’s medical history 
Healthcare professionals stated they believed it was important to refer to patients’ medical 
records even when patients were well known to them.  Knowing patients well was also 
considered to be a further defence against errors.  Knowledge of patients’ medical and 
medication histories was felt to be particularly important when access to such information 
was difficult, such as during home visits, consulting with recently registered patients and 
walk-in patients, and when clinical information was not properly coded in medical records. 
Access to information about patients’ medical history was limited during home visits because 
healthcare professionals did not have access to electronic medical records.  This resulted in 
patients being prescribed medicines they were allergic to, and increased the likelihood of 
other inappropriate prescribing.  This lack of information can be partially overcome by 
printing out a summary of the patient’s medical record.  
“We did a significant event meeting on a person that was prescribed amoxicillin on a 
home visit a few years ago and that was because it was a hand written prescription 
and the computer had obviously told us that they were allergic to penicillin so as a 
result of that we now print off the patient summary to take on a visit because 
obviously now that with computers we don’t take notes that we were kind of going a 
little bit with the repeat prescription maybe but not with anything else so that was a 
solution.” [FG3-GP2] 
Knowledge of patients’ allergies was considered particularly important and the need to 
properly code allergies in electronic medical records (rather than enter as free-text) was 
highlighted.  The need to train locum doctors, GP registrars, and staff responsible for 
summarising patients’ records, in how to code allergies was also emphasised.  In addition, to 
avoid allergies and adverse reactions becoming lost in medical records, ‘Practice 12’ added 
this information as “alert[s] so when the patient comes in, you call the patient in, [the 
computer] alerts you” [PR12-GP2]. 
Patients who had recently registered with the practice, especially those with repeat 
prescriptions, were also noted to be a problem.  These patients could request repeat 
prescriptions before their records had been transferred to their new practice.  These patients 
were always expected to consult a GP before having their prescriptions issued.  In addition, 
reception staff could “get in touch with the surgery previous and ask them to send us over [a 
summary] of their previous medication as a safeguard that they can take their medications” 
[FG6-Snr Recep 1]. 
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A similar problem was identified for “walk-in” patients (patients who were not registered at 
the surgery) where GPs had to rely on patients’ recollections of their medical and medication 
history; this was considered unsatisfactory.  GPs seeing “walk-in” patients at ‘Practice 8’ 
believed that the “[summary] care record would be ideal” because GPs would then know “if 
[patients are] allergic to anything or whether they’ve had an interaction or problem before.” 
They also hoped that “the computer (...) will flag up and I think that will prevent errors...” 
[PR8-GP1].  
9.2.2 Checking clinical and medicines information resources 
GPs referred to the importance of checking clinical and medicines information when making 
prescribing decisions, although there were differences in the types of information they 
accessed.  The majority of interviewees referred to the British National Formulary (BNF) if 
they were unfamiliar with a medicine. Some GPs used the paper-based BNF. 
“I tend to use just the good old-fashioned paper BNF. I get my glasses out. I don’t 
know why, that’s how I’m used to doing it and it just feels familiar and I do use the 
BNF a lot.” [PR14-GP3] 
Others preferred the online version (linked directly from the electronic prescribing system) 
because of the ease and speed of access. 
“GP: I mean I think that, you know, often, I mean with the EMIS system and we’re 
going EMIS web shortly that, when I went on a training thing it was actually quite 
helpful that you could click and you’d be straight into the appropriate bit of the BNF 
which I would find really helpful because I use the BNF all the time.  
Interviewer: So more quickly than in … 
GP: Oh much more, much more.  You actually prescribe the drug and then there’s a 
little icon and it goes Chapter 14, .72 and it’s actually got the page there for you to 
read about the drugs which is helpful.  Because sometimes if I’m not sure, I mean I’m 
old enough and experienced enough to quite happily pick up the BNF in front of the 
patient and say I’m just checking for whatever reason if I’m not certain so to have it 
on the screen as quickly as that would be great.” [PR2-GP1] 
Other clinical information systems of particular note included EMIS Mentor (a clinical 
decision support system which linked from the practice computer system), clinical knowledge 
summaries, patient.co.uk, and local and national policies.  
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“But in terms of clinical information I use loads of different places.  There is, I use 
Mentor a lot. It’s on EMIS.  Again because it keeps a record of what I have been 
looking at so I can make notes of what I’ve looked at as well.” [PR14-GP2] 
“Well, yes I do use clinical knowledge for some reason.  I think patient.co.uk is very 
good.  I like that, not just for patients, for me, because there are the ones with the 
little apple on, so they’re very good.” [PR4-GP2] 
Web-based resources which were linked directly from the prescribing system (and therefore 
easily accessible) were particularly valued. 
“What I don’t want to do, what works well for us is having an intranet where 
everything is very available.  So we have a hyperlink, so for example the new 
guidelines you’ve just sent out about preferred prescribing, we’ve downloaded that on 
to our computer and we’ve hyperlinked it so if we want to look up a preferred 
prescribing list it’s there.  It’s not practical in a 10 minute consultation to have to go 
through lots of hoops and jumps to get to something.  But of course the problem is 
you need it central so it can be updated easily.  If everybody’s got their own individual 
thing it quickly gets out of date so you almost need a central resource, that’s almost 
like a click away, that I think would be fantastic, to be able just to say ‘Yes, that’s 
what it is’, this is where your prescribing information is, that would be fantastic but 
having to be password protected and get into it, and go into this, that makes it tricky 
and it makes it less usable and if it’s not usable it doesn’t get used.  So it doesn’t 
matter how fantastic the information is if it’s not easily accessible.” [PR4-GP2] 
Not all prescribers had the skills to benefit from the HIT available to support them. 
“Interviewer: I mean with regards to the EMIS system I’ve been told there is a 
medical information 
GP: I never use it, I don’t know how to use it. Sad but true!” [PR14-GP3] 
It seems reasonable to conclude that, in order to make the best use of the electronic 
information resources available, prescribers should undertake training in how to use the 
electronic prescribing and medical record systems, including their additional features. 
9.2.3 Selecting appropriate medicine, dose and duration  
A number of strategies were identified which increased the likelihood of selecting the 
appropriate medicine, dose and duration for a prescription.  These ranged from personal 
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strategies such as prescribing from a restricted list of familiar medicines, to practice- or 
cluster-wide adoption of a formulary, and incorporating information technology strategies to 
reduce the risk of selecting the wrong drug. 
Some prescribers found the interaction alerts generated by the electronic prescribing 
systems to be very useful, considering themselves “lucky [to have] the backup of the default 
for alert messages and systems software that will assist you.” [PR2-GP2]  These alerts were 
considered particularly useful for GP registrars because “they’ll take heed of every single 
interaction it says and come and mention it to you, and you can go through it” [FG4-GP3].  
Frequent alerts were, however, also thought to cause alert fatigue which increased the risk 
of important alerts being missed.  
“...you get so many of them and when you’re prescribing for complex patients well I 
know all these things interact but, you know, there’s very few choices left and so you 
start to block out those because you see them so often.”[FG4-GP2] 
Another prescriber used the interaction alerts to determine which drugs from a particular 
class would be safest to combine with another drug (as an alternative to referring to the 
appropriate clinical information source).  This practice was not, however, considered safe by 
all prescribers.  In contrast, some prescribers felt that interaction alerts should not be relied 
upon; instead they should be used in conjunction with clinical skills and information from 
other sources because they required clinical interpretation.  It was also felt that interactions 
alerts may “give a false sense of security” [PR6-GP4] because prescribers might assume 
that they would be alerted to all potential problems. 
Prescribers found it “useful” [FG1-GP3] to have graded alerts (e.g. red alert, level one, level 
two, level three) which indicated the potential severity of interactions.  A summary of the 
interaction, and the ability to switch off the less severe interaction alerts on a per-prescriber 
basis, were also considered helpful.  In addition to the system-specific interaction alerts, an 
additional software called ScriptSwitch® (mainly used to highlight more cost-effective 
prescribing) could also be programmed to highlight “safety advice” [FG4-GP2]. 
National or regional strategies, such as prescribing single strengths of high risk medicines 
such as methotrexate or warfarin were considered “a good step forward in” [FG4-GP2] 
reducing the risk of prescribing the wrong dose of these medicines.  However, risks were 
also noted if patients moved from a region which did not adhere to this practice.  Patients 
who were accustomed to taking multiple strengths could be confused by administration 
instructions provided in areas which prescribed a single strength of warfarin.  These 
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instructions do not routinely contain the strength of tablet to be administered; for example 
“take one on a Monday, none on Tuesday, three on a Wednesday” [FG3-Nurse1]. 
Formularies were considered useful for ensuring that prescribers were familiar with a 
restricted list of medicines and GP1 from ‘Practice 1’ stated that the formulary had resulted 
in “slight changes” to his prescribing behaviour.  Prescribing from a restricted list of familiar 
drugs was perceived to “make errors less likely (...) because you just look at them and go 
that’s not right” [PR4-GP2].  Formularies could also be dictated by stock availability; this was 
a particular feature noted in the dispensing practices, but it seems reasonable to assume 
that this could also apply to surgeries with a close link to a community pharmacy.  Some 
prescribers felt that cluster-wide formularies would be useful to control prescribing costs and 
ensure consistency in prescribing across practices.  Electronic formularies were considered 
particularly useful, especially if they were embedded into the electronic prescribing system. 
‘Practice 2’ had “a system where certain drugs [were] above a dotted line” and this indicated 
the practices “preferred prescribing list” [PR2-GP3].  This allowed preferred choices to be 
highlighted and the medicines with similar names to be separated which, in turn, helped 
avoid wrong-drug selection errors.  
If formularies required prescribers to switch between screens they were less likely to be 
used by some individuals, however, others became accustomed to switching between 
screens and didn’t feel that this affected the formularies’ usability. 
“What’s crazy is that there is a – of – formulary but I don’t tend to use it very much 
because I’m peripatetic and I’m in a different room every day I don’t have it saved as 
a favourite on my desktop in every single room, I’ve never systematically managed to 
do that. (...) So ideally that’s what I would do but I don’t.” [PR14-GP3] 
Robust IT-based safety strategies for high risk medicines were welcomed by prescribers. 
Those of particular note prevented overdoses of methotrexate.  Strategies included 
preventing the prescription of methotrexate at intervals less than weekly and automatically 
inserting the dosage instructions for methotrexate.  This strategy could be of particular 
benefit where specific instructions are required such as topical steroids.  Where medicines 
have more than one indication and dosage schedule, however, automatically inserting 
dosage instructions was thought to increase the risk of prescribing errors.  Therefore, this 
strategy should be used with caution. 
“I mean, yes, sometimes it automatically gives the dose and the frequency when you 
don’t particularly want that frequency, like I don’t think it would be a major error or 
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anything but sometimes doxycycline it depends what you’re prescribing it for. If it’s 
like a respiratory type thing or sinus it says ‘Two now and then one for 8 days’ 
whereas if you’re doing it for Chlamydia or PID there’s a hundred, twice those so you 
just, yeah, I think you’ve just got to be a little bit careful.” [PR8 GP1] 
Some prescribers also felt that new prescriptions should be issued as ‘acute’ prescriptions 
only and not put straight onto repeat.  This helped ensure that patients were adequately 
reviewed in terms of efficacy, adverse effects and that necessary monitoring was carried out 
before medicines were re-issued or stopped.  Duration of first prescriptions varied between 
one to two months depending on the surgery and type of medication. 
One GP also noted the importance of linking a prescription to the indication at the time of 
prescribing.  This was felt to be particularly helpful for future medication reviews. 
9.2.4 Signing prescriptions  
Once the prescribing decision had been made and the appropriate medicine, dose and 
duration selected on the e-prescribing system, many prescribers did not re-check the paper 
prescription when they signed it.  Some prescribers assumed that the paper prescription was 
accurate once the details were entered on the computer because “you know what it sounds 
like, once you’ve done it, once you’ve made a decision you just go on, there’s so many other 
things to get right” [FG1-GP1].  Despite this, some prescribers were aware that patients had 
received the wrong prescription in the past.  
“I have on one or two occasions there’s been something on the printer that I’ve not 
taken off and picked it up and signed it and given it to the patient” [PR1-GP1] 
Our highlighting of a prescribing error which could have been identified by checking the final 
paper prescription was sufficient to encourage one GP “...to double check before [he] re-
issue[s]” [PR14-GP1] prescriptions. 
A small number of prescribers, however, had strategies of varying robustness to ensure that 
the paper prescription was correct.  The most robust strategy involved reading every 
prescription out loud to the patient, especially those with more than one item.  This allowed 
the GP to check the accuracy of the prescription and provide patient counselling in a time 
efficient manner.  Alternative strategies included, counting the number of items on a script to 
ensure it matched the intended number of items. 
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“What I do with patients is I read [the prescription] out to them, what it is, after it’s 
been printed out.  It’s come out of the printer, I’ve got the bit of paper, I read out to 
them what it is, how they take it so that they’re clear how to take it (...) You’re doing 
two things by doing that, a) you’re checking for yourself and b) you’re checking the 
patient understands it.” [FG2-GP1] 
9.3 Supporting ongoing patient decision-making 
Once a prescription was issued to a patient, the patient decided whether or not to take the 
medicine, how to take it, and whether or not to attend for subsequent monitoring visits.  A 
number of personal strategies were identified which could support patients in making these 
decisions.  These included providing patients with adequate information, helping them 
remember to take their medicines, or by facilitating an open discussion about patients’ 
concerns regarding the management of their medicines (further below. 
Table 29).  These defensive strategies are discussed in more detail further below. 
Table 29: Defensive strategies which may help improve safety by supporting patient 
decision making 
Medicines management 
processes 
Personal strategies 
Provide information about 
medicines 
Give both verbal and written instructions to the patient 
Supply medicines in multi-compartment compliance aids 
(MCAs) for confused patients ! 
Counsel patients about side effects 
Read aloud printed prescription to patient to confirm 
understanding  
Use shared-decision making 
within consultations 
Use shared-decision making in consultations with appropriate 
patients to achieve agreement on medicine taking and 
monitoring 
 
9.3.1 Provide information about medicines to patients or carers 
Informing patients about the potential side effects of their medicines and what to do if they 
occur was felt to be important.  This practice was perceived to encourage patients to seek 
advice if side effects did occur, and therefore improve the safety of medicines management.  
“Well it’s good practice anyway to advise patients on possible side effects and the 
need for them to be monitored, maybe to be seen every 6 weeks or 2 weeks or sent 
for blood, we’ll do that anyway, monitoring them, patient advice on side effects.” 
[FG6-GP2]  
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Another GP, however, did not “spend an awful lot of time [counselling patients] because they 
all go home and avidly read the bit of paper in the box” [FG2-GP3].  She perceived the 
majority of her patients to be a “...well-read professional (...) group of people in a higher 
social class, (...) Guardian readers” [FG2-GP3] who would contact the practice if they 
thought there was a problem.  In contrast, one GP felt it was his personal responsibility to 
“make it perfectly clear as to how I want [the patients] to take it” [PR2-GP1]. 
As described above, one GP facilitated patient counselling by reading “through [the paper 
prescription] on the desk, pointing to it as I go through” [PR3-GP2].  This provided an 
opportunity for patients to ask for further clarification if they were unsure. 
Providing both written and verbal instructions to patients was felt to be important.  A nurse 
highlighted how one of the GPs would “write on the blank side of the prescription a lot of 
instructions often, (...) if they need to be seen for a blood test in two weeks because of the 
commencement of a drug” [FG2-Nurse1].  This was considered particularly useful if the main 
carer was not present or there was a language barrier. 
“...a lot of things are said verbally and explained verbally or sometimes I write a little 
note so the family member I can then say, ‘Oh can you give this to your daughter’ 
because you know sometimes the daughter accompanies and she couldn’t this time 
so can you show it to your daughter and then she will tell you.” [PR6-GP4]   
This GP also experienced difficulties with language barriers when translators were hard to 
access “and you may not have a receptionist who could speak” [PR6-GP4].  This was 
sometimes overcome by “phon[ing] the pharmacy and specifically direct[ing] to the specific 
pharmacist who you know that person can speak their own language.  It is a problem” [PR6-
GP4]. 
Some prescribing situations required changes to prescriptions without face-to-face contact 
with the patient. Increasing the cost effectiveness of prescribing in general practice can be 
achieved by ‘batch changing’ prescriptions (where more than one patient’s records are 
changed in a single process).  Where many patients were involved it was felt impractical to 
have face-to-face consultations with all of them. Instead, patients who may be easily 
confused by the change were identified for face-to-face consultations in order to mitigate the 
risks of batch changes to prescriptions.  
The number of patients treated in a day can be increased by telephone consultations; 
however, these were perceived by some to reduce the safety of prescribing.  One GP 
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recalled an instance where, during a telephone consultation, he had advised a carer to 
increase the amount of amisulpiride suspension given to a patient based on his record of the 
strength of preparation prescribed.  The patient had, however, been supplied a different 
strength by the community pharmacy.  The carer noted the discrepancy between the verbal 
instruction and the product supplied “and thankfully they rang back and said, ‘I don’t think 
we’re talking about the same thing’” [FG4-GP2].  This example highlights the important 
defensive role played by patients and carers, and the importance of good communication 
and record keeping between community pharmacy and general practice. 
Some patients can be confused by their medicines, or forget to take them.  One practice 
believed that dispensing medicines in MCAs helped these patients take their medicines as 
prescribed.  There were, however, some difficulties associated with using MCAs.  
Medicines such as analgesics, which needed to be taken ‘when required’, caused a 
dilemma.  One GP highlighted that “in your old and confused patients is it safer just to say, 
‘Look, let’s put three lots in’. Just do it three times a day because that’s less harmful 
potentially than you taking twelve thinking you’ve only had two today.  That’s the problem, so 
it’s not perfect” [FG3-GP1].  In addition, some medicines also became chemically unstable 
when exposed to light or moisture in the atmosphere which, in turn, meant that they had to 
be dispensed separately.  The patients most likely to benefit from MCAs were also felt to be 
those who needed their medication regimens altering on a regular basis.  This could mean 
lots of wasted medicines if MCAs were filled monthly. 
“By the time they need a dosette they are by definition unstable.” [FG3-GP1] 
9.3.2 Use shared-decision making in appropriate consultations 
One GP found that using shared-decision making in consultations, where the risks and 
benefits of prescribing or monitoring medicines were discussed and patients’ views obtained, 
was helpful for improving safe medicines management.  This GP noted that a patient who 
was receiving six-monthly monitoring for lithium would not have attended any monitoring 
appointments had he not engaged in shared-decision making with her and reached an 
agreement on a monitoring interval that was acceptable to both parties. 
Other GPs also stopped short of a truly concordant approach to consultations, instead using 
extensive explanation and discussion to convince patients that their prescribing decision was 
the best course of action. 
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“Well there are times of course when the patient will refuse to take additional, you 
know, they’ll say I don’t want to take two new tablets, I just want one thing to sort this 
out, and then, you know, it is quite hard to have to sit down and talk through with 
them the reasons why you do it.  But I generally find those patients when you explain 
the reason why and say it’s only while you’re taking this other tablet that you have to 
take both, they’re usually OK with it.  So I wouldn’t think that’s a big factor, I’d like to 
think that most of us are quite willing to sort of have that discussion with the patient if 
they’re resistant to the idea.” [PR6-GP1] 
9.4 Dispensing medication 
In one of the focus groups, staff from a dispensing practice spoke about the process of 
dispensing medicines in general practice.  These data are supplemented with comments 
made by a community pharmacist who participated in different focus group.  Practice wide 
and IT-based defensive strategies at the points of screening, picking, labelling and accuracy 
checking medicines are summarised in Table 30 and discussed in more detail further below. 
9.4.1 Screen prescriptions 
In community pharmacy, all prescriptions are screened by a pharmacist who can identify 
certain types of prescribing error such as overdoses or drug-drug interactions.  Community 
pharmacists are also supported by computerised interaction alerts.  This safety barrier is not 
present in dispensing practices, where prescriptions are dispensed by trained dispensers. In 
‘Practice 1’, the loss of this safety barrier was felt to be mitigated by using well trained 
dispensary staff (NVQ level two).  The dispensary staff were:  
“usually pretty good at picking up something that doesn’t look quite right and certainly 
simple slip-ups like instead of prescribing 28 tablets you hit ‘two’ and they ring up and 
say, ‘Did you really want Mrs Bloggs to have two amoxicillin rather than whatever’, so 
they’re very good at that.” [PR1-GP1].  This GP “hadn’t really thought about losing 
that filter [pharmacist screening], until now.” This made him feel “uncomfortable” 
although he was “fairly confident in what [he] prescribe[d]” [PR1-GP1]. 
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Table 30: Defensive strategies which can improve the safety of dispensing medicines 
Medicines management 
processes 
Practice-wide strategies IT-based strategies 
Screen prescription  Use well trained dispensary staff   
Pick medicines  Keep remainder of split packs in 
original boxes 
Barcode dispensing !  
Label medicines   Electronic transfer of 
prescriptions !  
Check medicines   Barcode dispensing ! 
 
9.4.2 Picking and labelling medicines 
The dispensing practice used a barcode dispensing machine (Dispens-IT®) to improve the 
safety of dispensing.  Prescriptions were transferred electronically to the dispensary.  The 
dispensers then electronically transferred the prescriptions to the Dispens-IT machine, 
before picking the required medicines and scanning the barcodes to ensure they matched 
the prescription.  If the correct medicine had been selected, a label was automatically 
generated. The dispenser then stuck the label to the medicine packaging.  Dispensing error 
records showed that this system of work had reduced the numbers of dispensing errors 
identified within the practice.  A number of problems were, however, highlighted by the 
dispensers: 
 The first time a product was purchased, the details had to be manually entered into the 
Dispens-IT system.  If this information was entered incorrectly, the wrong medicine may 
be selected. 
 The barcode scanner did not recognise the quantity in a packet; therefore, wrong 
quantity errors would not be identified. 
 The Dispens-IT system did not recognise all of the abbreviated directions used by the 
GPs.  Dispensers sometimes needed to manually amend instructions to ensure that 
patients could understand the medicine labels.  If dispensers misinterpreted the 
abbreviations, patients would receive the wrong instructions. 
The GPs in the dispensing practice were unaware of these limitations to the Dispens-IT 
system, particularly the issue with abbreviated directions. 
“Dispenser 3: [Dispens-IT] doesn’t help at all because if on the system we’re on, if 
they put ‘mdu’ it says ‘mdu’ on it which the patient hasn’t got a clue what ‘mdu’ 
means and ‘1 om’ on omeprazole would come up ‘1 om’.  You’ve then got to go back 
into the computer and put them, the reference that it will recognise...‘take in the 
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morning’ but then put that in. The EMIS system we use doesn’t recognise all of the 
abbreviations that the doctor uses.(...) We have to change the computer to what it will 
recognise, ‘as directed’ (...) 
GP 2: You could set your doctors to change.” [FG1] 
9.4.3 Check medicines 
After all the items were picked and labelled, they were bagged.  When a patient collected 
their medicines a dispenser checked the items before giving the completed prescription to 
the patient.  This second manual check acted as an accuracy check on the prescription and 
further reduced the risk of dispensing errors reaching the patient.  In addition, prescriptions 
for controlled drugs were also accuracy checked by a GP before being given to the patient. 
9.5 Repeat prescribing 
Repeat prescribing allows general practices to issue medications to patients without the 
need for a consultation. This can save time for practices and for patients. There are, 
however, risks in terms of propagating prescribing errors or missing adverse events.  For this 
reason, repeat prescribing must be carefully managed to ensure safe medicines 
management.  Participants in the focus groups and interviews identified a broad range of 
defensive strategies to maintain the safety of repeat prescribing.  These are summarised in 
Table 31 and described in more detail further below. 
9.5.1 Add medicines to repeat list 
According to data from the interviews and focus groups, responsibility for adding 
prescriptions to the repeat list lay with the GPs in all the practices in the study.  If patients 
requested items which were not on the repeat list, these requests were referred to the GPs.  
The GPs only added medications that the patients were stable on to the repeat lists; one GP 
defined “stable” as “routine patients who are not to be monitored for 2 or 3 months (...) and 
they don’t need to see anyone for 3 to 6 months” [FG5-GP2] 
. 
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Table 31: Defensive strategies which can improve the safety of repeat prescribing 
Medicines 
management 
processes 
Personal strategies Practice-wide strategies IT-based strategies 
Add medicine to 
repeat list  
Use caution when adding medicines to 
repeat list  
Only add medicines to the repeat list 
when patients are stable on them  
Only allow GPs to add medicines to repeat list   
Select repeat 
duration  
 Issue one  to two months supply on each prescription  
Authorise repeats for 3 to 6 months for patients with chronic diseases 
 
Receive repeat 
request from 
patient or carer 
 Do not accept verbal requests for repeat prescriptions (unless 
housebound patients)  
Patients request repeats via online 
tick-list system or in writing via 
email 
Manage requests 
for unauthorised 
items  
 Train non-medical staff to manage requests for non-repeat prescriptions  
Dedicated staff to manage repeat prescriptions, with additional staff 
trained as back-up !  
Highlight repeat prescriptions with queries so they receive more 
attention  
Dedicated staff member to review unauthorised repeat requests  
Use EMIS practice notes to 
communicate with GPs about 
unauthorised repeat requests  
Re-authorise repeat 
medicines  
 Perform face to face medication reviews after 6 months 
Proactively identify patients approaching end of repeat authorisation ! 
Use computerised templates to help 
manage chronic disease patients ! 
Generate repeat 
prescriptions  
 Only generate prescriptions for medicines currently authorised on repeat 
list  
Staff responsible for generating repeat prescriptions check whether 
monitoring is due  
Check yellow book before generating repeat prescriptions for warfarin 
 
Sign repeat 
prescriptions  
Sign repeat prescriptions in small batches  
For chronic disease patients, check: blood 
results, progression, date since last 
review, and repeat interval before 
signing repeat prescription 
Only allow GPs to sign repeat prescriptions  
Issue repeat 
prescriptions  
 Document which pharmacy patients prefer prescriptions to be sent to  
Do not issue repeat prescriptions using postal service 
Maintain a record of where prescriptions have been sent to 
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Restricting the repeat list to “stable” medicines ensured that patients were regularly reviewed 
until the GPs were confident that patients were responding well to the medicines (i.e. the 
medicines were effective and not causing undue adverse effects).  Also, being cautious 
about adding medicines to the repeat list reduced medicine waste and helped avoid patients 
titrating doses of medicine by increasing the number of tablets they took (this was thought to 
increase the risk of confusion and therefore overdose).  Additionally, one GP was very 
cautious about adding prescriptions to the repeat list to avoid patients getting more 
medication than they needed. 
9.5.2 Selecting repeat duration 
In all practices, medicines on the repeat list were authorised for a limited period of time 
and/or number of issues.  This limit was set by the authorising GP.  The duration depended 
on the medicine and age of the patient.  High risk medicines such as lithium were given 
relatively short repeat intervals of two months by some GPs to ensure that appropriate 
monitoring was done (and the results regularly reviewed).  Most other medicines for chronic 
conditions were authorised for six months, except one practice where patients were 
reviewed every two to three months.  The duration of individual prescriptions varied from one 
month (in one practice which was perceived to have a very strong focus on medicines 
safety) to two months for most prescriptions and up to three months for oral contraceptives.  
Chronic disease templates were also used to limit the number and duration of prescriptions 
which could be issued.  
9.5.3 Receiving repeat requests from patients or carers 
In all practices, once medicines were on the repeat list, patients were able to request further 
supplies without seeing their GP.  Written requests for medicines were considered to have 
less “potential for medication errors” [FG2-GP2] than telephone requests because there was 
less risk of practice staff misunderstanding the request.  In all practices, verbal requests for 
repeat prescriptions were strongly discouraged because of the risk of selecting the wrong 
medicine from the tick list.  An exception was made for elderly and house bound patients 
where it would be difficult for them to request repeat prescriptions in other ways.  Written 
requests could be submitted via a tick list, a written list, email, or fax.  The safest method of 
requesting repeat prescriptions was considered to be via the online request linked to the e-
prescribing system.  
“...the problem with emails of course is that they’ve got to write it and then we’ve got 
to tick the right box whereas SystmOne does have a (...) choice for them yes, which 
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we’re trying to get more people to sign up to where they can actually just tick on their 
own screen the one they want.” [FG4-GP2] 
Repeat prescription requests were also received from pharmacies and nursing homes.  
Nursing home requests arrived in large batches which would allow practices to plan their 
staffing around this additional workload.  Requests from some pharmacies had raised 
concerns in one practice, because they had:  
“picked up [some] in the last couple of weeks where the pharmacist has literally just 
ticked everything that’s on their repeat and it may be a sheet that the pharmacist has 
had from an old prescription request and the pharmacist hasn’t checked with the 
patient what he actually needs” [PR6-GP2].  
In response, they had extended the prescription clerk’s role to “phone the patients and [ask] 
have you actually requested these” [PR6-GP2].  This GP felt that “there’s no reason why we 
can’t extend [the prescription clerk’s role] to say something like warfarin.” [PR6-GP2]. 
9.5.4 Managing requests for unauthorised items 
All requests for repeat items were screened by either reception staff or dispensing staff 
(depending on the practice) to check whether they were currently authorised for repeat 
prescribing.  Unauthorised prescription requests included requesting prescriptions too soon 
(suggesting overuse of medicines), not frequently enough (suggesting underuse), medicines 
not included on the repeat list, medicines started in hospital, or medicines which had past 
their review date. All staff who managed repeat requests received informal training on how to 
manage repeat requests (this involved shadowing an experienced member of staff and then 
being supervised for a period of time).  
One GP managed all requests for unauthorised items in his practice; in the remaining 
practices, requests were sent to the GP responsible for the patient.  Requests for 
unauthorised items were highlighted in different ways.  In some practices, requests were 
highlighted with either a coloured disc or a note attached to the request.  In one practice, 
EMIS practice notes were used to communicate unauthorised requests to GPs.  This had 
two benefits: there was a clear audit trail linked to the patients’ record for each unauthorised 
request and, because EMIS practice notes were linked to the patients’ record, GPs were:  
“more likely to go into the notes and see what it is. You know, when they last had it 
and whether or not. (...) I mean that was why that was done but because it’s on there 
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you’re also more likely I think to pull their history up so that you get a clearer idea 
than just scribbling ‘yes’ on this bit of paper that then goes back” [PR2-GP3]. 
In one of the dispensing practices, the repeat prescribing system was managed by the 
dispensary staff.  The dispensers were given extensive responsibility for managing 
unauthorised repeat prescription requests and described a number of “grey” areas where 
they believed they might be allowed to issue unauthorised requests, these included items 
started in hospital, requested by district nurses or community matrons, or where directions 
had been changed in earlier consultations.  For patients who requested items started in 
hospital, which were not yet entered on their repeat list, the dispensers checked whether the 
practice had received a letter.  If there was no letter, patients were asked to bring their 
medicines to the surgery.  It was unclear whether the dispensers then changed the 
prescription record, or passed the information onto the GP.  If patients requested a change 
to the directions on their repeat medicines, dispensers checked the medical record for a 
written record of the change.  If a change was found, the prescription record was amended 
and the printed prescription was sent to the GP (with an explanatory note attached) for 
signing.  At this stage, the GP could decide whether the change in prescription was 
acceptable. In some cases district nurses or the community matron would request sip feeds 
or dressings.  The dispensers believed they were able to authorise these requests, without 
asking the GPs.  The GPs were, however, unaware of this practice and did not agree with it: 
“Dispenser 3: Yes. There’s a little grey around dressings, sip feeds that sort of thing 
when the district nurses will come in or community matron and ask for things.  It’s still 
a little bit grey. (...) 
GP2: Well actually for nurses requesting sip feeds you shouldn’t just do them for 
nurses you need to go through a doctor, so we’re trying to keep those down.” [FG1] 
GPs used a series of quality judgements when deciding whether to issue an unauthorised 
prescription request.  These were based on the perceived risk of the medicine, knowledge of 
the patient and their motivations for making the request, frequency of use, potential for 
abuse, and whether the GP was comfortable to issue the medicine without seeing the 
patient. 
Some GPs admitted that requests for unauthorised prescriptions were onerous to deal with, 
but it was important to deal with them appropriately.  One GP suggested that it would be 
helpful to have a member of staff “with a bit more time behind a desk, with a bit more 
thinking time” [FG2-GP2] dedicated to reviewing unauthorised prescription requests.  
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Another GP felt that it created an additional workload when medicines authorised for repeat 
prescribing went past their authorisation date or duration.  When patients put in prescription 
requests, and some items were no longer authorised, prescriptions would be separated from 
those for authorised medicines.  This resulted in reception staff receiving queries from 
patients who had not got all the medicines they had expected. 
9.5.5 Re-authorising repeat medicines 
Once the authorised duration of repeat prescribing or number of prescriptions had expired, 
all practices had a system for re-authorising prescriptions.  Some practices allowed 
prescription clerks to authorise one extra prescription to ensure that patients did not run out 
of medicines.  The prescription was sent to the GP for signing with a form attached 
highlighting the need for a medication review.  In other practices, no further prescriptions 
could be issued by the prescription clerk until the GP had reviewed the patient.  In one 
practice, this system caused disruption because prescription requests from individual 
patients got separated and patients did not receive their full medication supplies at the same 
time. To counter this problem, two GPs:  
“proactively try and search ahead of who’s about to run out and we authorise their 
drugs so that it’s more streamlined within reception and less likely to have a few that 
are printed off and a few that aren’t because they’ve run out and then you’re trying to 
match up” [FG2-GP2].  
This particular GP then performed a technical review of the items and re-authorised the 
prescriptions.  This ensured that patients were less likely to experience supply problems 
because their repeat prescription had expired.  This GP did not, however, have face to face 
or telephone consultations with the patients and was therefore less able to identify 
adherence problems or adverse effects from the medicines.  He was aware that technical 
reviews were not as thorough as face to face medication reviews, but believed that technical 
reviews were a better use of the resources available to him. 
In one practice the role of the prescription clerk in re-authorising repeat prescriptions was 
extended.  In another practice, the GPs were considering extending this role.  In both cases, 
in addition to issuing authorised prescriptions, the prescription clerks were expected to check 
that monitoring had been undertaken. 
9.5.6 Generating repeat prescriptions 
Responsibility for generating repeat prescriptions within the surgeries lay with support staff, 
such as prescription clerks or dispensers.  These staff collected the prescription requests 
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and ascertained which requests were on the repeat prescription list and in date.  The support 
staff were authorised to issue these prescriptions. 
Some practices had dedicated members of support staff, other practices assigned 
responsibility for generating repeat prescriptions to the reception staff on a rota basis.  One 
GP thought they “probably [had] fewer errors because [they] have a dedicated Prescribing 
Clerk who’s very used to dealing with the repeat prescription requests” [PR6-GP1].  This was 
confirmed by the practice manager who thought:  
“it makes a difference having dedicated prescription clerks. I mean we do have quite 
a few members of the team that can in a, you know, crisis situation let’s say could, 
can do prescriptions but having people that are dedicated like [Prescription Clerk 2 
and Prescription Clerk 2’s] backup, they know the patients more, they know the 
medications more...” [FG4-Prac Manager1].  
The GP, however, felt that problems could arise when the dedicated prescription clerk was 
absent, even though they had another trained member of staff as back-up.  
In one practice, in addition to generating repeat prescription, the dispensary staff also 
checked whether monitoring had been done (the computer system reminded them when 
monitoring was due).  In another practice, prescriptions for warfarin were only generated 
after the yellow warfarin book had been checked by the reception staff. 
9.5.7 Signing repeat prescriptions 
In all practices, once the repeat prescriptions were generated, they were sent to the GPs to 
be signed. Systems for managing how prescriptions were signed differed between practices 
and individual GPs.  In ‘Practice 14’, GP2 had “a policy of not signing a prescription unless 
I’m in front of a computer and looking through, especially with repeat prescriptions because 
patients request them and then we just issue them” [PR14-GP2].  In contrast, GP3 in 
‘Practice 14’ felt that “...people just haven’t got enough time to look at prescriptions before 
they sign them and they’re repeats...” [PR14-GP3].  This sentiment was echoed by GP2 in 
‘Practice 2’ who felt that it was not possible to check all repeats carefully every time they 
were signed.  In another practice, one GP was responsible for signing repeat prescriptions; 
he signed them in small batches between patients or in the gaps created when patients did 
not attend appointments.  This helped him “concentrate on them individually” [FG5-GP2]. 
Another practice differentiated between routine repeat prescriptions, and those with queries.  
Authorised prescriptions were put in a box and GPs “grab a handful and sign” [PR4-GP2] 
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when they have a chance.  Unauthorised prescriptions were “put into individual doctor’s 
boxes” [PR4-GP2] which highlighted that they needed careful consideration. 
9.5.8 Issuing repeat prescriptions  
Once the repeat prescription has been signed it must be transferred to a pharmacy for 
dispensing.  Most practices reported a system for issuing prescriptions to patients.  Some 
practices documented which pharmacy patients preferred their prescriptions to be sent to 
(this allowed patients to collect the dispensed prescription direct from the pharmacy).  One 
practice had a policy of not posting prescriptions back to patients because “whatever the 
reasons are sometimes [patients] don’t get their prescriptions posted back in time.  So that 
either they’ve run out of it, don’t have medication or various things happen or the post 
doesn’t get there at all and we get so much of hassle with it...” [FG5-GP2].  This practice 
aimed to produce repeat prescriptions within 24 hours of receiving requests.  Other practices 
were also concerned about prescriptions going missing.  To counter this one practice 
recorded the destination of prescriptions issued, including uncollected, faxed, and posted 
prescriptions, prescriptions collected by pharmacy staff and prescriptions for Ritalin so that 
they “know basically where each one’s gone” [FG4-Prac Manager 1]. 
9.6 Monitoring patients 
Monitoring is important for patients who have been recently started on medicines, such as 
statins, and for all patients who are on repeat prescriptions.  Monitoring involves reviewing 
the effectiveness of medicines through medication reviews in addition to performing tests 
and reviewing results.  Participants in the focus groups and interviews identified a broad 
range of defensive strategies to maintain the safety of monitoring.  These are summarised in 
Table 32 and described in more detail further below. 
9.6.1 Select monitoring interval 
Monitoring intervals varied depending on whether it was for a new medicine or a chronic 
disease.  In general, most GPs aimed to review patients four weeks after starting a new 
medicine.  One GP reviewed patients two weeks after starting diclofenac, and another 
reviewed patients with hypercholesterolaemia or hypertension after four to six weeks. 
Patients with stable chronic diseases were reviewed six monthly in most practices, but in 
one practice the GPs preferred to see their patients monthly. In other practices patients aged 
over 75 years with chronic diseases were seen every two months. 
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9.6.2 Identify patients who need monitoring or medication review 
All practices had systems in place to identify patients who needed monitoring or a 
medication review.  Systems varied between practices. In ‘Practice 4’, GP2 authorised 
“meds for the appropriate amount of time, so if I want to see them in three months for anti-
depressants I would give them a three month review date I wouldn’t just let it go on.”  In one 
practice, when repeat prescriptions expired, the dispenser’s saw “a red highlighted date” 
[FG1-Dispenser 3] alerting to the need for monitoring.  The dispenser’s were expected to 
“check before they print [methotrexate prescriptions] that [patients] have had the blood test 
done” [FG1-GP2]. 
In another practice patients were recalled for review after two or three prescriptions had 
been issued. Practice receptionists were also responsible for identifying patients needing 
monitoring.  In one practice the receptionists had “a list of chronic disease management and 
what is required, to a six month and a twelve month review, which is in reception and the 
review date of the medication corresponds with that so when the review date for medication 
comes up [the receptionists] know that they’ve got to book an appointment for a blood 
pressure and a U&E or whatever.  And the receptionists do that and then, yes.” [FG2-
Nurse1]  In another practice, the dispensers were responsible for highlighting patients that 
needed monitoring.  They were reminded by a “big message on the message screen at the 
bottom of the repeat prescribing there’s a message, when the next one is due” [FG1-
Dispenser1]. 
In other practices reminders for monitoring were not linked to the repeat prescribing system.  
Instead, screen alerts were used to remind practice staff that monitoring was due.  This was 
useful when multiple healthcare professionals were caring for a patient because they would 
all be alerted to the need for monitoring.  In one practice the GP entered a date when 
monitoring was next due and the computer raised an alert when that date was reached.  
Screen alerts were also used to highlight the need for three monthly monitoring with 
methotrexate and warfarin.  Similarly, another practice ran a chronic disease clinic where the 
practice nurse used reminders to alert to the need for monitoring.  Disease management 
templates, where the date of the last test was recorded, were also used to highlight the need 
for monitoring.  However, relying on chronic disease clinics or lists to identify patients 
requiring monitoring means that patients that don’t meet the criteria for these chronic 
diseases may fall through the net. 
“GP1: He would not have fulfilled the criteria to come to our regular Long Term 
Condition clinics. However having said that I normally do an annual audit on folk on 
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non-steroidals and look at their renal function so that does get done and I personally 
do that audit every year. 
Interviewer: Do you do that on all the patients or just on... 
GP1: Yes we do it on them all. And he hasn’t had his renal function checked for 
some time and I would agree that we probably do need to tighten that up.” [PR7] 
Audits of the prescribing system can help to identify patients needing monitoring although, 
as the above example shows, patients can still be overlooked.  Likewise, audits of 
prescribing systems were not able to identify patients who were underusing their medicines.  
Despite this, audits can be useful for creating patient registers to ensure that monitoring is 
completed.  In training practices, these audits were usually completed by GP registrars as 
part of their training. 
Screen alerts were used in one practice to remind staff of the need for a medication review.  
However, if the alert was not put on the patient’s record, the review would be missed.  One 
practice linked medication review dates to the month of the patient’s birthday and six months 
later.  This ensured that medication reviews were spread evenly across the year, and not 
linked to a chronic disease list. 
Some GPs believed that patients should also take some responsibility for being monitored.  
If patients were reluctant to attend monitoring appointments then GPs could encourage them 
by insisting that patients attend an appointment to get their prescription, rather than continue 
to collect repeat prescriptions. 
9.6.3 Call patient for monitoring or medication review 
All practices had systems in place to encourage patients to attend monitoring.  In practices 
where monitoring was linked to the repeat prescribing interval, patients were encouraged to 
attend appointments by alerting to the need for monitoring on the repeat prescription form, 
reducing the duration of supply on each prescription and writing to patients if they did not 
attend, and then taking the medicine off the repeat list if they still did not attend.  Finally, in 
worst case scenarios, GPs would refuse to supply medicines until patients had their 
monitoring completed. 
“GP1: ...the message goes there on the side of their repeat prescriptions saying ‘You 
are due to have a medication review please make an appointment in the next few 
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weeks’. So then on the computer if they don’t do that then that goes down as another 
failed time and then is it 2 or 3 strikes? 
Dispenser 3: Well then we send them a letter that says you need to come in or else 
and then if the worst comes to the worst... 
GP1: And then you’ve got, if they don’t respond you drop it down to weeklies.” 
[FG1] 
In one practice, when GPs started new prescriptions which required monitoring, patients’ 
were given a blood test form and told when to return for monitoring.  This, however, relied on 
patients understanding and recalling the instruction. In one case where a patient was started 
on a diuretic, the patient had their blood tested on the day the prescription was supplied, 
rather than two weeks later.  This led to the test results being misinterpreted: 
“...I normally tend to give people a U&E form when I start them on a diuretic and say 
‘You need to have this done in two weeks time’ and then there was lots of 
miscommunication between the hospital at that point as well with his anti-coagulation 
so I think it was sorting that out and sorting out his abnormal LFTs and his liver 
ultrasound and stuff like that and so whether he took it straight to the desk and got 
bled the same day, which might have happened if he was seen on the 12th and he 
had his bloods done on the 12th but how he didn’t get another one after that.”[PR3-
GP2] 
One GP noted that, following a period of leave, some of the more challenging patients she 
had passed on to more junior members of staff had not been sorted out.  She felt that in 
future she would only transfer care for complex or challenging patients to senior GPs who 
would be able to take full responsibility for their management. 
9.6.4 Medication reviews 
Medication reviews were considered to be particularly problematic in a number of practices.  
Patients often didn’t understand their importance and they were slotted onto the end of 
appointments because patients would finish the consultation with “by the way can you do my 
review?” [PR3-GP1] GPs did not feel they could refuse to supply the medication, so instead 
they performed a lower standard of review to ensure continuity of supply.  This meant that 
problems were missed.  This problem was particularly exacerbated in complex patients 
where problems were thought to be even more likely to be missed: 
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“GP: And I probably, for the medication review, it’s interesting isn’t it because when 
you do the medication review in the 10 minutes if she comes and presents you with a 
whole battery of symptomology and says, ‘Oh by the way can you do my review?’ 
And you’re 9 minutes 59 seconds or in her case 19 59 seconds, what do you do? 
You can say clear off,... 
Interviewer: So she comes for her medication review but it’s filled up with other 
issues. 
GP: It’s filled up with other clutter. If you tell her to clear off and come back but also 
the way we run the system we actually don’t, we don’t issue prescriptions for people 
who go overdue on their review so you’re left backed into a corner to do a review 
quickly, and probably inadequately as you’ve seen.” [PR3-GP1]. 
As noted earlier, one GP partially solved this problem by proactively identifying patients 
whose repeat prescriptions were due to run out.  He did not, however, perform face-to-face 
medication reviews.  Instead, he performed a technical review with the patient’s medical 
record only.  Although useful for identifying overdue monitoring, he was unlikely to identify 
wrong instructions on medicines, underuse or adverse effects.  The GP, however, perceived 
this method to be a better use of his time and allowed him to plan his medication reviews 
into quiet periods in the surgery and perform them on a rolling basis.  This GP did not seem 
to value medication reviews highly.  He believed that it was important to get prescriptions 
right the first time because medication reviews were not effective at identifying all prescribing 
problems.  He also did not feel it was possible to use double appointments to review 
complex patients: 
“Yes I would love to be able to say we’ll make a 20 minute appointment, give me 
more time to actually go through this thing but we just cannot physically do that, it 
would just be impossible. And we’ve talked about this as a practice because there 
were certain parts of the practice where some people do take double appointments 
and we’re saying, ‘I’m sorry guys, I know you’ve got complex patients, we’ve all got 
complex patients but, you know, this is how we all do it. And this is how we should all 
do it’. Can’t fill up a morning surgery with double appointments just because you’ve 
got to do medication reviews.” [Pr2-GP1] 
In some practices the responsibility for medication reviews was split between practitioners. 
In one practice a healthcare assistant had a face to face discussion with the patient about 
their medicines.  The GP then reviewed the healthcare assistant’s notes with the test results.  
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This process, whereby tests were conducted a week before the medication review, was 
considered desirable by another GP.  In another practice, patients were reviewed by disease 
and therefore did not receive a holistic review.  If some of the patient’s medicines were not 
reviewed, then the patient had a further appointment with their GP to complete their review.  
This was considered inefficient for both the patient and the practice.  Similarly, where 
patients were reviewed according to disease templates, medicines could be missed if they 
were not included on the template: 
“GP1: Or they’d come in for a blood pressure and then they’d come in and our Health 
Care Assistant or the nurses would then send it through to us for a medication 
review, so this is your information, do the review. 
GP2: So they may have had a face-to-face check with somebody, one of the team 
and that there’ll have been a conversation about are your tablets all right and the 
bloods will have been taken and then we’ll get a message saying the medication 
review’s done and we’ll look at the blood pressure, we’ll look at the results, we’ll look 
at the dialogue...” [FG3]. 
One GP felt very strongly that medication reviews should only be undertaken by an 
‘autonomous practitioner’ who could take full responsibility for the patients’ care:  
“So I don’t think, this is a personal view and it is shared by some of my partners 
which is why we are moving to change it and potentially reconfigure our workforce, 
that actually  nurses who are not the full autonomous practitioner are the right way of 
doing it because for the very reasons we’ve just identified in terms of monitoring, they 
don’t know what they don’t know, their lack of knowledge of the monitoring, their lack 
of knowledge of counselling when starting patients on medications potentially and the 
initial monitoring, so for instance short term Us and Es or even 3 monthly LFTs, 
they’re not aware of that. And we’re caught on the hoof, you know, we’re given a 
problem, no time to solve it, it’s a quick signature and they slip through the net.” 
[PR3-GP1]. 
Some GPs used a combination of telephone and face-to-face appointments to increase the 
efficiency of their medication reviews.  One GP reviewed each patient’s medication list 
annually and then called the patient for a telephone or face-to-face review if he identified a 
problem.  This, however, does not allow patients to raise their own problems so is not an 
ideal system for medication review.  Another GP performed “partial medication reviews” 
[PR4-GP2] each time he saw a patient, and updated their review date based on this.  This, 
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however, did not allow for a comprehensive medication review therefore problems may have 
been missed. 
9.6.5 Review results of monitoring 
Once monitoring has been completed it is essential to have robust systems in place to 
ensure that test results are reviewed.  Some practices noted that this was a particular 
problem with warfarin where the GPs take responsibility for prescribing warfarin, but are not 
involved in dosing or monitoring patients.  In some practices, international normalised ratio 
(INR) records were incomplete.  ‘Practice 12’ addressed this by asking to see the yellow 
warfarin book before issuing a repeat prescription.  Another practice ensured that monitoring 
was undertaken by having three monthly reminders on patients’ records.  However, because 
of the incomplete INR records, they were not always able to review the results.  Incomplete 
records were the result of poor communication between anticoagulation clinics and 
practices.  The INR monitoring system relied on patients attending anticoagulation clinics 
and practices were only informed about attendance after a patient had missed an 
appointment: 
“Our system now tells you it’s 12 weeks since an INR was done, it didn’t up until very 
recently and as it’s all set up at the moment you can be issuing warfarin and have no 
idea what the patient’s INR is and no idea whether they’re turning up anywhere and 
we’re not automatically getting results through and advice that the clinics are giving.  
The patients get them, when they get their yellow book but the way we’re set up at 
the moment we don’t see that and we need to consider changing our system.” [FG4-
GP2]. 
It is clear from these data that improvements to the reporting of INR results in general 
practice are needed. 
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Table 32:  Defensive strategies which can improve the safety of patient monitoring 
Medicines 
management 
processes 
Personal strategies Practice-wide strategies IT-based strategies 
Select monitoring 
interval  
Review patients on 
new medicines after 
2 to 6 weeks 
Monitor renal function at 
least annually for 
patients taking 
medicines which 
affect renal function 
Face-to-face review with 
chronic disease 
patients at least every 
6 months! 
 
Identify patients 
who need 
monitoring  
When prescribing high 
risk medicines, 
document need for 
increased monitoring 
in patients’ notes 
 Search clinical 
records system to 
identify patients 
Programme 
computer alert 
when patients 12 
weeks post last 
INR test  
Use screen alerts 
and repeat 
prescribing dates 
to remind about 
monitoring  
Call patient for 
monitoring  
 Senior GPs should 
retain responsibility 
for complex or 
otherwise challenging 
patients  
 
Review results of 
monitoring  
 Check yellow book 
before generating 
repeat prescriptions 
for warfarin 
Schedule tests one 
week before 
medication review  
 
Amend medicines 
according to 
monitoring 
results  
Titrate medicine doses 
according to patient 
response 
  
 
9.6.6 Amend medicines according to monitoring results  
Once the test results have been reviewed, it is important to adjust medication accordingly.  
One GP felt very strongly that titrating medication was poorly performed in general practice: 
“GP: Yes. You know, like with anything. Even blood pressure medications, with 
asthma you know you can increase the puffs, you can decrease the puffs so a lot of 
people forget, all GPs they don’t stress on titration is not in their world, titration is a 
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new word for them. Only Pharmacists will know titration rates. They’re very, very poor. 
(…) But I’m very conscious about it, titration. That’s why patients don’t get better. You 
see, patient’s blood pressure is there OK? Not getting better, you have to look at 
increasing the doses, adding of more, of multiple bloods, you just keep them and oh 
not getting better, but you have to look at it, having to increase to the maximum dose. 
You know like they’re happy to, same thing all the blood should be maximum doses, 
I’m talking about maximum doses. So titration is very poor with a lot of doctors but I 
must say it. Titration is, when you start medicine you must be able to increase and 
decrease it or stabilise it. Depends upon the response you get from the patient. (…) 
Fundamental otherwise there’s no pharmacology, without titration there’s no 
pharmacology. It’s not a life-long one dose. (…) It’s not training, it’s a fundamental, 
when you’re at medical school you ought to learn titration. You’re a Pharmacist, you 
learnt Pharmacy. Titration but we forgot. When they actually come into practice they 
forget. They forget they need to titrate the medication, they forget.” [PR12-GP2] 
9.7 Amending prescriptions based on outside correspondence 
A final stage in the medicines management process is updating prescription records based 
on outside correspondence.  Such correspondence could come from specialist consultant 
clinics, hospital discharge summaries, or out of hours consultations with GPs or Accident 
and Emergency (A&E).  Effective management of this correspondence is essential for the 
safe management of patient’s medicines.  Strategies to improve the safety of managing 
outside correspondence are summarised in Table 33 and described in more detail further 
below. 
9.7.1 Receive correspondence  
Practices reported receiving correspondence in both paper and electronic formats.  
Electronic or type-written letters were considered more legible and easier to understand than 
handwritten correspondence.  Handwritten discharge letters had caused particular problems:  
“The positive thing is [the discharge summary] is now typed, we used to have lots of 
problems with legibility a few years ago.” [FG4-GP3] 
Electronic letters were useful because they could be incorporated straight into the patient’s 
electronic medical record; however, paper copies of letters were preferred by GPs because 
they were easier to view in conjunction with the electronic medical record: 
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“Well the turnaround time for hospital letters has improved greatly, certainly for 
admissions of late and they come by and large electronically.” [PR7-GP1] 
If letters were received in paper format, they were scanned into the computer and then 
passed onto the GPs for review.  This could lead to a delay in the GPs receiving the letters.  
If letters were received in electronic format, some GPs preferred to wait for the paper copy or 
print their own to avoid having to switch between screens (which made identifying important 
details more difficult): 
“The trouble is you can’t read the letter and make the alterations on the computer at 
the same time because a) the screens aren’t big enough and it’s just you end up 
having to have the paper copy to update the computer because it’s just not possible 
to do.” [PR7-GP1] 
9.7.2 Review appropriateness of recommended changes 
Once correspondence was received, in all practices, GPs were responsible for reviewing the 
letters and identifying the recommended changes made.  GPs noted that the layout of letters 
could make identifying changes more difficult.  One GP suggested that letters should begin 
by highlighting new medicines, changes to medicines and reasons for changes.  Instead, 
some letters lost these important details in long narratives: 
“GP3: But if they realized what would make our life a bit easier, you know, what 
other changes that they made, something I said earlier and what needs to continue, 
just one line or a couple of lines would be very helpful. It’s usually up to us to look 
through the list and decipher what bits have changed 
GP2: And that crucial bit of information is actually buried in lots of other stuff and it 
actually needs to jump out at you so that everybody sees it, the most important bit 
first...” [FG4]. 
Once medicine changes were identified, GPs needed to decide whether they agreed with the 
recommended changes.  Many GPs stated that they would query recommendations where 
they perceived the harms to outweigh the benefits, or where they were uncomfortable with 
the changes.  In contrast, one GP stated that he was happy to make the suggested changes 
if they were within the consultant’s specialist area.  If he was unfamiliar with the medicine, 
then he would have a “quick look in the BNF” [PR1-GP1]. 
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One GP also felt that when hospital consultants recommended starting unusual medicines, 
they should specify how long to continue the medicine for, important side effects to monitor 
for, which tests to undertake and how often: 
“What sometimes happens, mostly unlicensed drugs when the consultant starts it, we 
don’t get the proper information because as we believe we have to take over the 
care, we’ll be prescribing those drugs in the future so as to how long do we continue, 
what side effects to look, what blood tests to follow up, those are the information still 
we lack at times, as the consultant’s letter follows after several days and sometimes it 
doesn’t.  So that is still an issue” [FG4, GP1]. 
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Table 33: Defensive strategies which can improve the safety of amending prescriptions based on outside correspondence 
Medicines management 
processes 
Personal strategy Practice-wide or hospital-based strategies IT-based strategies 
Receive correspondence    Send letters electronically 
! 
Scan paper letters for 
electronic clinical records 
! 
Avoid handwritten 
correspondence 
Review appropriateness of 
recommended changes 
Refuse to prescribe if risks outweigh 
benefits  
Give careful thought to, and take 
personal responsibility for, changes 
to prescriptions 
Assign one GP to review and annotate 
correspondence ! 
Distribute correspondence to GP 
responsible for patient 
Correspondence should highlight new 
medicines, changes to medicines and 
reasons for changes 
Requests for unusual medicines should 
state duration, key side effects, and 
monitoring requirements 
 
Patient requests amended 
prescription before 
correspondence arrives  
 Clarify prescribing change with specialist or 
medication packaging if correspondence 
not available 
Counsel patients about medicines if they 
are confused by changes 
 
Contact specialist or patient  Clarify changes with specialist if 
prescriber uncomfortable with 
prescribing decisions 
  
Amend prescription   Update prescribing records as soon as 
possible, and within 48 hours of receiving 
correspondence 
Prescription clerk/dispenser make 
annotated changes on computer 
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9.7.3 Patient requests amended prescription before correspondence arrives  
Sometimes patients request new prescriptions before the GPs have received the 
correspondence detailing the recommended changes.  In this situation, all practices would 
require confirmation of the recommended changes before a new prescription would be 
issued.  How this information was obtained varied. In some cases reception staff would ring 
the hospital to confirm the changes or request a faxed copy of the letter.  In other cases 
reception staff would ask the patients to bring in the new medicines (with the packaging) to 
verify the changes. 
In some cases patients would be confused by the changes to their medication.  In this 
situation, one GP would invite the patients to bring their medicines to an appointment where 
they could talk through the changes. 
9.7.4 Amend prescription  
Once GPs have accepted the recommended changes, the patient’s prescription record 
needs to be updated.  In some practices, GPs made changes to the prescription records 
whilst they reviewed the letters.  In other practices, the GPs annotated the letters with the 
required changes and the staff responsible for repeat prescribing made the changes on the 
prescription record on their behalf.  In one practice one GP was responsible for reviewing 
correspondence.  Sometimes this GP reviewed the letters whilst the practice manager made 
the changes on the prescribing system.  In another practice, the GPs tried to update the 
prescription record on the day the letter arrived, but if that was not possible, then within 48 
hours of receipt. 
9.8 Processes supporting medicines management 
Within each practice were a range of processes which supported the safety of medicines 
management by creating a safe culture of work.  These processes help to address 
communication issues and knowledge gaps which are important contributors to medication 
errors.  Defensive strategies which improve the contribution of significant event reporting to 
medicines safety are summarised in Table 34.  Other processes which support the safety of 
medicines management are summarised in Table 35 and described in more detail further 
below. 
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Table 34: Defensive strategies which can improve the contribution of significant event 
reporting to medication safety 
Medicines management 
processes 
Practice-wide strategies IT-based strategies 
Regular meetings and 
open, blame free 
communication 
Maintain a good safety culture 
based on open, blame-free, 
communication 
Regular multidisciplinary meetings 
to facilitate practice-wide 
discussion 
Informal discussions during “coffee-
breaks” 
 
Recording, investigating 
and reporting significant 
events 
Include medication errors in 
significant event reports 
Record significant events on a 
standard form or in a book 
Perform root cause analyses for 
serious events 
Report significant events to 
designated staff member or 
committee 
Report major significant events to 
PCT 
EMIS practice notes used 
to communicate 
prescribing errors to 
originator 
Discussing significant 
events 
Discuss significant events at regular 
multidisciplinary practice 
meetings 
Have a mechanism for cascading 
learning to staff not present at 
significant event meetings  
 
Changing practice in 
response to significant 
events 
Re-audit changes in practice to 
ensure efficacy  
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Table 35:  Defensive strategies which can improve the safety of processes which support medicines management 
Medicines management 
processes 
Personal 
strategies 
Practice-wide strategies IT-based strategies 
Staff training  Mandatory staff training 
Debrief with GP registrars 
Senior practice staff demonstrate open communication throughout 
day-to-day work 
Clinical meetings and audit presentations useful for informal training 
 
Cascading prescribing 
information 
 Appoint prescribing lead for practice to lead on protocol reviews and 
best-practice for prescribing 
Discuss guidelines at clinical meetings 
Prescribing information should highlight key messages, supported by 
evidence at bottom of document 
Do not hold meetings with “drug reps”, obtain prescribing information 
from PCT pharmacists instead 
Attend cluster/PCT wide meetings 
Review NPSA guidance at clinical meetings 
Practice notes used to alert to new 
prescribing information 
Workload planning and 
appropriate delegation 
 Longer appointment slots allow more time to see complex patients ! 
Alter clinic appointments and staffing levels for known busy periods  
Avoid handing over complex cases to junior or locum staff 
Use screen reminders to pass on 
important monitoring information 
Community pharmacy 
management of 
prescriptions 
Phone community 
pharmacist to 
check doses of 
unfamiliar 
paediatric 
medicines 
Develop close-working relationship with local community pharmacy Amend electronic prescribing record if 
accepting community pharmacist’s 
intervention on prescription 
Give community pharmacists access to 
patients’ electronic clinical records  
Practice pharmacists Face to face contact 
to maintain better 
relationships 
 Audit electronic clinical records to identify 
errors in practice patients 
Use the e-formulary to guide prescribing 
to safer alternatives and avoid similar 
drug names being adjacent in pick-lists 
Patients’ decision making  Patients can act as a defence against errors  
Managing locum staff  Use same locum agency to ensure familiarity with practice systems 
Provide induction and locum pack 
Familiarise locum with clinical record and 
e-prescribing systems 
Innovative use of clinical 
systems 
  EMIS practice notes allow patient-specific 
messages to be communicated without 
interrupting consultations 
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9.8.1 Regular meetings and open, blame free communication 
All practices held regular multidisciplinary meetings which varied in frequency from weekly to 
monthly to quarterly.  These meetings facilitated practice-wide discussion of important 
issues. Some practices had additional meetings for different staff members which fed into 
each other e.g. clinical meetings, reception meetings, and practice meetings.  Discussions 
about individual patients were rarely included in these meetings, instead these were held 
informally during coffee breaks.  ‘Practice 12’, however, included presentations about 
complex patients in their clinical meetings.  These were felt to be educational to all members 
of staff.  Staff in most practices also felt able to discuss problems informally, although one 
GP felt isolated and unable to discuss his prescribing problems.  GPs in one practice noted 
that “because of this silly walk-in system not everybody is comfortable because one person’s 
got to be doing the walk-in.” [PR15-GP3].  This meant that the GP seeing walk-in patients 
could not participate fully in the staff meetings. 
One GP commented that prescribing meetings no longer took place at a Primary Care Trust 
(PCT) level.  These meetings were also not taking place at a GP-cluster level.  The GP felt 
this had affected the dissemination of prescribing information.  Another practice reported that 
they received all their prescribing information from the PCT pharmacists because they no 
longer saw pharmaceutical representatives. 
Most practices reported having a blame free culture where staff felt able to talk freely about 
problems.  In one practice this was encouraged by the senior staff raising their problems 
within meetings in order to demonstrate to new and junior staff that this was a good thing to 
do: 
“...new people coming into the team to start with are very quiet and listen to what 
everybody else has to say and they’re seeing that the senior partner brings 
something that he’s been involved in and something that one of the nurses brings 
and actually then they get the confidence actually, well you know all these people are 
sharing their stuff so I’ll start and come out with some. It takes a while but they get 
the idea that all of us can be involved in something somewhere along the line and it’s 
good to share that.” [FG4-GP2] 
9.8.2 Reporting, investigating and recording significant events 
All but one of the practices recorded significant events and included medication errors within 
this reporting system.  The exception was a practice where the GPs preferred to discuss 
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clinical prescribing errors informally over coffee, rather than feed these issues into the 
significant event reporting: 
“If somebody’s written the wrong thing we would tend to be informal and perhaps 
have a chat over coffee about, ‘I saw this, you probably didn’t mean it, what do you 
think?’” [FG2-GP2] 
In one practice all events were reported to the senior GP, who would then report up to the 
PCT if the event was serious.  Most, however, practices did not routinely report significant 
events to the PCT.  One exception was a practice where the PCT required the practices to 
submit a certain number of significant event reports in order to earn Quality and Outcome 
Framework (QOF) points.  This practice reported that the PCT had said their significant 
events “weren’t really significant. I said, ‘Well they are to us, so we’ll do it’.” [FG4-Prac 
Manager1]. 
Few of the practices were aware of the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), 
and some confused the reporting system with the yellow card reporting system for adverse 
events.  However, one practice had reported one significant event to the NRLS.  This 
practice had a book that they routinely recorded all significant events in.  Other practices 
used a standard form for reporting. 
One practice, where GPs were not always able to attend practice meetings, sent “...each 
other practice notes on EMIS about what errors they’ve noticed…” [PR14-GP3].  This was 
considered to be “…mostly (…) a very OK kind of a way…” [PR14-GP3] to communicate 
errors to each other.  Other practices said that, if an event was serious enough, it would be 
investigated using root cause analysis.  
9.8.3 Discussing significant events 
In most practices, significant events were discussed in regular multidisciplinary meetings.  
These discussions were considered to have educational value in most practices.  In one 
practice, the branch surgeries discussed significant events independently, and the results of 
these discussions were then reported at the GP partners’ meeting.  This final presentation at 
the GP partners’ meeting was viewed as a “bit tedious” [FG1-GP2].  In another practice, it 
was noted that there was no mechanism for cascading learning points from the significant 
event meetings.  Individual significant event reports could be emailed to staff, but learning 
was impaired if you weren’t engaged in the meeting.  This was a particular problem where 
one GP had to be on duty to see walk-in patients during these meetings. 
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“It depends who’s there is one thing because increasingly the practices are open 
longer and not everyone is there at meetings and what have you and so we minute 
them and circulate the minutes but it’s often you learn it better if you’re there don’t 
you or if you’ve been involved personally. So we would, if there was a significant 
event report we might send it round as a notification which flicks up on everyone’s 
desktop for people to have a look at and think about. But we’ve got no formal system 
really” [FG2-GP2]. 
The frequency of significant event discussions varied between practices from weekly to six-
monthly.  One GP reported that his practice should have quarterly significant event 
meetings, but these had not been held for a while.  Another GP felt that there should be 
more discussion about significant events between practices within each ‘cluster’ of general 
practices. 
9.8.4 Changing practice in response to significant events 
Most practices demonstrated that they changed practice systems of working in response to 
discussions about medication-related significant events (see Table 36 for examples). One 
GP, however, noted that they did not close the audit loop by checking that the new systems 
of work had improved the safety of medicines management. 
Table 36:  Examples of changes to practice systems of working in response to 
medication-related significant events 
Practice/area Significant event Change in practice 
Area 1 500 Piriton prescribed in error Problem related to 
computerised drug dictionary – 
increased vigilance advised 
Area 1 Problem with repeat 
prescriptions going missing 
Tracking system introduced to 
record who collected repeat 
prescriptions 
Practice 2 Requests for changes to repeat 
prescriptions noted on pieces of 
paper, or in a book, which were 
subsequently lost 
Requests for changes to repeat 
prescriptions sent to GPs as 
EMIS practice notes linked to 
an individual patient’s record 
Practice 12 Patient receiving warfarin from 
practice but not attending 
anticoagulation clinic 
Yellow books checked before 
issuing prescriptions for 
warfarin 
Practice 13 Confusion over patients with 
same names 
Date of birth checked, in 
addition to patient’s name 
 
9.8.5 Staff training 
Staff training was considered important in most practices.  In one practice, however, they 
received no training about medication errors; instead staff were expected to “…get 
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[them]selves there…” [FG6-GP2].  In some practices training was perceived to involve more 
than just attending training sessions.  In one practice, the clinical meetings were designed to 
act as educational sessions for all practice staff: 
“What we do is normally, we have our clinical meetings regularly then we have review 
and all the staff in the clinic they can listen what we’re saying so if they listen they 
can understand and we are doing so many audits in the clinical areas and prescribing 
and we present the audit results and discuss them during the clinical meetings. So 
that’s education for the clinicians and the management staff as well.” [FG5-GP2] 
Training was particularly aimed at new staff and locums to ensure they were aware of the 
systems of work within the practice.  Training could include shadowing existing staff 
members, familiarisation with the computer system and reading induction packs. In addition, 
in a teaching practice, GP registrars were “debriefed after every surgery” [FG3-GP1].  This 
was “helpful” to the senior GPs as well because “if you’re up-to-date for other people you 
have to be up-to-date for yourself and, you know, registrars have sometimes got a better 
idea of what’s current in hospital than we have so they can sometimes be very useful” [FG3-
GP1].  Also, computerised interaction alerts were considered to be a useful learning tool for 
GP registrars because “they’ll take heed of every single interaction it says and come and 
mention it to you, and you can go through it” [FG4-GP3]. 
One GP felt that there was “never…any off the record, anonymised sort of error discussion 
with any professional colleagues” [PR2-GP2].  He felt such openness was essential for 
developing an open culture about error: 
“…the culture should be well they do occur, let’s have a look why they occur and we 
know it’s never going to be zero but goodness me let’s make sure we don’t make 
these big bloopers that actually hurt people.” [PR2-GP2].  
This GP felt very strongly that “some postgraduate sort of learning and analysis would be a 
huge advancement” [PR2-GP2].  Another GP had previously found the cluster-wide 
meetings helpful but now felt that “the [cluster] events where you potentially can disseminate 
good care.  I think the problem is in effect where they’re becoming business meetings and 
the educational component is being shunted to the sides.” [PR4-GP2]. 
No practices talked about formal training in using computer systems; instead, training for 
locum GPs involved “familiarising” themselves with the computer system.  There were also 
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clear examples where prescribers were not able to get the best support from the computer 
systems they used because they did not know how to use some features: 
“Interviewer: I mean with regards to the EMIS system I’ve been told there is a 
medical information 
GP3: I never use it, I don’t know how to use it (…) Sad but true!” [PR14-GP3] 
9.8.6 Cascading prescribing information 
Most practices had a process for cascading prescribing information.  Systems ranged from 
informal discussions during coffee breaks, to formal discussions at clinical meetings or email 
cascades.  Email cascades were considered problematic because of time restrictions and 
the volume of “irrelevant” emails that were received.  Some of the GPs found the public 
media, such as Radio 4 or the Daily Mail were more helpful for giving them “a heads up as to 
what horrors are waiting that morning… that’s going to be a subject for discussion during 
your surgery” [FG3-GP1].  Another practice felt that, although you could easily miss email 
alerts, important messages were sent lots of times and in different ways, so you generally 
saw them. 
One practice routinely reviewed National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
guidance in their clinical meetings, but with a focus on “cost-effectiveness” rather than 
“safety”, which was considered to be “down to the clinician” [PR6-GP4].  This practice also 
has a “prescribing lead” GP who reviews “protocols as well as cost-effectiveness and how to 
prescribe efficiently, [and] safely” [PR6-GP4].  Another practice, which had no prescribing 
lead, found it more difficult to keep abreast of new developments.  He felt that “prescribing 
could be a lot more important clinically than some of the other dross we have to trawl 
through on a daily basis. But it’s having the time to do it.” [PR1-GP1]. 
One practice relied on “Community Pharmacy and PCT Pharmacists” for prescribing 
information because they “don’t see (…) any pharmaceutical reps and things” [FG3-GP1].  
This practice was cautious about starting “anything too new” and this meant they had not 
“been caught out with many things (…) and (…) didn’t really get hammered with...” [FG3-
GP1] needing to change lots of prescriptions when new drugs were withdrawn from the 
market such as COX-II inhibitors. 
One GP felt that it would be helpful if prescribing information was more “practical, you know, 
and it’s lovely to be evidence referenced but I like that to be at the bottom where, I really 
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want a points system of do this, and this is why.” [PR4-GP2].  Another GP reported that his 
practice used EMIS practice notes to alert each other to prescribing issues, although, these 
were focussed on cost-effectiveness, rather than safety: 
“We tend, I mean we have a, you probably have seen the computer system 
encompassing messages, so if anyone comes across any issues around this drug is 
out of market, or is more costly or whatever you tend to send a message round to all 
the doctors.” [PR6-GP4] 
9.8.7 Workload planning and appropriate delegation 
This section draws together workload related themes, some of which have been described 
earlier.  Some of the increased workloads in general practice were predictable, but one GP 
felt they could adjust their staffing levels better to compensate for known busy periods: 
“There are some things you can plan for and anticipate demand and probably we 
could do more of that, so like you know after a Bank Holiday everybody wants to be 
seen so we should clear the decks and make sure everybody can be seen. We don’t 
always do that but I think we could do more of that really.” [PR7-GP2]  
Similarly, longer appointment slots could be used to see complex patients, but one GP felt 
this system was “physically…impossible” and that you “can’t fill up a morning surgery with 
double appointments just because you’ve got to do medication reviews” [PR2-GP1] 
Some GPs also had reservations about passing on complex patients to junior or locum staff.  
One practice felt so strongly about this that they would process all the nursing home 
prescriptions before the lead GP went on holiday so that this responsibility was not 
delegated to a locum: 
“Practice Manager: We always try to do the batch of nursing home prescriptions 
before they go so that then… 
GP2: …nursing home is taken out. 
Practice Manager: We don’t ask the locum to do that.” [FG5] 
This issue was also noted by a part-time GP who found that if he handed over complex 
patients to locum or more junior salaried GPs they did not want to “take responsibility, make 
[themselves] extra work etc, etc.” [PR6-GP2].  This GP believed that there was “a real risk 
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that patients get lost to follow-up if their regular doctor isn’t here all the time.” [PR6-GP2].  
His solution was to hand over patients to “the partners…because they realise how important 
things are” whereas she thought “some of the junior doctors or locums I think they’re a little 
bit, they can be a little bit slack” [PR6-GP2].  This GP also used screen messages to remind 
himself to monitor patients, but he found when he returned to work, he would be bombarded 
by messages where GPs had delegated tasks back to him. 
9.8.8 Community pharmacy management of prescriptions 
Community pharmacists were generally viewed as “quite good” [FG4-GP2] and many GPs 
were happy to take their advice, and seek their advice in some cases.  GPs were even more 
likely to listen to community pharmacists’ advice if they had a close working relationship with 
them.  Such a relationship was improved by face to face contact.  
“GP: Well the other thing that I would say that I think would be that we’ve had the 
community pharmacist come in to us and sometimes look at our prescribing and I 
think that has helped us in a way as well. 
Interviewer: OK and would that also generally improve your working relationship? 
GP: Yes. Our local pharmacist here, like the one on the same street and then if there 
are things that they’re not quite sure they easily call us and I think they know me by 
name now, on a first name basis, so he calls me and I call him sometimes and say, 
‘Oh this is what’s going on.’” [PR14-GP2] 
This relationship was, however, less likely when there were multiple pharmacies in one area: 
“…in one of our branch surgeries we’ve got a very close working relationship with the 
pharmacist who’s constantly helping us with cost-effectiveness and who’s not 
compliant with their medication and things like that and, you know, that helps so 
much but the main surgery don’t have that because people are dissipated round 
different pharmacists. So there’s advantages and disadvantages.” [FG4-GP2] 
Within the prescribing errors reviewed in the interviews, there were opportunities for 
community pharmacists to have intervened (i.e. they should have had sufficient information 
to know a prescription was in error), but if they had intervened with the prescriptions, their 
interventions would not be routinely documented on the patient’s medical record.  This could 
lead to errors being propagated to subsequent prescriptions. 
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“Yes so you mean a chemist may phone and say, ‘By the way doctor do you really 
mean to say bd?’ and then the doctor will go, ‘Oh yes, whoops, sorry’ and that won’t 
necessarily get documented as that conversation. I mean sometimes it will and 
sometimes it won’t, it depends how busy and also just how obsessed that doctor is 
about paying attention to documenting details.” [PR14-GP3] 
One GP felt that the safety of role community pharmacists would be further improved if they 
were able to access clinical records, especially where the pharmacy was based within the 
practice building.  The practice had considered making such access available but there were 
concerns about confidentiality which they were unable to overcome: 
“We raised it in a practice meeting and the feeling of the meeting was that’s probably 
going to be difficult for patients to accept.(…) So the only way that I could see was to 
make somebody an honorary member of staff but again that was uncharted territory. 
We asked at the PCT level and nobody was doing that.”[FG4-GP2] 
9.8.9 Practice pharmacists’ role in medication safety 
Two practices specified that they had input from a practice pharmacist, but only one 
pharmacist was interviewed as part of this study.  The remaining practices did not feel that 
the PCT pharmacists’ had a particular role in medication safety: 
“Well there is monitoring of what we do, we have an attached PCT advisor, there’s 
obviously an annual PCT visit.  We’ve got the Newcastle data. There’s a lot of 
involvement in broad use of prescriptions groups and classes particularly with costs, 
the PCT’s more concerned about costs I think than they are about individual errors.” 
[PR2-GP2]. 
The Practice pharmacist believed “that’s part of my job isn’t it, to find problems around 
prescribing” [FG2-PCT Pharm1] and cited many instances where she had helped improve 
the safety of prescribing within her practice.  This pharmacist reviewed patients in nursing 
homes and highlighted patients who were overdue for monitoring.  She felt there were two 
approaches to medication safety from a practice pharmacists’ perspective: “do it actively for 
the future or you can look at what’s happened in the past and usually you find the problem 
and then you audit it and fix it and then try and put a process in place for the future, which 
happens quite a lot” [FG2-PCT Pharm1].  One approach was to identify problems in 
individual patients and then audit practice records to determine whether other patients were 
also affected:  
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“...if you came across a couple of patients not prescribed calcium and vitamin D but 
are on a bisphosphonate then you kind of go OK, who else is this not happening for 
so we’ll fix the problem and then ensure that everybody’s aware it was a problem and 
it tends not to happen again.” [FG2-PCT Pharm1] 
This pharmacist used the electronic formulary embedded within the e-prescribing system to 
improve the safety of prescribing: 
“...with choosing prescribing for me its formularies are great because it makes it really 
easy to choose the correct drugs that you’re supposed to be using and it makes it 
less easy to choose those that aren’t in frequent use so even if there’s a way of, if I 
put things on the formulary only those on the formulary come above the picking list 
line so if you go below the line you know you’re looking for something less frequently 
used. Anything above the picking list line should be something that you frequently 
and commonly use therefore like you’re saying you would have enough knowledge 
and you’re not going to select the drugs that are 30 milligrams instead of 35 because 
it’s not going to be easy to find.” [FG2-PCT Pharm1] 
Another practice had had a positive experience of working with their practice pharmacist to 
improve patient safety.  In this case, the pharmacist had performed a “serious drug incidents 
audit” [FG4-GP3] which had identified two incidents.  This practice also noted how the “face 
to face” contact with the PCT pharmacist had created a “better relationship” which helped 
the practice to ask the pharmacist “more general things” [FG4-Prac Manager1]. 
9.8.10 Patients’ decision making 
Throughout the interviews there were a number of examples where patients or carers had 
identified errors and therefore acted as a defence.  GP1 in ‘Practice 1’ recalled how 
sometimes he gave the wrong prescription to patients: 
“Mostly but I have on one or two occasions there’s been something on the printer that 
I’ve not taken off and picked it up and signed it and given it to the patient and the 
patient goes, ‘That’s not me’. (Laughs) Sorry, yes, yours is the next one. So 
occasionally that does get done” [PR1-GP1]. 
In another example, the carer identified that they were being asked to alter the dose of a 
different strength of medicine during a telephone consultation: 
  
 
161 
 
“We’ve also had somebody where the patient was having amisulpiride and I thought 
she was having 25 milligrams in 5 mls and her behaviour had deteriorated and as a 
short term fix we were adjusting that and I said ‘Oh well I can do this many mls’. And 
then they rang back and said, ‘Well actually our bottle says 100 milligrams in 1 ml’. 
And I said, ‘Well I prescribed 25 milligrams in 5 mls’. So they received something 
different from the pharmacy from what I prescribed, so we fed back through to the 
pharmacy about that and we did have a report back from them. So you think you’re 
giving the right advice and actually somebody’s got something different in front of them 
and thankfully they rang back and said, ‘I don’t think we’re talking about the same 
thing’” [FG4-GP2]. 
9.8.11 Managing locum staff 
Practices which used locum GPs to cover staff absences had a number of strategies to 
maintain the safety of patient care.  One practice always used the same locum agency to 
ensure that the GPs were familiar with the systems of work within the practice.  Whilst 
another practice provided locums with an induction to the practice to allow them to 
familiarise themselves with the clinical record and e-prescribing system as well as a locum 
pack containing details of the practice protocols. 
9.8.12 Innovative use of clinical systems 
A number of practices had begun to use EMIS practice notes in innovative ways to improve 
communication across the practice. This had many benefits, including maintaining an audit 
trail for unauthorised repeat prescription requests, avoiding interrupting consultations with 
queries about patients, disseminating important prescribing data, and advising prescribers 
when they had made errors. 
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Chapter 10: Discussion 
10.1 Summary of main findings 
From a 12-month retrospective review of the records of a 2% random sample of patients 
from 15 general practices in England, prescribing or monitoring errors were detected in 
around one in 20 prescriptions; around one in eight patients were exposed to a prescribing 
or monitoring error.  The vast majority of these errors were of mild to moderate severity.  The 
following factors were associated with increased risk of prescribing or monitoring errors: 
male gender, age less than 15 years or greater than 64 years, prescription of additional 
medications, and being prescribed preparations in the following therapeutic areas: 
cardiovascular, infections, malignant disease and immunosuppression, musculoskeletal, 
eye, ENT and skin.  Prescribing or monitoring errors were not associated with the grade of 
GP or whether prescriptions were issued as acute or repeat items. 
On the basis of interviews with prescribers, focus groups with general practice staff and root 
cause analyses, a number of important error producing conditions, and defences against 
error, were identified.  Error producing conditions were associated with a wide variety of 
factors concerning the prescriber (therapeutic training, therapeutic knowledge and 
experience, knowledge of the patient, perception of risk, and physical and emotional health); 
the patient (including personality, engagement with health services, literacy and language 
issues); the team (including communication problems, interruptions, and the ‘quasi-
autonomous’ role of nurses); the working environment (high workload, time pressures and 
associated stress); the task (problems relating to repeat prescribing systems and inadequate 
blood-test monitoring); the computer (errors in selecting from pick lists, overriding alerts, 
failure to maintain accurate electronic records), and the primary-secondary care interface 
(significant problems were highlighted concerning correspondence about medications 
particularly at the time of hospital discharge). 
A wide range of defences against error were identified as being deployed in relation to the 
multiple stages of the medicines management process.  These defences include strategies 
that can be used by individual prescribers, practice wide strategies, and the effective use of 
health information technology. 
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10.2 Discussion of the methods used in the study 
This is one of the largest and most comprehensive studies to be undertaken aimed at 
identifying the prevalence, nature and causes of prescribing and monitoring errors in general 
practices.  One of the major strengths is the multifaceted nature of the study which allows for 
triangulation of the findings.  Below we highlight some of the strengths and limitations of the 
different components of the study. 
10.2.1 Systematic reviews 
We updated two systematic reviews23, 24 using standard rigorous approaches.  These 
updated reviews did not identify many new publications, reinforcing the importance of the 
current GMC-funded study. 
10.2.2 Sampling 
The 15 general practices recruited to the study were reasonably representative of English 
general practices in terms of list size (number of patients per practice), number of GPs per 
practice, age profile and points achieved in the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF).  
Compared with overall figures for England, the recruited practices were more deprived.  
Our sampling strategy allowed us to cover a range of locations (inner-city, urban, suburban 
and rural) and have both GP training practices and dispensing practices. It is possible that 
the recruited practices had relatively high levels of interest in prescribing compared with 
other practices, and a greater openness to external scrutiny of potential prescribing errors.  
We sampled the 34 face-to-face interview participants based on the errors that we had 
identified.  The sample was extremely varied in terms of gender, location of undergraduate 
medical education, and length of experience in general practice.  The majority of participants 
were GP partners with only four being salaried GPs, and one a nurse prescriber.  The 
interviews did not directly cover the views of locum GPs and GPs in training. 
The sampling for the six focus groups was very successful in terms of recruiting a wide 
variety of primary healthcare staff in each of the groups. 
10.2.3 Investigating the prevalence and nature of prescribing and monitoring 
errors 
Our study of the prevalence and nature of prescribing and monitoring errors used 
retrospective case note review, which is recognised as one of the most practical methods for 
obtaining information on errors29.  It is particularly useful in highly computerised general 
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practices, such as those used in our study, as information is easily available to help judge 
whether an error may have taken place.  For example, full details of virtually all prescriptions 
are available along with demographic details, consultation records, details of morbidities and 
previous adverse reactions, laboratory test results, and correspondence from hospitals.  
Other methods for investigating the prevalence and nature of prescribing and monitoring 
errors are available including real-time collection of information (this is a highly labour-
intensive activity, and potentially invasive for practitioners), examination of prescriptions only 
(this potentially misses out all the information available in the patient's clinical record), or 
database studies29.  Each method has strengths and limitations and may pick up different 
types of error. Nevertheless, a study comparing four methods of detecting prescribing errors 
in the hospital setting suggests that retrospective record review captures the highest 
proportion of clinically important errors30.  Our study has focused on errors associated with 
prescribing and blood test monitoring.  With more resources it would have been helpful to 
have investigated errors associated with other aspects of medicines management in primary 
care, as Barber et al were able to do in their recent study of medication errors in care homes 
in the England6. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter (Chapter 1), the prevalence of prescribing errors 
can vary between studies depending on the definitions of error that are used. As explained in 
Chapter 2 we used a definition that is practitioner derived, clinically relevant, has been 
validated, and has been used in several other studies11, 21. 
We obtained a random sample of patients from each practice and this meant that any 
problems with sampling bias were avoided. 
The pharmacists who collected data for our study all had clinical experience and were 
provided with training.  Nevertheless, it is possible that the pharmacists varied in their ability 
to detect potential prescribing and monitoring errors.  The processes we used for collecting 
data seemed to work well. 
The pharmacists were asked to identify omission errors related to failure to prescribe a drug 
for an existing clinical condition.  This was separate from their investigation of prescriptions 
issued to patients, and so the task may not have received their full attention.  Only 11 
omission errors were identified, and we suspect that this under represents the true scale of 
the problem. 
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The use of a panel to judge whether the problems identified by the pharmacists fitted with 
our error definitions meant that we were able to provide consistency in the classification of 
errors.  We have provided detailed information on the judgements that we have made (see 
Appendix 7. 
We put considerable effort into ensuring that data entry was correct by employing a 
pharmacist to check every data entry item and to make changes where necessary.  We had 
a statistician (SA) as a member of the project team and she undertook the statistical analysis 
for the study investigating the prevalence and nature of prescribing and monitoring errors. 
We used a previously validated method involving a panel of judges for assessing the 
severity of prescribing and monitoring errors26, 27, and this worked satisfactorily using data 
from primary care. 
10.2.4 Investigating how general practices incorporate medicines information 
from hospital discharge correspondence 
Our investigation of medicines reconciliation issues for patients discharged from hospital 
worked well in identifying and quantifying potential issues.  The sample was not particularly 
large, however (38 patients), and this may limit the generalisability of any conclusions that 
can be drawn from the findings.  
10.2.5 Investigating the causes of prescribing and monitoring errors and 
informal and formal safeguards to protect patients against potential harm 
In keeping with previous research undertaken in secondary care31, 32 we have successfully 
used Reason’s Accident Causation Model9 to guide the analysis, although we deliberately 
focused on error producing conditions rather than unsafe acts by individuals.  Partly this was 
out of necessity, because the time-lag between the errors identified and the interviews 
meant that it was often difficult for the prescriber to comment in detail on unsafe acts such as 
slips and lapses.  More importantly, however, it was because we felt that the identification of 
error producing conditions offered the greatest potential for generating solutions to the 
problems.  
The face-to-face interviews and focus groups generated rich data, and the use of N-Vivo 
software enabled us to map the large amounts of qualitative data to the themes that 
emerged from the analysis.  Originally, we had planned to analyse the interviews and focus 
groups separately, but it turned out that both sources of data were valuable in terms of 
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exploring the causes of error and defences aimed at preventing error.  The focus groups 
were particularly helpful in allowing us to witness interactions between members of the 
primary health care teams.  In general, these interactions were lively, respectful, and 
sufficiently challenging at times, to give us a sense that practices had a culture that allowed 
for open discussion of issues concerning medication error. 
We recognise that the data obtained from the interviews and focus groups represent the 
accounts of healthcare professionals and that these do not necessarily accord with their 
behaviour. In general, respondents seemed open in their discussions, and this is evident 
from many of the quotes we have provided in this report. Understandably, however, there 
were times when respondents appeared defensive and not willing to divulge information.  An 
example of this was a relatively new GP partner who clearly had concerns about some of the 
prescribing of his predecessor, but was not keen to expand on these concerns. 
10.2.6 Root cause analyses 
We managed to obtain useful data from the root cause analyses and these were helpful in 
triangulating with the findings from other parts of our study.  Having said this, the 
pharmacists varied in their levels of confidence in conducting root cause analyses and as a 
result we have presented only summary data in this report. 
10.3 Discussion of the findings in relation to the objectives of the 
study 
10.3.1 Updating systematic reviews 
As mentioned earlier, the updated systematic reviews did not identify many new 
publications.  A study of the prevalence, causes and potential harm associated with 
medication errors in care homes for older people is relevant to the current study because it 
used similar methods for assessing errors, and it reported a particularly high prevalence of 
errors in an elderly population with multiple morbidity6.  While the prescribing error rate by 
opportunity for error was 8.3%, almost four in ten care home residents had one or more 
prescribing errors.  There were monitoring errors in over one in six medications that required 
blood test monitoring. 
 
In contrast to our earlier systematic review24, our updated review did not show benefit from 
pharmacist interventions aimed at reducing medication related morbidity or hospital 
admissions.  Pharmacist interventions have nevertheless been shown to be effective in other 
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aspects of patient care such as using medication review to reduce drug-related problems for 
patients on repeat medication33.  
10.3.2 The prevalence and nature of prescribing and monitoring errors 
The prevalence of prescriptions with prescribing or monitoring errors found in our study was 
4.9% with fairly tight 95% confidence intervals of 4.4% - 5.4%. Around one in eight of the 
population studied were exposed to a prescribing or monitoring error during the 12 month 
data collection period. Given that we had a sample of practices and patients that was 
reasonably representative of England, we believe that these figures give a reasonable 
estimate of the likely prevalence of prescribing and monitoring errors across the country.  It 
is reassuring that the vast majority of the errors were judged to be of only minor or moderate 
severity, with one in 550 prescriptions being associated with a severe error. 
 
The prevalence of prescribing or monitoring errors was particularly high in certain groups of 
patients: it was 38% in patients aged 75 years and older receiving at least one medication; 
30.1% in patients of any age receiving 5 or more medications, and 46.5% in patients 
receiving ten or more medications. While is it expected that patients receiving more 
medications would have a higher prevalence of error, our multivariable analysis showed that 
there was an additional 16% increased risk for each medication received, over and above 
the risk associated with each item independently. Overall, these findings suggest that 
greater attention needs to be paid to the elderly and those on multiple medications to 
prevent (or detect and correct) errors. Creating more time for thorough prescription reviews 
would be one way of addressing this problem. 
We identified a wide range of types of error associated with different drugs and drug groups.  
There were, however, some patterns to the errors detected, and several of these would be 
amenable to audits to detect and correct problems.  Examples include: 
 Identifying high-risk drugs (such as oral corticosteroids) with non-specific dosage 
instructions, and correcting these 
 Identifying older people taking non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs to check 
whether the prescription is necessary and that they are receiving ulcer-healing drugs 
to protect against gastrointestinal bleed 
 Identifying prescriptions for simvastatin to ensure that these state that the drug 
should be taken at night 
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 Identifying patients taking medications that require blood test monitoring to ensure 
that monitoring is taking place at appropriate intervals; this is particularly important 
for high risk drugs such as immunosuppressants and warfarin. 
We have recently shown that a pharmacist-led intervention was effective at reducing the 
prevalence of errors in general practices that had been detected through searches of GP 
clinical computer systems34. This approach, which involved pharmacists working with 
general practices to correct the errors identified and improve safety systems, would be 
suitable for tackling some of the errors identified in the current study. 
Some of the most serious errors detected in our study related to prescribing medications that 
patients had a recorded allergy to.  Practices need to ensure that allergy alerts are activated 
for all patients with previous history of allergy; effective systems are needed to ensure that 
prescribers are aware of a history of allergy when seeing patients outside the practice. 
In addition, serious errors were detected for patients who were prescribed warfarin by GPs 
without access to the results of blood-test monitoring; in one case this led to a 93 year-old 
man continuing to receive warfarin when he had not attended the (separate) anticoagulation 
clinic for blood-test monitoring on three occasions, and did not have an INR result in his GP 
records within the previous 12 months. Almost all of the errors relating to warfarin came from 
one general practice and this highlights the importance of ensuring that all practices have 
robust procedures in place for the prescribing and monitoring of warfarin.  
Given the paucity of research into the prevalence and nature of prescribing and monitoring 
errors in general practice, it is difficult to compare the findings from our study with other 
literature.  The recent study by Barber et al6 involving care homes is probably the most 
comparable although it was based on a high-risk elderly population, while the current study 
covered a random sample across the whole population.  There were some similarities in 
terms of types of error, with incomplete information on the prescription being the commonest 
category of error in both studies. 
There were some similarities between the approach taken to identifying errors in our study 
and that used by Dornan et al in their GMC-funded study of the prevalence of prescribing 
errors in hospitals32.  Potential errors were detected by pharmacists and a validation panel 
was used to judge whether each report represented a ‘genuine prescribing error’.  The 
severity of errors was also considered.  The study from Dornan et al differed from ours in 
that the data were collected very close to the time of the prescribing act, the majority of 
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prescribers were junior doctors, and the setting was secondary care.  Dornan et al found 
prevalence of 8.4 errors per 100 medication orders32.  Dornan et al had four categories of 
seriousness: Minor, significant, serious and potentially fatal32. While these do not map 
directly onto the categories that we used - mild, moderate and severe - it is interesting that in 
both studies over 90% of errors were in the two lower severity categories. 
10.3.3 Factors associated with prescribing and monitoring errors 
Our study found some important associations with prescribing and monitoring errors at the 
patient and prescription level.  
The finding that older people were at high risk of prescribing and monitoring errors is not 
surprising, and in keeping with other studies6.  Nevertheless, this highlights the importance 
of developing better strategies for avoiding errors in older people, particularly in terms of 
judicious use of medicines and thorough prescription reviews.  
The finding that those aged up to 14 years are at higher risk of receiving an error is in 
keeping with longstanding concerns about prescribing to children in the community35.  Our 
study has highlighted particular problems relating to incorrect drug doses in children, and the 
accompanying qualitative work has shown that some GPs do not feel they have the time to 
properly check doses in relation to a child's weight.  In addition, the prescription of topical 
corticosteroids with non-specific instructions was another common problem picked up on 
children's prescriptions.  These issues need to be addressed to help protect children against 
the risk of adverse events associated with overuse of oral and topical preparations. 
The finding that men seemed to be at higher risk of prescribing and monitoring errors than 
women is surprising, as the literature suggests women are at increased risk of adverse drug 
events36. Nevertheless, while adverse drug events are associated with prescribing and 
monitoring errors, they are not synonymous and so it is possible that men and women differ 
in their susceptibility to each. This finding needs further exploration. 
The finding that larger practices (with a list size of over 10,000 patients) were associated 
with a reduced risk of error needs to be treated with some caution given the low numbers of 
practices and the upper 95% confidence interval being close to 1.  The literature gives 
conflicting findings in relation to the influence of practice size on quality and safety in general 
practice.  Nevertheless, in a stratified sample of 60 English general practices, diabetes care 
was better in larger practices37.  Also, in a secondary analysis of data from 271 general 
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practices in the Netherlands, composite scores of 8 process measures of medication safety 
were higher in practices with more than two GPs38. 
The finding that the risk of error is increased three-fold for the prescription of drugs requiring 
blood test monitoring is not surprising given the increased opportunity for error with these 
drugs.  Nevertheless, this does highlight the importance of practices ensuring that rigorous 
processes are in place for patients to receive appropriate monitoring, particularly as the most 
common underlying reason for error was failure to request monitoring. 
The finding that, compared with gastrointestinal drugs, several drug groups had substantially 
increased risk of error is of considerable importance.  The more than six-fold increased risk 
for musculoskeletal drugs and drugs use for malignant disease and immunosuppression 
suggest that these groups of drugs need to be targeted in error reduction strategies.  As 
mentioned earlier, the major problem with musculoskeletal drugs relates to high risk 
prescribing of NSAIDs.  The finding in relation to drugs used for malignant disease and 
immunosuppression needs to be treated with some caution because of the low numbers of 
prescriptions for these drugs and the wide 95% confidence intervals.  Nevertheless, errors 
were detected in relation to incorrect formulations, dosage instructions, and inadequate 
monitoring.  For such high risk drugs it is essential that robust processes are in place if 
prescribing and monitoring is to be undertaken in general practices. 
It is worth mentioning some of the factors that were not associated with differences in the 
prevalence of prescribing and monitoring errors.  Grade (or type) of GP did not emerge as a 
significant factor, although the clear majority of prescribers were GP partners.  Also, there 
was no difference between acute and repeat prescriptions in risk of error.  This is an 
interesting finding given concerns that have been raised about repeat prescribing33.  It 
suggests that problems detected on repeat prescriptions may not be strongly related to the 
fact that they are repeats, but instead to the global problem of prescribing errors in general 
practices.  Nevertheless, if repeat prescribing systems - with robust medication review - were 
more effective, one might expect lower error rates for drugs on repeat. 
10.3.4 Incorporation of information from hospital discharge prescriptions 
Although we had only a small sample of cases involving medicines reconciliation at hospital 
discharge the findings are potentially important because they back up previous research39  
highlighting the major risks to patients at the interface between primary and secondary care.  
Explanations for some of the difficulties that GPs face when dealing with hospital discharge 
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medications were highlighted in our qualitative studies, and some thoughtful solutions were 
proposed.  In particular, GPs highlighted the need for the wording of hospital 
correspondence to be clear and accurate with any medication changes clearly highlighted. 
10.3.5 The causes of prescribing and monitoring errors 
Our qualitative studies have generated a wealth of useful information on error producing 
conditions associated with prescribing and monitoring errors.  Some key issues are 
discussed below. 
Training and continuing education for GPs 
GPs commented on the lack of formal training and ongoing education with respect to 
therapeutics and safe prescribing.  It would seem that there is relatively little emphasis on 
these topics in vocational training schemes and newly qualified GPs struggle to make the 
transition to becoming a partner or salaried GP because of the need to take increasing 
responsibility for patients with long-term conditions and complex medication needs.  
Our study would suggest there is a need for increased emphasis on therapeutics and safe 
prescribing as part of GP training. Management of prescribing for complex patients needs to 
be included in this. If the length of GP training in the UK were to be extended, this would 
allow for more time to address safe and effective prescribing and medicines management. 
There is also clearly scope for paying greater attention to safe prescribing and medicines 
management in continuing professional development for GPs. Options include educational 
packages addressing key safety concerns, the use of audits to identify and correct errors 
and the continued use of significant event auditing. Encouraging GPs to focus on improving 
safety systems within their practices would also be valuable. 
Knowing the patient, and the problem of medication review 
While some GPs suggested that knowing their patients well was helpful in terms of 
medication safety, others commented on the risk of becoming blasé and not properly 
reviewing patients to check the safety and appropriateness of their medications. This was 
evident when, as part of our study, we detected patterns of hazardous prescribing that had 
been going on for many years on repeat prescription without apparent challenge.  GPs noted 
the difficulties of conducting thorough medication reviews in some of their regular complex 
patients given that this was normally done as part of a consultation, and simply dealing with 
the patient's agenda often took well over 10 minutes.  In these cases, there may be benefits 
  
 
172 
 
to having extended consultations for high-risk patients, or an independent health 
professional to review the patients’ repeat medications at appropriate intervals. 
Dealing with challenging patients 
When we discussed a number of prescribing and monitoring errors with GPs, they 
commented on the difficulties of dealing with patients who had strong views on what 
medicine they wished to receive (even if it was contraindicated), or who did not engage well 
with blood-test monitoring.  GPs often sought a compromise with these patients in a 
concordant manner, but often were left feeling discomfort about hazardous prescribing or 
monitoring failures.  The discomfort GPs feel in this sort of situation has been highlighted 
previously in the literature40.  Nevertheless, while respecting patients choices is important41 
some GPs need help with developing strategies to resist pressure to prescribe where the 
risks of harm are particularly high. 
GPs’ perceptions of risk 
Most of the GPs involved in the interviews and focus groups showed high levels of 
awareness of risks associated with prescribing.  These appear to have developed with 
experience in general practice and were sometimes associated with previously “run[ning] 
into trouble”.  There was one GP who recognised that he was at the ‘laissez-faire’ end of the 
spectrum when it came to being worried about prescribing, and although he expressed the 
hope that he was ‘still safe’, his expressed reliance on patients to report adverse effects of 
drugs, rather than trying to detect potential problems early, gave some cause for concern.  
Similarly, as highlighted above, we had concerns where GPs did not take responsibility for a 
situation where they were prescribing warfarin without any information on the patients’ INR.  
GPs clearly vary in their perceptions of risks associated with the use of medicines and it is 
important that high-risk attitudes are identified and challenged. This might be a role for 
general practice teams or for primary care organisations. 
Team factors 
Although we came across many good examples of effective team working in relation to 
medication safety, there were also perceived to be some problems in relation to the role of 
nurses, interruptions and in some cases professional isolation.  GPs expressed concern 
about what one called nurses’ ‘quasi-autonomous role’ in terms of assessing patients, 
issuing prescriptions and then expecting GPs to sign these without seeing the patient.  Our 
study did pick up a small number of errors associated with this practice, but it was not one of 
the highest risks that we identified.  Nevertheless, if nurses are to issue prescriptions based 
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on their own clinical assessment practices it would seem most sensible (and in line with 
current legislation) for them to be qualified as non-medical prescribers42 
Interruptions were also an issue identified by some GPs, and they talked about this in 
emotive language using words like being ‘pounced’ upon.  One of the major concerns here is 
that GPs’ thought processes can be disrupted by an interruption, meaning that they might 
make a mistake or fail to record something, with potential adverse consequences for 
patients.  We did not come across specific examples of errors caused by interruptions, but 
this was probably because of the time-lag between errors and the interviews.  It would seem 
sensible for practices to develop strategies to minimise the frequency of prescribers being 
interrupted during their clinical work.  
Workload 
High workload, time pressures and associated stress were perceived to make errors almost 
inevitable by some of the GPs in our study. The main problem seemed to be limited time in 
consultations and the fact that dealing with prescribing issues (including prescription review) 
is often squeezed into the last part of the consultation. A solution to this would be to increase 
consultation length, particularly for complex patients. However, in the context of current 
workload in general practices, several interviewees felt this would not be feasible. Therefore, 
attention does need to be paid to adjusting GP workload to levels that allow sufficient time 
for safe prescribing and medicines management. One option would be to increase the size 
of the GP workforce. Another would be to train more non-medical prescribers, particularly 
pharmacists who might be well placed to deal with complex medication regimes. 
Information technology 
It was clear from our study that GPs valued the safety features of their clinical computer 
systems, but some safety concerns were identified that have been highlighted in previous 
studies43-45 There is a need for computer system suppliers and drug database manufacturers 
to address some of these issues (such as improving design to reduce the risks of prescribers 
making mistakes when choosing from pick-lists, and increasing the availability of alerts for 
contraindicated prescribing and the need for blood-test monitoring). There is also an 
important need to ensure that general practices are able to make best use of the existing 
features of their clinical computer systems (e.g. by ensuring that important information (such 
as drug allergies) is reliably and accurately coded on the system; by attending to hazard 
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alerts, and by using existing call and recall systems to help ensure that patient received 
blood-test monitoring).  
Other studies exploring the causes of prescribing and monitoring errors 
We are not aware of many other studies that have explored in depth the causes of 
prescribing and monitoring errors in general practices.  Gaal et al undertook a qualitative 
study involving 22 GPs and seven practice nurses in the Netherlands46.  Practitioners were 
interviewed about their perceptions of patient safety.  Medication safety was seen to be the 
most important item and the following were highlighted to be of particular importance: repeat 
prescribing, the use of computerised medication monitoring systems, and dealing with 
polypharmacy.  In their study, practice nurses were seen to play an important role and GPs 
relied heavily on their knowledge and skills.  
10.3.6 Informal and formal safeguards to protect patients against potential 
harm from prescribing and monitoring errors 
Our study has identified a large number of informal and formal safeguards to protect patients 
against potential harm from prescribing and monitoring errors.  These defensive strategies 
are applied at all stages in the medicines management process, including those processes 
which support medicines management.  
The defensive strategies can be divided into three main categories: personal strategies 
which individual prescribers can choose to adopt; those that would be most effective if 
adopted at practice-level; and those which utilise the features of electronic prescribing 
systems or other forms of information technology.  These defensive strategies have been 
summarised in tables throughout Chapter 9.  
Our analysis has raised a number of important issues in relation to defences against 
prescribing and monitoring errors in UK general practice.  For example, there is great 
variation in the use of defensive strategies within individual general practices, and between 
general practices.  At present, many practices do not have a unified approach to reducing 
the risk of prescribing and monitoring errors.  This is despite many practices having open 
cultures for discussing errors in a blame free environment where learning from significant 
events is common.  In one practice, there appeared to be a ‘business-oriented’ approach to 
running the practice whereby processes were focussed on time efficiency, not prescribing 
safety.  In contrast, another practice appeared to be highly focussed on medicines safety.  
Given the large number of medication safety strategies identified in our study, it would seem 
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sensible to consider these in further detail with the aim of sharing best practice.  This might 
result in a wide range of information and practical tips being available so that practices can 
select from these to suit their needs, and the needs of their patients. 
As might be expected, when there is limited sharing of defensive strategies within and 
between practices there is no unified approach to reducing the risk of error between 
practices at a cluster or regional level.  This may be because there is little opportunity to 
share learning at a cluster or regional level.  The data presented in Chapter 9 has 
highlighted examples of good practice in terms of error defences.  Dissemination of these 
data through inter- and intra-practice training is essential to ensure the spread of best 
practice. 
Research identifying interventions which can reduce medication errors in general practice 
has, to date, focussed on pharmacist-led interventions, educational interventions, and 
interventions to reduce the risk of falls24.  Previous research exploring the underlying causes 
of medication errors in general practice has identified prescribers, pharmacists, and 
computer systems as potential defences, but has not explored in detail how processes of 
work could act as defences against medication errors47.  In contrast, our study highlights the 
importance of processes of work for maintaining medicines safety in general practice. 
Research has highlighted the importance of pharmacists in preventing medication errors in 
the hospital setting31, 32 and the recent PINCER trial has shown the benefits of pharmacist 
intervention to reduce prescribing error rates in general practices34.  Our current study, 
however, has highlighted a relative lack of involvement by community and practice 
pharmacists in preventing medication errors in general practices.  At present, community 
pharmacists are largely restricted to a reactive role in which they usually respond only when 
patients present a prescription.  Their ability to respond as an error defence is also limited by 
lack of access to clinical information about patients.  Practice pharmacists are currently more 
focussed on cost-effective prescribing than medicines safety.  As noted earlier, pharmacists 
have a potentially important role to play in medication review in primary care33, 34 and our 
study would suggest that there is considerable scope for this role to develop, particularly in 
relation to the management of complex patients on multiple medicines.  
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10.3.7 Systems that are used, or could be used, to report prescribing errors in 
general practice 
All but one of the practices involved in the study recorded significant events and included 
medication errors within this reporting system.  The exception was a practice where the GPs 
preferred to discuss clinical prescribing errors over coffee.  There was, however, little 
evidence of errors being fed back to the local primary care organisation (PCT) and we 
identified only one case of a practice reporting to the National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS) (http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/ ), with many practices not having heard of the 
system, and some confusing it with the Yellow Card reporting scheme for adverse drug 
reactions. 
These findings echo those of a Dutch study where GPs and nurses reviewed safety 
incidents only within their own practices46.  When asked, some primary care workers said 
that they would be prepared to engage with an external incident reporting system, but most 
did not see the benefits. 
It would seem, therefore, that GPs see the value of reporting significant medication-related 
events within their own practices, but may need convincing of the value of reporting these 
events more widely.  Greater publicity for the NRLS would be helpful, particularly if 
accompanied by a clear rationale for the benefits of reports from primary care. 
10.3.8 What might be unique to general practice culture that might have an 
impact on prescribing error rates and incident reporting? 
We identified a number of positive aspects of general practice culture that might be 
conducive to minimising prescribing error rates and encouraging incident reporting.  In 
contrast, we also identified some concerns.  These are discussed further below in relation to 
the dimensions of patient safety culture identified in the Manchester Patient Safety 
Framework (MaPSaF)48.  
Overall commitment to quality 
In the accounts given in the interviews and focus groups, the majority of practitioners 
seemed committed to delivering high-quality care for patients. 
Priority given to patient safety 
While there were a small number of exceptions, most of the participants in the interviews 
and focus groups expressed a high priority for patient safety. 
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Perceptions of the causes of patient safety incidents and their identification 
All of the practices involved in the study undertook analyses of prescribing safety incidents 
and seemed prepared to investigate the underlying causes of these.  
Investigating patient safety incidents 
All but one of the practices involved in the study used significant event auditing to investigate 
prescribing safety incidents.  More detailed investigations, such as root cause analyses, 
appeared to be rare. 
Organisational learning following a patient safety incident 
We identified a number of instances where, as a result of discussions around a significant 
prescribing safety event, practices made changes to policies and procedures in order to try 
and prevent that event from occurring again in the future.  Having said this, it is likely that 
there were many other cases where prescribing safety incidents were discussed without any 
definitive actions being taken. 
Communication about safety issues 
The clear majority of practices reported having an open blame-free culture for 
communicating prescribing safety issues, and this seemed to be backed up by the 
interactions we witnessed in the focus groups.  In some practices, communication was 
augmented by very strong personal relationships that had built up over years and by informal 
discussions over coffee or lunch.  One GP, however, reflected on the isolation he felt whilst 
working in his practice; this would not have been helpful in terms of allowing for open 
communication over safety issues.  We did not come across many examples of practices 
describing the use of written communication to convey information and policies regarding 
prescribing safety. 
Personnel management and safety issues 
There was relatively little discussion of personnel management and safety issues.  It was 
striking how, in some practices, the GPs struggled to enforce safety policies such as 
reducing the amounts of interruptions they had during their clinical work. 
Staff education and training about safety issues 
Apart from the use of significant event audits meetings, which many practices opened up to 
all staff, education and training about safety issues was considered important in most 
practices, particularly for new staff.  In some cases there was a strong expectation of staff 
picking things up ‘on the job’, and this echoes the findings from a recent ethnographic study 
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of repeat prescribing in general practices49.  Some practices had mechanisms for ensuring 
that locum doctors were trained in the use of the clinical computer system and informed of 
practice prescribing policies.  It was noted that GP registrars (GPs in training) had debriefing 
after every surgery which gave the opportunity for discussing prescribing safety issues 
including how to deal with computerised interaction alerts.  While many practices recognised 
the importance of being able to use all the important prescribing safety features of their 
practice computer systems, there was no discussion of formal training in the use of these 
systems.  Instead, staff were expected to ‘familiarise’ themselves with the computer system 
without formal training. 
Team working around safety issues 
There was not a strong sense of team-working around prescribing safety issues, apart from 
the use of significant event auditing.  Instead, responsibility for prescribing safety seemed 
very much located in the individual prescriber.  All practices had procedures for repeat 
prescribing and blood test monitoring, but there was not a strong sense of working as a team 
to ensure patient safety (even though teamwork was clearly used in these aspects of 
medicines management, as has been demonstrated by Swinglehurst et al in relation to 
repeat prescribing49). 
10.4 Recommendations arising from the PRACtICe Study 
A number of recommendations have emerged from this study for reducing the prevalence of 
prescribing errors in general practice and these are outlined below. 
 
A number of recommendations have emerged from this study for reducing the prevalence of 
prescribing errors in general practice and these are outlined below. 
 
1) GP training 
 
Many of the types of error identified in the PRACtICe Study could have been prevented with 
better training in safe prescribing in general practice. We recommend that the GMC discuss 
the outcomes of this research with those organisations with a remit for quality assurance 
(including other professional and systems regulators), patient safety and the provision of 
medical education and training. Where appropriate, this would include the RCGP and 
General Pharmaceutical Council. We recommend that discussions focus on ways of 
strengthening training in, and assessment of, safe prescribing and medicines management.  
Options include: 
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 Reviewing the RCGP curriculum to give greater prominence to therapeutic knowledge, 
and the skills and attitudes needed for safe prescribing 
 Development of an educational package to enable GPs in training to assess the safety of 
their prescribing (e.g. by structured examination of, and reflection on, a sample of their 
prescription items) 
 Development of an educational package to help GPs in training (and established GPs) to 
improve their knowledge and skills in undertaking structured medication reviews with the 
aim of identifying and correcting important prescribing and monitoring errors 
 Making available within the RCGP Trainee ePortfolio a facility to enable GP associates in 
training to record educational activities, audits, and reflections specifically relating to 
prescribing 
 Including in the RCGP membership examination, assessments of prescribing 
competence, such as the ability to write error-free prescriptions and to detect, and 
correct, errors when undertaking simulated medication reviews 
 Additional educational support for newly qualified GPs to help them make the transition 
to providing on-going medicines management for patients with complex long-term 
conditions. 
 
2) Continuing professional development for GPs 
 
Many of the types of error identified in the PRACtICe Study could have been prevented with 
greater attention to safe prescribing in the continuing professional development of GPs. 
Some of the recommendations made above for GP training may be relevant to established 
GPs. In addition, we recommend that the GMC discuss the outcomes of this research with 
those organisations with a remit for quality assurance (including other professional and 
systems regulators), patient safety and the provision of medical education and training. 
Where appropriate, this would include the RCGP and General Pharmaceutical Council. We 
recommend that discussions centre on the following options for continuing professional 
development: 
 
 Development of an educational package highlighting key learning points from the 
PRACtICe Study to support reflection and, where appropriate, for use in identifying GPs’ 
personal development needs 
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 Development of strategies to support GPs in dealing appropriately with high-risk 
prescribing scenarios (balancing risks, benefits, patient requests and the need to avoid 
error) 
 Development of strategies to help GPs make best use of information technology to 
support safe prescribing 
 Development of strategies for improving prescribing safety systems in general practices. 
 
3) Clinical governance 
 
Many of the types of problem identified in the PRACtICe Study could have been identified 
and corrected using appropriate clinical governance procedures, particularly in relation to 
hazardous prescribing and failure to undertake timely blood test monitoring for certain drugs. 
We recommend that the GMC discuss the outcomes of this research with those 
organisations with a remit for quality assurance (including other professional and systems 
regulators), patient safety and the provision of medical education and training. Where 
appropriate, this would include the RCGP and General Pharmaceutical Council. We 
recommend that discussions centre on promoting the following clinical governance methods 
to identify, correct and report prescribing errors: 
 
 Conducting audits using prescribing safety indicators50 and correcting problems identified 
using evidence-based approaches (such as support from pharmacists, as demonstrated 
in the PINCER trial34 
 Conducting significant event audits 
 Reporting adverse prescribing events (and near misses) through the National Reporting 
and Learning System 
 
4) Effective use of clinical computer systems 
 
General practice clinical computer systems contain a number of features aimed at improving 
the safety of prescribing. As noted above, we recommend that general practices develop 
strategies to ensure that they make best use of the safety features that are already present 
on their systems. 
 
In addition, we recommend that the GMC discuss the outcomes of this research with those 
organisations with a remit for quality assurance (including other professional and systems 
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regulators), patient safety and the provision of medical education and training. Where 
appropriate, this would include the RCGP and General Pharmaceutical Council. We 
recommend that discussions centre on whether improvements can be made in the following 
areas: 
 
 The training of GPs and practice staff so that they are able to make best use of 
prescribing safety features 
 The use of pre-specified “order sentences” to encourage prescribers to provide 
appropriate dosage instructions 
 Context-specific dosage guidance taking account of patient factors such as age and 
renal function 
 Alerts to the most common and important examples of hazardous prescribing (in addition 
to drug-drug interaction alerts which are present on all GP clinical computer systems in 
the UK) 
 Alerts to the need for blood test monitoring for certain drugs 
 
5) Improving safety systems 
 
General practices vary in the systems they use to support safe medicines management 
within the practice and at interfaces in health care (such as community pharmacy, 
community nursing, care homes and secondary care). We recommend that the GMC discuss 
the outcomes of this research with those organisations with a remit for quality assurance 
(including other professional and systems regulators), patient safety and the provision of 
medical education and training. Where appropriate, this would include the RCGP and 
General Pharmaceutical Council. Specifically, we recommend that discussions focus on the 
following proposals:  
 
 General practices review the procedures they have in place for repeat prescribing, 
medication monitoring, medication reviews and communication at interfaces in health 
care to help ensure that these are as safe as possible in the context of high workload 
and multiple competing demands on staff 
 Primary care organisations, general practices, community pharmacies and acute trusts 
take account of recommendations for managing patients’ medicines after discharge from 
hospital, such as those issued in England by the Care Quality Commission39 
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 General practices review the procedures they have in place for minimising interruptions 
to clinical staff  
 Further research is commissioned to establish the organisational policies, procedures 
and practices that help to ensure safe medicines management in primary care. 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
Prescribing or monitoring errors occurred in one in 20 prescription items and most of these 
were judged to be of mild to moderate severity; one in 550 prescription items contained a 
severe error. The risks of error were higher in young people, the elderly, males and those on 
multiple medications. Several groups of drugs were associated with higher risks of error 
including those requiring blood test monitoring, and those used for musculoskeletal problems 
and malignant disease/immunosuppression. A wide range of different types of error were 
identified with a wide range of underlying causes. The general practices involved in the study 
identified a large number of strategies for minimising the risks of error. As a result of this 
study a number of recommendations have been made in relation to GP training, continuing 
professional development, clinical governance, the effective use of clinical computers, and 
improving systems to support safe medicines management. 
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Appendix 1: Practice Information Sheet 
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Appendix 2:  Form used for collecting demographic and prescription data on patients. 
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Appendix 3:  Form used for collecting detailed information on potential medication 
errors.  
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Appendix 4:  Form used for collecting data on potential omission errors related to not 
prescribing for an existing condition 
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Appendix 5:  Form used for information on medicines reconciliation for patients with 
a hospital discharge communication. 
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Appendix 6:  Medicines requiring blood test monitoring 
 
1) Monitoring following the initiation of therapy 
Drug/drug group Monitoring on initiation 
ACE inhibitor/Angiotension-II receptor antagonists On initiation: Pre U&E and 2 weeks after 
Digoxin  Pre U&E 
Diuretics Pre U&E and 1 month after starting 
Glitazones Pre LFT 
Statins Pre LFT before starting treatment 
 
2) Monitoring of maintenance therapy 
Drug/drug group Maintenance monitoring 
ACE inhibitor/ 
Angiotension-II 
receptor antagonists 
12 monthly U&E 
Amiodarone 6 monthly TFT 
6 monthly LFT 
Azathioprine 3 monthly FBC 
Carbimazole 3 monthly TFT (6 monthly if patient been stabilised for over 1 year) 
Digoxin Digoxin level if toxicity or lack of efficacy suspected. 
Diuretics 12 monthly U&E 
Glitazone 12 monthly LFT 
Levothyroxine 12 monthly TFT 
Lithium 3 monthly lithium levels 
12 monthly TFT 
Methotrexate 3 monthly FBC 
3 monthly LFT 
6 monthly U&E 
Sulfasalazine FBC 3 monthly in 1st year 
LFT 3 monthly in 1st year 
FBC 6 monthly in 2nd year 
LFT 6 monthly in 2nd year 
No further monitoring if stable 
Theophylline Theophylline level if toxicity suspected  
Valproate 3 monthly LFT for first 6 months 
Warfarin 12 Weekly INR 
Statin 3 monthly and 12 monthly LFT in the first year following initiation 
  
  
 
200 
 
Appendix 7:  Examples of judgements made by the error judging panel on scenarios 
identified as part of the study 
Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
Helicobacter eradication 
treatment to a patient who is 
Helicobacter negative. 
Error: 
unnecessary 
drug. 
Significant increased risk of harm with no likely 
benefits from the antibiotic components of the 
treatment. 
Combined oral contraceptive pill 
left on repeat prescription after an 
alternative hormonal 
contraceptive had been given. 
Sub optimal 
prescribing: risk 
of duplication 
low. 
The panel felt that it was suboptimal 
prescribing to leave a combined oral 
contraceptive pill on repeat prescription and 
alternative hormonal contraception had been 
given. Nevertheless, the panel felt that it was 
highly unlikely that the patient would request 
this medication having been given an 
alternative hormonal contraceptive. 
Prescription of a second dose of 
the same influenza vaccine within 
one flu season (whether or not 
the patient received the second 
dose). 
Error: 
duplication. 
Significant increased risk of harm if patient 
were to receive a second dose (even if this 
was just a local reaction to the injection) 
without any benefits. 
Prescription of paracetamol when 
another paracetamol containing 
product is on the patient's repeat 
prescription (or vice-versa): both 
products prescribed at the same 
time with no warning that they 
should not be taken together. 
Error: 
duplication. 
Significant increased risk to the patient if they 
were to take the two products together. 
Prescription of paracetamol when 
another paracetamol containing 
product is on the patient's repeat 
prescription (or vice-versa): 
products not prescribed at the 
same time, e.g. >3 months 
between prescriptions, but no 
warning that the preparation 
should not be taken together. 
Assess on a 
case by case 
basis. 
The panel felt that it was difficult to produce 
case law on this scenario and so cases should 
be judged individually. 
Prescription of a drug in 
circumstances where the 
pharmacist notes that an allergy 
to that drug has been recorded, 
and the prescriber gives no 
acknowledgement/justification for 
prescribing in light of the previous 
allergy documentation. 
Error: allergy 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm. Not all 
allergy recordings represent true allergy. 
Nevertheless, at a minimum one would expect 
a prescriber to acknowledge that previous 
(potential) allergy had been recorded and to 
justify their prescription in these 
circumstances. 
Prescription of a drug that is 
contraindicated according to the 
BNF (unless a clear and 
defensible justification has been 
given by the prescriber or in 
correspondence from secondary 
Error: 
contraindication 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm. 
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Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
care). An example would be the 
prescription of combined 
hormonal contraceptives in 
patients with two or more risk 
factors for thromboembolism. 
Prescription of two oral NSAIDS 
at the same time. 
Error: 
interaction 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm, e.g. from GI 
Bleed. 
Aspirin 150 mg daily as 
secondary prevention for 
coronary heart disease. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
dose/strength 
error. 
While the panel felt that doses >75mg daily 
increased the risk of harm while not being 
likely to increase benefits, it was felt that the 
increased risks were not sufficiently high to 
label this as an error. It was also noted that 
150mg daily was a standard dose in the US. 
Calcium tablets prescribed at 
lower than the recommended 
dose. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
dose/strength 
error. 
Risk of harm (or reduction in probability of 
treatment being timely or effective) is probably 
low. Also, BNF is not very specific about 
calcium doses noting that dietary intake also 
needs to be taken into account. 
Failure to act on a suggested 
dose change from secondary 
care correspondence, where that 
dose change was aimed at either 
increasing therapeutic benefits or 
reducing risk of harm. 
Error: 
dose/strength 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm or reduced 
probability of treatment being timely and 
effective. 
Overdose of an oral medication in 
a child, e.g. clearly above that 
recommended by BNF for 
height/age, unless the medication 
has extremely low risk of harm. 
Error: 
dose/strength 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm. 
Overdosage of an oral medication 
in an adult where there is clear 
increased risk of harm (unless a 
clear and defensible justification 
has been given by the prescriber 
or in correspondence from 
secondary care). 
Error: 
dose/strength 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm. 
Overdosage of a single dose of 
an oral medication (e.g. 
sulphonylurea) where BNF 
recommends dividing the dose 
above a certain dosage level 
(unless a clear and defensible 
justification has been given by the 
prescriber or in correspondence 
from secondary care). 
Error: 
dose/strength 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm. 
Prescription of a drug with Error: Significant increased risk of harm. 
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Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
significant potential for harm at a 
dose above that recommended 
by the BNF (for a specific 
indication) e.g. Rosuvastatin 40 
mg in a patient without “severe 
hypercholesterolaemia or with 
high cardiovascular risk and 
under specialist supervision”. 
dose/strength 
error. 
Underdosing of oral antimicrobial 
agents. 
Error: 
dose/strength 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm if infection 
not treated adequately (or if infecting organism 
not fully eradicated, thus increasing the risk of 
resistant strains developing) 
Underdosing for a condition that 
is not serious and where failure to 
prescribe the recommended dose 
is unlikely to have a significant 
deleterious effect on the patient in 
terms of lack of control of 
symptoms. 
Suboptimal: 
dose/strength 
error. 
The panel felt that for non-serious symptomatic 
conditions it was not appropriate to label 
underdosing as an error because prescribers 
may have consciously used a low dose to 
avoid side-effects. 
When a patient is under the care 
of a specialist, prescription of a 
drug with significant potential for 
harm at a dose above that 
recommended, e.g. failure to 
adjust doses in response to 
correspondence from secondary 
care. 
Error: 
dose/strength 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm from 
prescribing a drug that a higher dose than that 
recommended. 
Drug not prescribed in the correct 
formulation when this might lead 
to increased risk of patient harm, 
e.g. tacrolimus and other 
medications where the BNF 
states the importance of 
prescribing the correct 
formulation. 
Error: 
formulation 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm, or reduction 
in the probability of treatment being timely or 
effective. 
Oral antibiotics prescribed at a 
frequency below that 
recommended in the BNF. 
Error: 
frequency 
error. 
Significant increased risk of harm 
(development of antibiotic resistance) or 
reduced probability of treatment being timely 
and effective (due to failure to maintain 
adequate plasma levels of antibiotic). 
Prescription of a hydrocortisone 
containing products in a child at a 
frequency higher than that 
advised by BNFC or SPC. 
Error: 
frequency 
error. 
The panel debated this at length, but with input 
from a paediatrician decided that prescribing 
hydrocortisone at a frequency greater than that 
recommended could increase the risk of harm 
to a child. 
Prescription of a topical product 
which has low potential for harm, 
e.g. antifungal, mild corticosteroid 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
frequency 
Risk of harm not significant. 
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Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
(in an adult and not on the face), 
at a frequency different to that 
recommended by the BNF. 
error. 
Bendroflumethiazide prescribed 
OD. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
timing problem. 
While thiazide diuretics should normally be 
taken in the morning, the panel did not feel 
there was a significant increased risk of harm 
from this once daily dosage instructions. 
Oral corticosteroids prescribed 
without instructions that they 
should be taken in the morning. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
timing problem. 
 
The BNF states that the suppressive action of 
a corticosteroid on cortisol secretion is least 
when it is given as a single dose in the 
morning. The panel felt that the risks of harm 
to patients from not stating that the drug should 
be taken in the morning were small in the 
majority of patients. Therefore this was 
classified as suboptimal prescribing rather than 
error. 
 
Simvastatin prescribed without 
instructions that it should be 
taken at night. 
Error: timing 
error. 
Significant reduction in the probability of 
simvastatin being effective if not taken in the 
evening/at night. 
Benzodiazepines at low dose, 
e.g. 2 mg, and small numbers of 
tablets, e.g. 10, prescribed “as 
directed” for conditions such as 
flight phobia and muscle spasm. 
Suboptimal: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel felt that in the majority of patients 
there would not be at significant increased risk 
of harm from this pattern of prescribing. 
Ear drops prescribed without 
indicating which ear they should 
be used in. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel felt that risks of harm to the patient 
would be low here as it is highly likely that the 
patient would know which ear to use the drops 
in. 
Eye drops (for non-serious 
symptomatic conditions such as 
conjunctivitis or dry eye) 
prescribed without indicating 
which eye the drop should be 
used in. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel felt that risks of harm to the patient 
would be low here as it is highly likely that the 
patient would know which eye to use the drops 
in. 
Eye drops for glaucoma 
prescribed as directed or without 
indicating which eye the drop 
should be used in. 
Prescribing 
error: 
information 
incomplete. 
Given that glaucoma is usually asymptomatic, 
and that there are serious risks to sight if 
treatment is not administered correctly, the 
panel felt that risk of harm would be 
significantly increased by not having clear 
dosage instructions. 
Eye drops containing steroids 
prescribed as directed or without 
indicating which eye the drop 
should be used in. 
Prescribing 
error: 
information 
incomplete. 
Given the risks of steroids in the eye, it is 
important to give clear instructions. 
GTN sublingual tablets/spray Suboptimal It was felt that patients will almost certainly 
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Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
prescribed “as directed”. prescribing: 
information 
incomplete. 
have been informed about how to take GTN 
sublingual tablets/spray and that these 
products come with a Patient Information 
Leaflet that gives detailed unequivocal 
instructions on how to take the medicine. 
Inhaled corticosteroid prescribed 
without clear dosage instructions, 
e.g. PRN, BD. 
Error: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel felt that given that inhaled 
corticosteroids are normally prescribed 
regularly for asthma in order to prevent 
exacerbations, there was a significant 
increased risk of harm from not having clear 
dosage instructions. 
Inhaled salbutamol prescribed 
PRN. 
Suboptimal 
.prescribing: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel felt that there was unlikely to be a 
significant increased risk of harm here because 
salbutamol inhalers come with clear dosage 
instructions on the PIL. 
Medication, with significant risk of 
harm if not taken according to 
precise dosage instructions, 
prescribed “as directed” (e.g. 
amiodarone, betablockers, 
methotrexate, n.b. warfarin not 
included). 
Error: 
information 
incomplete. 
Significant increased risk of harm if the patient 
does not know what is meant by “as directed”. 
Medication prescribed without 
stating the number of tablets to 
be taken each time, e.g. 
metformin 500 mg tablets “twice 
daily” provided that the default 
dose of one tablet/capsule each 
time would be an appropriate 
dose (n.b. very high risk drugs 
not included in this scenario). 
Suboptimal: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel felt that most community 
pharmacists and patients would interpret the 
instructions to mean one tablet to be taken at 
each dose, and that in most circumstances the 
inadequate dosage instructions would not 
present an increased risk to the patient. 
Oral corticosteroids prescribed 
“as directed” without further 
instructions. 
Error. Significant increased risk of harm if patients do 
not have clear instructions on how to take oral 
corticosteroids. 
Oral corticosteroids prescribed 
“as directed by X” (where X is 
usually a secondary care 
clinician). 
Suboptimal. The panel felt that while there was a potential 
increased risk of harm to patients, by 
specifying the patient was to follow directions 
given by another clinician it is likely that the 
patient had been given specific dosage 
instructions. 
Phosphodiesterase type-5 
inhibitors with “as directed” 
dosage instructions. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel felt the risks of harm in this situation 
were low. 
Prescription of a preparation for 
an adult that is available OTC 
and is prescribed with “as 
Sub optimal 
prescribing: 
information 
OTC preparations come with clear dosage 
instructions and so use of “as directed” is not 
likely to expose a patient to significant 
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Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
directed” dosage instructions 
(n.b. NSAIDs to be considered on 
a case-by-case basis). 
incomplete. increased risk of harm. 
Prescription of a topical product 
which has very low potential for 
harm, e.g. emollient, antifungal, 
without clear dosage instructions. 
Sub optimal 
prescribing: 
information 
incomplete. 
Risk of harm not significant. 
Prescription of a topical product 
with significant potential for harm 
if dosage instructions are 
incorrect or not clear, e.g. 
moderate-potent corticosteroid in 
a child, or potent corticosteroid in 
an adult, or products containing 
antibacterial agents (includes lack 
of information on duration of use). 
Error: 
information 
incomplete. 
Risk of harm significant. 
Prescription of oral antibiotics 
without clear dosage instructions, 
e.g. PRN. 
Error: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel felt that there was a significant 
increased risk of harm from prescribing oral 
antibiotics without clear dosage instructions, 
e.g., due to risks of harm from underdosing, 
overdosing or prolonged treatment, and 
potential problems with development of 
antibiotic resistance. 
Prescription of hormone 
replacement therapy without 
detailed dosage instructions, e.g. 
“as directed”, for preparations 
where the PIL contains clear and 
unambiguous instructions. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
information 
incomplete. 
For preparations where the PIL contains clear 
and unambiguous instructions the panel felt 
that there was not a significant increased risk 
of harm from “as directed” instructions. 
Prescription of hormone 
replacement therapy without 
detailed dosage instructions, e.g. 
“as directed”, for preparations 
where the PIL does not contain 
clear and unambiguous 
instructions. 
Error: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel felt that there was significant 
increased risk of harm from overdose if “as 
directed” instructions were given for a HRT 
preparation where the PIL did not give 
unambiguous dosage instructions. 
Prescription of the combined 
hormonal contraceptive pill/patch 
without detailed dosage 
instructions, e.g. “as directed”. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
information 
incomplete. 
It was felt to be common practice for some 
GPs to use “as directed” instructions knowing 
that patients will have been informed about 
how to take the contraceptive pill and that all 
pill packets come with a Patient Information 
Leaflet that gives detailed instructions on how 
to take the medicine. 
Sofradex eye/ear drops 
prescribed without specifying 
whether they were to be used for 
eye or ear. 
Prescribing 
error: 
information 
incomplete. 
Given dangers of inadvertent use of steroids in 
the eye the panel judged this to be an error. 
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Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
Steroid eye drops prescribed as 
directed or without indicating 
which eye the drop should be 
used in. 
Prescribing 
error: 
information 
incomplete. 
Given the dangers of topical eye drops, clear 
dosage instructions are essential. 
Strong opioids with inadequate 
dosage instructions. 
Prescribing 
Error: 
information 
incomplete. 
Given legal requirements and risks from 
overdose, the panel felt that risk of harm to the 
patient was significantly increased if dosage 
instructions were not clear. 
Topical preparation prescribed 
with dosage instructions implying 
an oral route for administration, 
e.g. take one twice daily. 
 
Suboptimal: 
information 
incomplete. 
The panel judged that while these dosage 
instructions could be misinterpreted, it is 
almost certain that a community pharmacist 
would put the correct instructions on the 
dispensing label. 
Unclear dosage instructions on a 
corticosteroid inhaler for asthma 
in a patient with poorly controlled 
asthma. 
Error: 
information 
incomplete. 
Significant increased risk of harm if the patient 
is not receiving an adequate dose. 
Varenicline starter pack with “as 
directed” instructions. 
Sub optimal 
prescribing: 
information 
incomplete. 
Instructions for use of the starter pack are 
complicated and these are clearly explained in 
the Patient Information Leaflet. The panel felt 
that it was not an error to write “as directed” as 
full and unequivocal instructions are available 
in the PIL. 
Antiepileptic treatments (modified 
release preparations) prescribed 
generically for epilepsy where 
more than one brand is available. 
Error: 
generic/brand 
name error. 
The panel felt there was a significant increased 
risk of patient harm from generic prescribing in 
these circumstances where there may be 
differences in bioavailability between brands. 
Failure to prescribe calcium and 
vitamins D to a patient who is 
receiving a bisphosphonate for 
osteoporosis or fracture 
prevention. 
Suboptimal: 
omission error. 
The panel felt that while all trials of 
bisphosphonates had included calcium and 
vitamin D, some patients may be taking 
sufficient calcium and vitamin D through OTC 
supplementation or diet. 
Prescription of an NSAID to an 
older person (>65 yrs) without an 
ulcer-healing (younger patients to 
be judged on a case-by-case 
basis). 
Omission error 
related to 
failure to 
prescribe 
concomitant 
medication. 
Significant increased risk of harm (although 
judgement required in cases at the lower risk 
end of the spectrum, e.g. occasional use of low 
dose ibuprofen in a 65-year-old with no other 
risk factors - such cases were discussed by the 
panel to reach a judgement). 
Prescription of a drug in 
circumstances where the 
pharmacist notes that a previous 
adverse drug reaction (ADR) has 
been recorded, but the details of 
that ADR have not been 
documented and the patient has 
used the drug since without 
apparent problems. 
Sub optimal 
prescribing: 
inadequate 
documentation 
in medical 
records. 
Risk of harm probably not significant given that 
patient has been taking the drug without 
apparent ill effects. 
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Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
Prescription of a drug with very 
high potential for harm (e.g. 
immunosuppressants, strong 
opioids) without documented 
evidence of an indication for the 
drug. 
Error: 
inadequate 
documentation 
in medical 
records. 
Significant increased risk of harm from 
prescribing high risk medication without a 
recorded indication. 
Prescription of any medication 
(except those with very high 
potential to cause harm) without 
documentation of the indication in 
the medical records. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
inadequate 
documentation 
in the medical 
records. 
Lack of documentation made it difficult to judge 
whether the prescription was associated with a 
significant increased risk of harm. Therefore 
sub-optimal prescribing classification used 
rather than error. 
Antihelminthics (for threadworms, 
head lice, scabies) prescribed on 
a single prescription with a 
quantity large enough to treat a 
whole family. 
Suboptimal 
prescribing: 
quantity issue. 
Even though the quantity is large, this does not 
necessarily imply an error and there is no legal 
issue unless the prescriber has explicitly 
suggested that someone other than the patient 
can use the medicine. 
Oral antibiotics prescribed with a 
quantity that is clearly below that 
normally recommended for 
successfully treating infection. 
Error: quantity 
issue. 
Significant increased risk of harm if infection 
not treated adequately (or if infecting organism 
not fully eradicated, thus increasing the risk of 
resistant strains developing) 
Prescription of a very large 
quantity (e.g. greater than six 
months) of a drug that is not high-
risk and has low potential for 
misuse. 
Suboptimal: 
quantity issue. 
The panel felt that there was probably not a 
significant increased risk of harm to patients. 
Prescription of a large quantity 
(e.g. greater than three months) 
of a drug that is either high-risk or 
has significant potential for 
misuse. 
Error: quantity 
error. 
The panel felt that there was a significant 
increased risk of harm. 
Oral terbinafine prescribed (e.g. 
for fungal nail infection) for 3-6 
months without review. 
Suboptimal: 
duration 
problem. 
The panel felt that in order to consider whether 
a prescription was still necessary, a patient 
should not go 3-6 months without a review. 
See further case below for prescribing beyond 
six months without review. 
Oral terbinafine prescribed (e.g. 
for fungal nail infection) for 
greater than six months without 
review. 
Error: duration 
error. 
Beyond 6 months without review, the panel felt 
that continuing prescribing might increase risks 
for patients when no assessment had been 
made as to whether further treatment was 
necessary. 
Not responding to a request from 
secondary care to undertake 
laboratory test monitoring where 
this request is justified in terms of 
risks from the medication the 
patient is taking. 
Error: 
monitoring not 
requested. 
Significant increased risk of harm. 
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Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
Increasing the dose of an ACE 
inhibitor/AR II antagonist without 
checking U&E within three 
weeks. 
Error: 
monitoring not 
requested. 
Increased risk of harm if adverse effects not 
picked up early. 
Dosage instructions given using 
decimals rather than words, e.g. 
0.5 tablets. 
 
Not a problem. The panel felt that while the use of decimals 
may be dangerous in some circumstances, it is 
unlikely that they would be transmitted on to 
the dispensing label having gone through a 
community pharmacy or dispensary. 
Eye drops prescribed without 
indicating how many drops to 
use. 
Not a problem. Eye drops designed so that one drop gives a 
sufficient volume; patient inadvertently using 
more than one drop are unlikely to come to 
harm as excess liquid spills out of the eye. 
Loop diuretics prescribed “twice 
daily” without stating “one to be 
taken in the morning and one at 
lunchtime”. 
Not a problem. The panel felt that while the usual twice daily 
dosage for loop diuretics was in the morning 
and at lunchtime some patients might wish to 
take the doses at different times. 
Prescription of a broad spectrum 
oral antibiotic to a woman 
receiving the combined oral 
contraceptive pill (for 
contraception) without instruction 
(on the prescription, or 
documented in the patient's 
records) that extra contraceptive 
precautions should be taken. 
Not a problem. In light of WHO and RCOG advice that risks of 
pregnancy are not increased by use of non-
enzyme inducing antibiotics, the panel judged 
this not to be a problem.   
 
Prescription of a cephalosporin to 
a patient with previously recorded 
history of penicillin allergy (but no 
evidence of anaphylaxis). 
Not a problem. Although cross sensitivity is a potential 
problem, the panel felt that it was not a 
significant risk unless the patient had 
previously had an anaphylactic reaction to 
penicillin. 
Prescription of a drug, e.g. an 
oral NSAID, at a frequency 
greater than that recommended 
in the BNF, but with the total daily 
dose no higher than the 
recommended maximum. 
Not a problem. The panel felt there was no increased risk to 
patients from this pattern of prescribing. 
Prescription of mild opioids to 
patients with mild-moderate 
COPD. 
Not a problem. The panel felt that the risk to patients was very 
low. 
Prescription of two or more 
antihypertensive drugs to a 
patient with blood pressure in the 
normal range (this also includes 
prescriptions of ACE inhibitors 
and non-potassium-sparing 
diuretics (or spironolactone in 
Not a problem. Risk of harm low and patients likely to receive 
benefit from having blood pressure in the 
normal range. 
  
 
209 
 
Scenario Judgement Rationale for judgement 
heart failure)). 
Stating oral doses in milligrams, 
e.g. “amoxicillin 125mg/5mL, 
125mg three times a day” is 
acceptable practice, as is stating 
the volume per dose, e.g. 5mL 
three times a day. 
Not a problem. Either way of stating the dose is acceptable 
practice. 
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Appendix 8: Examples of scenarios used in the questionnaire assessing the severity of prescribing and monitoring errors made by 
general practitioners  
 
Assessors were given the following instructions: Below are a number of prescribing and monitoring errors identified in a study of errors in general practice. 
We are now asking you to assess their severity. This method is a validated and reliable tool for assessing the severity of medication errors.   
 
Please could you rate these error scenarios in terms of potential clinical significance. The scale runs from zero to ten, where zero should be given to a case 
which will have no effects on the patient, and ten should be given to a case that would result in death. Mark the scale clearly by either circling the appropriate 
number or placing a mark on the scale anywhere between the numbers. Please assess the cases based on the information available, but feel free to look up 
any information you need in the BNF or elsewhere.  
 
001. 
Methotrexate 2.5mg, ten tablets weekly, prescribed to a patient in 
June 2009. Liver function tests and full blood counts have been 
done regularly (every three months), but urea and electrolytes done 
less often than 6-monthly. 
 
002. 
Furosemide 40mg prescribed to patient. Urea and electrolytes 
(U+E) were checked the same day as the treatment was started, 
but no further monitoring of U+E after two weeks. 
 
003. 
Sofradex® (dexamethasone, framycetin sulphate, gramicidin) 
prescribed to 12-year old patient with dosage instructions 'two 
drops TDS (three times a day)'. Sofradex can be used as eyedrops 
as well as eardrops, the route was not specified on the prescription. 
 
 
004. 
Letters from epilepsy review clinic state total dose of lamotrigine 
should be 375mg daily. The current dose prescribed is 175mg in 
the morning and 275mg at night, giving a total dose of 450mg daily. 
 
005. 
Simvastatin prescribed to patient to be taken daily rather than at 
night. 
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Appendix 9:  Quantitative analysis plan 
 
PRevalence And Causes of prescrIbing errors in general practiCE (PRACtICe 
study) – Analysis plan for the quantitative output of the study 
The aim of this study is to determine the prevalence and nature of prescribing errors in 
general practice. This analysis plan will describe in detail, the steps that are going to be 
taken to achieve the quantitative study objectives.  
 
Description of general practices; 
The PRACtICE study is being carried out in three Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) – one in 
Nottinghamshire, one in City and Hackney, London, and one in Luton. Information on the 
characteristics of these practices will be obtained from the practices themselves or extracted 
from online resources and summarised in tabular form. The following characteristics will be 
compared informally between the practices and the average for practices in England 
(wherever national figures are available): 
 List size (e.g. median, interquartile range) 
 Number of GPs (e.g. median, interquartile range) 
 Percentage of practice population aged ≥ 75 years (e.g. median, interquartile range) 
 Training status (percentage) 
 Deprivation using Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004 score (median and interquartile 
range) 
 QoF medicines management points (median, interquartile range) 
 QoF total points (median, interquartile range) 
Description of patients 
A 2% random sample of all patients will be obtained from each practice. For each practice 
and for the total data sample, the following characteristics will be summarised in tabular form 
and compared among practices and with figures for England (where available e.g. from 2001 
census): 
 Total number of patients in the study (and total number from each practice) 
 Percentage of patients from each practice contributing to the overall study population 
(this is to check that 2% sample obtained) 
 Age (median, IQR) 
 Age distribution (median percentage in each of the following age groups: 0-14, 15-64, 
65-74, 75 and over) 
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 Gender (percentage male/female) 
 Months registered with the practice during the 12 months of the study (median, IQR 
and total patient months) 
Description of prescribed drugs 
Information provided on prescribed drugs will be obtained from study Form 1 (prescribing 
record sheet). Drugs will be classified on the basis of British National Formulary (BNF) 
chapters and subchapters. We will calculate and present the following: 
 Total number of drugs reviewed 
 Median (and interquartile range) drugs per patient 
 Total number (and percentage) of drugs on the monitoring list 
 Total numbers (and percentages) of acute and repeat items 
 Median (and interquartile range) acute and repeat items per patient 
 The top twenty classes of drugs prescribed 
 The top twenty drugs prescribed 
 The form of the medications (numbers and percentages from the total in terms of 
tablets, capsules etc.) 
 Number of “possible prescribing errors” 
 Number and proportion of drugs with at least one “possible prescribing error” 
 “Possible prescribing error” rate per 100 drugs 
 Number of “possible monitoring errors” 
 Number and proportion of drugs with at least one “possible monitoring error” 
 “Possible monitoring error” rate per 100 drugs 
Description of types of prescribers 
The following characteristics will be summarised for the overall study population and by 
practice in tabular form: 
 Nature of prescribers (e.g. GP partner, salaried GP, locum, GP in training, non-
medical prescriber etc.) 
 Acute to repeat prescribing ratio per type of prescriber 
 Number (and percentage) of drugs per type of prescriber 
 “Possible prescription error” rate for different types of prescriber 
 “Possible monitoring error” rate for different types of prescriber 
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Description of types of errors 
The following will be determined based on data from the Forms 2s that have been completed 
by pharmacists for drugs where there has been a possible error:  
 Numbers and percentages of “possible errors” assigned to the following categories 
(for all possible errors, and those involving either acute prescriptions or repeat 
prescriptions): 
o Prescribing error 
o Monitoring error 
o Sub-optimal prescribing 
o Legal error 
o Not an error 
 The top twenty classes of drug prescribed associated with prescribing errors 
 The top twenty classes of drug prescribed associated with monitoring errors 
 The top twenty classes of drug prescribed associated with sub-optimal prescribing 
 The top twenty drugs associated with prescribing errors 
 The top twenty drugs associated with monitoring errors 
 The top twenty drugs associated with sub-optimal prescribing 
 The form of the medications (numbers and percentages from the total in terms of 
tablets, capsules etc.) associated with prescribing errors, monitoring errors and sub-
optimal prescribing 
 Numbers and percentages of each type of prescribing error (See Form 2 for 
classification) 
 Numbers and percentages of each type of monitoring error (See Form 2 for 
classification) 
 Numbers and percentages of each type of suboptimal prescribing (See Form 2 for 
classification) 
 Numbers and percentages of each type of legal error  
 Number and prevalence of different types of prescribing and monitoring errors for 
acute and repeat prescriptions. 
 For categories of error that are most common the top 10 classes of drug associated 
with these errors 
 For categories of error that are most common the top 10 drugs associated with these 
errors 
 For categories of error that are most common the numbers and percentages 
associated with each type of formulation 
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Estimation of relative risk of prescribing error in primary care 
Logistic regression techniques will be used to model the relationships between the risk of 
medication errors (a combination of prescribing errors and monitoring errors) and selected 
predictor variables and apriori confounders. The principle outcome variable will be a 
dichotomous level dependent variable of medication errors versus no medication problems 
(this, therefore, excludes the suboptimal and legal problem categories). We may also 
undertake an analysis of suboptimal prescribing versus no medication problems. Predictor 
variables that we will consider modelling will include: 
 
Patient characteristics 
 Age of patient 
 Gender of patient 
 Number of drugs per patient 
Practice and prescriber characteristics 
 The practice  
 Type of prescriber (GP partner, salaried GP, locum GP, GP in training, etc) 
 The computer system used by the practice 
 Whether the practice was involved in GP training or not 
 Whether the practice was a dispensing practice or not 
 Index of Multiple deprivation 2004 score 
 QoF points for medicines management 
 Overall QoF points 
Prescriptions characteristics 
 Type of prescription (repeat or acute) 
 Category of drug (e.g. BNF chapter) 
 Formulation of drug 
Initially, the risk of medication error will be fitted against each predictor variable and apriori 
confounder in several univariate models. Likelihood ratio tests will be used to select the most 
significant factors. A parsimonious model will then be fitted using multivariate logistic 
regression. Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for the adjusted risk of prescribing 
error will be reported in tabular form.  
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Appendix 10: Participants for face-to-face interviews letter and information sheet. 
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Appendix 11: Participants for focus group letter and information sheet 
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Appendix 12: GP and Practice Staff interview schedule 
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Appendix 13: Topic Guide for Focus Groups 
 
